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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Political and Property Rights Change in Seventeenth-Century England
By
Kara Dimitruk
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Irvine, 2018
Associate Professor Dan Bogart, Chair
The political and institutional changes in late seventeenth-century England and their role
in its subsequent development have been the subject of much debate. The focus has largely
been on constraining the executive, constitutional change, and security of property rights.
This dissertation provides novel insight to the political economic changes from 1660 to 1702
using new datasets and the tools of applied economics. It is organized as three self-contained
chapters on different dimensions of politics and property rights change of the period. All
offer more general lessons on these fundamental factors influencing economic development.
The first chapter studies the impact of conflict between the monarch and parliament on
parliament’s capacity to provide legislation that reorganized property rights to land use,
so-called estate acts, for individual landholding families. I collect a new dataset on the
population of estate bills and their legislative life-cycle from primary sources as well as create
proxies for political conflict to study the effect of conflict on bill success. I first show that
fiscal conflict caused estate bills to fail by leading the monarch to suddenly close parliament.
The conflict created a political barrier to parliament’s functioning and ability to reorganize
property rights. Second, I show that political and institutional changes with the Glorious
Revolution mitigated the effects of this conflict and in turn improved parliament’s capacity
to reorganize rights.
x
Chapter 2 focuses on property rights change by studying the economic and legal functions
of estate acts. I examine the individual clauses of a random sample of estate acts collected
from the Parliamentary Archives for the period from 1660 to 1702. I first document that
were four main types of acts that reorganized property rights for economic purposes, such as
refinancing a family’s estates (pay debts) and exploiting new opportunities made possible by
England’s growing economy. Second, I find that the composition of estate acts evolved over
time. The evolution is connected to the rise of strict settlements and the Glorious Revolution
of 1688. Last, at odds with the literature, I find estate acts had large economic benefits for
property markets and families in part because they allowed economic transactions in London
and Middlesex and were for members of the lower gentry.
The last chapter studies how the occupations and elections of Members of Parliament (MPs)
influenced their political support. I use a new panel dataset of the population of MPs elected
from 1660 to 1702 and multinomial logit models to examine the choice to support different
political parties: the Court and Opposition from 1660 to 1685 and the Tories and Whigs
from 1689 to 1702. First, the evidence for the Court and Opposition is consistent with the
monarchs’ attempt to build support in parliament through patronage with the Court and
the growing importance of elections for the Opposition during this era. Second, I provide
evidence that there was continuity and change in the occupational and electoral support
from the Court to the Tories and the Opposition to the Whigs after 1688. The evidence is
consistent with the argument that the Glorious Revolution led to a new political economic
equilibrium.
By way of a conclusion, this dissertation offers more general lessons. It provides insight to
how the Glorious Revolution improved England’s state, in particular legislative, capacity to
reorganize property rights. It also highlights the importance of this capacity to reorganize
feudal (or traditional) rights to resources as economic opportunities changed throughout the
preindustrial era. But first, our friends from Pearl Jam...
xi
Chapter 1
Political Barriers to Changing
Property Rights
1.1 Introduction
The evolution of property rights institutions is crucial for economic development. They are
at the heart of economic activity in modern societies. For example, titling agencies and deeds
registries provide records of ownership and allow land to be securely bought and sold. These
agencies help solve insecurity in ownership - moving from possession to property - but also
make it easier to transfer ownership. Other types of rights structures, such as communal or
familial-based property rights, can be secure and formal. They can, however, prevent land
from being traded or used in new ways. How to reorganize and change these types of property
rights to improve economic outcomes poses challenging questions for economists and policy
makers because it often requires the involvement of state and political actors.1 This structure
raises at least one fundamental question: how do politics influence the provision of property
1See especially Lamoreaux (2011).
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rights services and therefore economic development?
I study this question by analyzing how politics influenced the reorganization of property
rights in seventeenth-century England. Property rights to land in preindustrial England
were a problem. It was difficult to trade or use land in new ways because land use was
restricted by a family-based inheritance system and norms. Rights could not be changed
easily and could not be adjudicated in the common law system.2 Property holders, however,
could petition parliament for a so-called estate act, which would break restrictions and allow
land to be sold, leased, and mortgaged. Estate acts were also important to parliament. They
made up the single largest category of its legislative output for this period.
The lessons from this particular period in English history, from 1660 to 1702, loom large in
the economic history, political economy, and development literatures. This period is often
cited as a celebrated historical example of when a society got “good” political and property
rights institutions that in turn allowed it to become the first country to industrialize.3 There
are several hypotheses regarding why this period served as the institutional origins of the
Industrial Revolution. One argument is that the regime change improved the government’s
credibility and made property rights secure. It did so by constraining or otherwise shifting
power away from the monarch to parliament, a relatively more representative institution.4
2See Clark (1996), Epstein (2000), Hoppit (2011), Bogart and Richardson (2009, 2010, 2011), and Hodgson
(2017) for perspectives on property rights in England. While work has emphasized the importance of the
common law system for England’s economic development, England’s equity and inheritance system has been
relatively understudied by economists. For an example of work highlighting the importance of the common
law system, see Glaeser and Shleifer (2002).
3See North and Weingast (1989) for the seminal work on the Glorious Revolution’s role in improving
England’s political institutions. See also Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005a) and Besley and Ghatak
(2010) for examples of work using this period as evidence of how political and property rights institutions
influence development.
4See Epstein (2000) for a summary of the framework and Introduction in Coffman et al. (2013) for an
overview of how the literature has developed and advanced since North and Weingast (1989). Much work
has focused on how government credibility improved England’s ability to fund public debt. The literature
is extensive, with recent work focusing on how multiple types of commitment mechanisms are necessary to
make sovereign debt “relatively accessible, safe, and liquid investment vehicle” (Coffman et al. 2013: 17). I
highlight a different strand of work showing that private property rights to land in England were secure from
predation by the monarch, but that they were feudal and restrictive during this era (Clark 1996; Epstein 2000;
Hodgson 2017). The Glorious Revolution did however improve security and enforcement of property rights,
and therefore investments, for larger scale projects (Bogart 2011; Cox 2012). Regarding important political
2
The framework has been further developed and refined in light of new evidence, but still
remains incomplete especially in regards to if and how the Glorious Revolution influenced
England’s property rights regime.
I show the Glorious Revolution enhanced parliament’s operation and passage of estate acts
by mitigating the effects of political conflict in government. The political changes allowed
parliament to pass more estate acts, which released more property from restrictive insti-
tutions. This evidence supports an alternative hypothesis regarding the importance of the
Glorious Revolution in England’s development: the political changes enabled part of English
property rights institutions to be adaptable as it industrialized and urbanized.5
I construct two datasets to study politics and property rights during this period. The first is
a new dataset of the population of estate bills introduced in parliament from 1660 to 1702. I
end the analysis in 1702 because there were a series of organizational changes to the process
for passing estate bills which further streamlined and standardized its procedures.6 The
dataset contains detailed information on when parliament worked on estate bills, the types
of property holders coming to parliament, and legal types of bills. The second is a newly
constructed political dataset that allows me to study the politics of this era. It contains
information on indicators of political conflict that impacted parliament’s passage of estate
bills and other macro-political variables that could also influence how parliament legislated.
Using probit and OLS models of bill success, I first show that conflict between the monarch
and parliament created a political barrier to passing estate bills from 1660 to 1685. Specif-
ically, conflict over fiscal issues caused bills to fail. The evidence suggests conflict operated
through a specific mechanism: it led the monarch to suddenly close sessions of parliament. I
use detailed information on when parliament worked on bills (their so-called legislative life-
and constitutional changes, Cox (2012) also argues and provides evidence that the Glorious Revolution made
the monarch credibly respect parliament’s constitutional rights.
5Bogart and Richardson (2011).
6See William (1948) on standing orders and how they changed parliamentary procedure.
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cycle) to show that the effect was causal. For example, there is no evidence of an anticipation
effect (how quickly parliament passed estate bills) leading up to the closure event.
Second, I show that the Glorious Revolution mitigated the effects of this conflict. Political
conflict still occurred after 1688, but political and institutional changes with the Glorious
Revolution made the types of conflict examined here less common and sudden closures less
likely. Figure 1.1 shows the implications of mitigating this conflict. Both the average success
rate of estate bills - bills that were approved by the House of Commons, House of Lords,
and the monarch - and the number of bills introduced improved after 1688. These findings
support that the Glorious Revolution made the monarch credibly respect parliament’s con-
stitutional rights (Cox 2012). Parliament’s functioning not only improved because they were
able to pass and work on more estate bills, but it adapted to the new regime. Prior to the
Glorious Revolution, estate bills were introduced within the first fifty days of a session. After
1688, with sudden closures less likely, improved probability of bill success, and more time in
sessions, there was an evolution in bill introduction. By the end of the period of study, most
bills were introduced after the fiftieth day a session met. Improving parliament’s capacity to
work on more estate bills later in sessions may have also allowed it to to work on other types
of economic bills, for example bills changing rights regarding transportation authorities (e.g.
turnpike trusts), that were previously impossible in the high conflict, low success regime.7
This paper makes three contributions. First, it provides the most comprehensive evidence
thus far on how the Glorious Revolution was important for England’s political and economic
development. While most work has used structural break tests, I use a comprehensive and
detailed dataset on politics that spans the regime change.8 I also improve on previous
outcomes that have been used in the literature by studying a legislation that was important
7See Bogart (2011) and Bogart and Richardson (2011) for so-called statutory authority acts.
8Murrell (2017) provides a battery of structural break tests on proxies for economic activity to study
the processes of institutional change more generally. There has been less quantitative work on politics that
includes the Glorious Revolution. See, for example, Harris (1993) and Stasavage (2007).
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for economic activity and captures how well parliament operated.9 Second, the findings
inform our understanding of underlying property rights and economic problems, which is
crucial for designing and implementing appropriate policies.10 England’s legal institutions
made property rights to land relatively secure, but it had to solve how to effectively reorganize
property rights in response to new economic opportunities. Parliament’s ability to provide
legislation was a crucial aspect of this system.11 Last, this paper provides insight to how
resolving or mitigating the effects of conflict in governments can improve state capacity.12
States with the most capacity to provide public goods and services that support economic
activity modernized first in the preindustrial era.13 I provide detailed evidence on how
English parliament’s capacity transformed by mitigating conflict.
1.2 Changing Property Rights to Land: Background
and Data
1.2.1 Settlements and Estate Acts
Elizabeth Montagu, widow, petitioned parliament for an estate act in 1690 to make building
leases for 31 years for her estate in Stepney in East London. After the death of her husband,
Edward Montagu (an esquire), she did not have the legal right to make leases that would
9Work has used the evolution of interest rates or the evolution in the duration and frequency of parlia-
mentary meetings for evidence that parliament effectively constrained the executive after 1688. Clark (1996)
and Sussman and Yafeh (2006) examine interest rate and price changes. Randall (1916) details the evolution
of constitutional changes to parliamentary meetings. See also van Zanden et al. (2012) for parliamentary
meetings or activity. Work has documented that parliament’s legislative output increased dramatically after
the Glorious Revolution, but has not studied the specific reasons why this occurred. See Hoppit (1996),
Bogart and Richardson (2011), Hodgson (2017).
10See, for example, Demsetz (1967), Coase (1974), De Soto (2000), Besley and Ghatak (2010), Lamoreaux
(2011), Libecap and Lueck (2011).
11See Bogart and Richardson (2011) on parliament as an elastic or adaptable institution. See Hoppit (1996,
2011), Hodgson (2016), and Mokyr and Nye (2007) for related perspectives on parliament and property rights.
12See Besley and Persson (2011) for state capacity and development.
13See Epstein (2000), Dincecco (2011), Johnson and Koyama (2014; 2017) for historical perspectives on
state capacity as well as van Zanden et. al. (2012) for functioning parliaments.
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allow tenants to repair and maintain the buildings. She cited that, without the proper
contract, tenants were not maintaining the housing and a selection problem: the most “able
sort[s] of tenant[s]” were leaving to other places: they “have not only neglected to repaire
their Houses [...] they can have noe certeine Estate in their Houses to manage their trades
soe begin to withdraw themselves to houses in other places and doe suffer the premisses
to lye in a very ruinous condition.” The Act went on to describe a persistent effect of the
property rights:
soe that the said Elizabeth is forced to expend severall great summes of money
in repairing the same and when they are repaired the best and most able tenants
for the reasons aforesaid doe refraine to take them by reason whereof those that
are let are lett of under values and many of them remaine without tennants and
more are like to doe soe which will greatly lessen and impaire the said Widdows
Estate (Montagu Estate Act, 2&3 W&M, c. 9).
Rebuilding and construction in the area ensued after receiving the act that gave her the right
to make leases. Two new streets and squares were constructed from 1703 to 1708.14
The description in Elizabeth Montagu’s act is illustrative of the problems created by Eng-
land’s preindustrial property rights regime. Land and permanent fixtures, such as buildings
and mines, were bound by a set of inheritance institutions and norms, known as family
settlements and in particular strict settlements.15 Family settlements were contracts that
(1) ensured that a family’s estate would descend across generations and (2) provided for
extended family members. It “provided a framework, a constitution, for the family and
estates” (English and Saville 1983). To carry out these goals, the settlement would assign
stipends for family members and create an entail that specified a line of inheritance for the
estate. Settlements, depending on the type and legal status of the entail, created constraints
to using land in new ways and transferring property.
14‘The Halifax estate in Spitalfields’, in Survey of London: Volume 27, Spitalfields and Mile End New
Town, ed. F H W Sheppard (London, 1957): 237-241. British History Online http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/survey-london/vol27/pp237-241 [accessed October 2017].
15This section draws on English and Saville (1983), Bogart and Richardson (2009), and Bonfield (1983).
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Property holders decided to settle land or restrict their rights. Life tenants had to fulfill
the terms of the stewardship but had restricted powers to charge estates, make or renew
leases, sell, exchange or mortgage land after it was settled. The restrictions could ensure
that resources were not dissipated by the current life tenant and that any future life tenant
did not put other family members’ interests at risk. There was a trade off between insuring
against risk from uncertain future outcomes and flexibility to use resources in new ways in
this type of property right.16
There were a variety of ways a settlement increased costs of trading or using land in new
ways. First, life tenants or landholders could not easily convey or transfer ownership of
settled land to third parties. A buyer of settled land may not be secure in his or her title
because settlements were not public records and any remote family member with an estate
could dispute the purchase far into the future. Second, life tenants could not easily use
or improve their resources, like mines, timber, or buildings, because their powers were too
restrictive or unknown. Landholders were held liable if they carried out transactions without
the proper powers. Third, if an economic opportunity for improvement arose or there was
an interested third party to sell the land to, the rights and powers could not immediately be
changed to respond to the new opportunity: “No part of the settlement could be broken”
unless the life tenant and tenant in tail came of age (turned 21) or by Act of Parliament.17
16In preindustrial England, this type of structure and problem is also seen in land held in common. The
enclosure movements were one way of reorganizing these rights to allow for greater flexibility in land use.
See Hodgson (2017) on the evolution of feudal rights in preindustrial England and Bogart and Richardson
(2011) for how enclosure acts. This type of rights structure was common in preindustrial societies and is
still found in developing regions. For example, work has studied the implications of familial rights for land
use in Haiti’s development and tenure insecurity in Ghana. See Palsson (2016) for Haiti and Aryeetey and
Udry (2010) for Ghana.
17When the tenant in tail turned 21 the tenant in tail and his father or other life tenant used the legal
process called a common recovery to break the restrictions (English and Saville 1983: 23). A family could
wait to break restrictions at a time of re-settlement or possibly go to Chancery, but these were prohibitively
expensive alternative forums or options to change rights (Bogart and Richardson 2009: 14-16).
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Parliament provided estate acts as a service to its constituents - land and property holding
families.18 Estate acts could legally remedy any problem created by a settlement. They could
authorize transactions and help landholders convey land and use resources in new ways. It did
so by reorganizing the property rights, compensating beneficiaries, and revealing information
relevant to conveying land (Bogart and Richardson 2009). The text of the acts themselves
created clear evidence on the property rights in question that could be used in a court of
law. After a series of procedural changes beginning in 1702, the parliamentary process for
passing estate acts was streamlined and relatively inexpensive (Bogart and Richardson 2009:
19-22).19 How the parliamentary system worked from 1660 to 1702, a crucial era in English
political and economic history, however, is largely unknown. I show that politics between
the crown and parliament was a key factor influencing parliament’s work on estate bills.
1.2.2 Data: Estate Bills
I construct a new dataset on the population of estate bills introduced in parliament from
1660 to 1702. The estate bill data contains information on all of the intermediate stages of
estate bills’ passage, their so-called “legislative life-cycle,” collected from the Journals of the
House of Lords and Journals of the House of Lords.20 An estate bill had to be approved
by both the House of Commons and the House of Lords and receive the royal assent by the
18As a constituent service, they are most similar to regulatory exceptions for geographic constituencies
(Baron 1994). The bills had concentrated benefits for families, land markets, and Members of Parliament
(MPs) representing those constituencies. The bills had diffuse costs, perhaps time costs of working on the
legislation relative to more general legislative alternatives, to MPs. Historians and legal scholars have also
noted similar patterns: estate acts were “unlikely to cause broad problems [...] as Maitland put it [...] ‘A
vast majority of statutes he would class rather as privilegia than as leges’” (Hoppit 1996: 118).
19On changes in parliamentary procedure, see William (1948). Parliament served as a forum where life
tenants could respond to changing economic opportunities by the beginning of the 18th century. There is a
debate on this framework, however. See McCahill (2013) for an overview and recent evidence.
20I compiled the set of estate bills from Hoppit (1997) and Bogart and Richardson (2010). The Journals
were parliament’s official record book of both Houses’ business for a given day. For estate bills, the entries
are usually recorded as edited summaries of the intermediate stages of the legislative process. Further details
are found in Appendix Section A.1.1.
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monarch to be successful and become an Act of Parliament.21
Table 1.1 reports summary information on estate bills. From 1660 to 1702, most bills (67%)
passed the entire legislative process and became Acts of Parliament (Panel A of Table 1.1).
Estate bills could fail because they were rejected by parliament. Panel B shows parliament
rejected 26% of failed bills as recorded in the Journals. A rejection is when the Journals
record that the bill was rejected or failed by a vote.22 Most bills (about 55%), however, were
still active when a session was ended. Bills could also be re-introduced in multiple sessions.
I therefore code bills as “projects” that capture this re-entry and exit. I code projects as
bills that were re-introduced with the same family name and the same legal and economic
type. Panel C shows that most projects are bills: 77% only enter a session of parliament
once. In the analysis below I examine why a project is re-introduced.
1.3 Political Barriers in Seventeenth-Century England
In this section, I show political conflict caused estate bills to fail from 1660 to 1688 under
the late Stuart monarchs Charles II and James II. This is largely because conflict led the
monarch to suddenly close sessions of parliament.
1.3.1 Background and Data
Political conflict between the monarch and parliament created a barrier to parliament’s
passage of estate bills. Conflict stemmed from: (1) the monarch’s power over parliamentary
meetings, (2) parliament’s power of the purse (“supply”), and (3) its general legislative
21The stages of the legislative process are shown in Figure 1.5. The monarch could veto a bill, but this
was used only 4 times on estate bills during this period.
22The evidence from the Journals and committee notes from the House of Lords suggest that rejections
occurred when the proposed project did not meet legal requirements or beneficiaries were not compensated
from the proposed project.
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functions (Ogg 1962; Horwitz 1977; Smith 1999). The monarch had broad powers over
parliament’s meeting after the passage of the Triennial Act of 1664.23 The monarch had
the power to call and dissolve parliaments, requiring general elections. The monarch also
had the power to call and end (prorogue) a session of parliament. All legislation had to be
approved during a session of parliament.
The monarch generally called parliaments and sessions of parliament to receive tax revenue
from parliament, which held the power of the purse. There were two sources of income
for the monarch (1) permanent or ordinary revenue from customs and excise taxes and (2)
extra parliamentary grants of revenue from additional taxes.24 Parliament passed hereditary
or ordinary revenue at the beginning of a monarch’s reign. Monarchs’ independence from
parliament depended on their income from ordinary revenue as well as the terms of the bill.
Both hereditary revenue bills and extra parliamentary tax bills were legislated on during
single sessions.
The monarch opened a session of parliament by making a speech in parliament and request-
ing tax revenue or “supply.” Once convened, parliament as an organization had legislative,
judicial, and administrative functions that were essential to the workings of the English
state. While in session, parliament began legislating on tax or revenue bills, the House of
Lords heard court cases as the highest appellate court, and both Houses began legislative
work on two general classifications of bills. They received petitions for and introduced (1)
private bills, for example, estate bills, and (2) public bills, for example, regarding religion
and trade.25
There were conflicts between the monarch and parliament over fiscal issues - tax or revenue
23At the end of the seventeenth century, the royal prerogatives over parliament were still real powers.
The Act of 1664 repealed the previous Triennial Act of 1641, which had a far more detailed and “vigorous
wording” regarding the monarch’s powers (Randall 1916: 655-657, 663).
24See Braddick (1996) and Chandaman (1975) for evolution of taxes and fiscal capacity in England and
Chapter 12 in Ogg (1962) for an overview of the methods of parliamentary taxation.
25See Hoppit (1996) for different types of parliamentary legislation as well as Tables 3 and 4 for general
patterns in content during this era.
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bills - and over general policies. Historians note that parliament used the power of the purse
in a strategy known as “redress before supply” where parliament presented its grievances
to the monarch, expecting redress, and not passing a tax or supply bill until the grievances
were acknowledged or remedied. They could also use the strategy to pass other general
bills. This was a tactic acknowledged by Charles II, James II, and William III, three of the
monarchs who ruled from 1660 to 1702.26 For example, James II, in a speech to parliament,
criticized the argument “from the Inclination men may have for frequent Parliaments” to
grant revenue to king “by feeding [him] from Time to Time, by such Proportions as they
shall think convenient.”27 This strategy was not always effective (Smith 1999: 61). In
particular, conflict and debates in parliament that were exogenous to estate bills could make
the monarch more likely to directly interfere with parliamentary proceedings by suddenly
closing the session.
To study the effect of conflict on parliament’s functioning and passage of estate bills, I
draw on the historical and economic history literatures and code two indicators of political
conflict. These variables are summarized in Panel A of Table 1.2. They are not mutually
exclusive. The first is an indicator for sessions that had fiscal conflict: specifically, conflict
over or delaying the passage of revenue bills (ConflictRevenue). For example, parliament
investigated the administration of finances rather than passing a new revenue bill during a
session under Charles II in 1669 (Ogg 1962: 342). The second is an indicator for sessions that
had conflict with the monarch’s policies or interests (ConflictMonarch). It occurred when
there was disagreement in parliament regarding a royal policy or legislation was initiated
that was divergent from royal interests. For example, under Charles II, parliament began
work on a bill that would influence the succession of the monarchy by requiring heirs to be
raised as Protestant.
26They are recorded as criticizing this strategy (Smith 1999: 60; Horwitz 1977: 42).
27‘House of Lords Journal Volume 14: 22 May 1685’, in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume
14, 1685-1691 (London, 1767-1830): 9-12. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-
jrnl/vol14/pp9-12 [accessed September 2018].
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A third variable - the monarch’s permanent income stream - captures the monarchs’ finan-
cial independence from parliament. The monarchs received income from indirect tax sources
of customs and excise that was independent of extra revenue granted from parliament. In-
creases in the monarchs’ permanent revenue was thus dependent on the state of trade.
IndirectRevenue is a series of indirect revenues from O’Brien and Hunt’s data on English
revenues from the European State Financial Database available at www.esfdb.org. With
increases in the monarch’s permanent revenue (increasing IndirectRevenue), the monarch
was more financially independent and thus may have been more likely to be in conflict with
parliament.
1.3.2 Political Barriers: Empirical Analysis
To examine if political conflict caused estate bills to fail from 1660 to 1685, I use probit and
OLS models of the form:
Actit = pi0 + pi1ConflictRevenuet + pi2ConflictMonarcht + pi3IndirectRevenuet
+X ′tδ1 +X
′
itδ2 + νit,
(1.1)
where Actit is equal to 1 if a bill became an Act of Parliament and 0 if it failed for ses-
sions t meeting from 1660 to 1685.28 Xit is a matrix of bill-level controls, such as bill
and landholder types; Xt is a matrix of time-varying political variables. ConflictRevenuet,
ConflictMonarcht, and IndirectRevenuet are as defined above. I expect pi1, pi2, and pi3 < 0.
It is possible that bill success and failure is a function of other factors. Examples include
changes in England’s fiscal capacity, sessions meeting during war years, or the majority
political party in the House of Commons. I include Xt to control for any time-varying
observable factors that could also be correlated with conflict and bill success or failure. They
28Under James II, parliament did not meet from 1686 to 1688.
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are summarized in Panel B of Table 1.2. Details on sources can be found in Appendix Section
A.1.4. Xt includes ConflictHousest, an indicator for sessions where there is recorded conflict
between the two Houses. It also includes a year trend to control for any trend in bill success
over time; WarSessiont, an indicator for sessions meeting during war years; DeficitRatiot,
the deficit ratio as a measure of England’s fiscal capacity; and MajorityPartyt, a categorical
variable for majority party in the House of Commons during a parliament.
Xit is a matrix of bill-level characteristics that help control for the effects of omitted variable
bias at the bill-level, for example family type, bill quality, or lobbying efforts associated
with different legal types of bills. Panel C of Table 1.2 reports difference in means across
bill failure and success for a variety of bill characteristics. There does not appear to be
any obvious differences in success and failure for most characteristics. Xit also includes an
indicator for bills that repeated in any session. Details on coding are discussed further below
and in Appendix Section A.1.1.
Table 1.3 reports the results from estimating equation (1). Columns (1)-(5) report the av-
erage marginal effects (AME) from a probit model and column (6) reports estimates from
OLS. For the probit specifications, columns (1)-(3) successively introduce the political con-
flict variables. Column (4) introduces political controls Xt. Column (5) introduces bill-level
characteristics Xit. Column (6) reports estimates from the same specification as column (5)
but uses OLS and clusters errors at the session of parliament level. I cluster at this level
because there is likely correlation across bills introduced into specific sessions of parliament.
Across all specifications, estate bills were more likely to fail in sessions that had fiscal conflict
from 1660 to 1685. Estate bills were about 28 to 29 percentage points more likely to fail in
these sessions. While the coefficient for ConflictMonarch is negative in some specifications,
neither this type of conflict nor IndirectRevenue is statistically associated with estate bill
success or failure. I discuss these results further in the next section.
13
1.3.3 Mechanism: Sudden Closures of Sessions of Parliament
How did political conflict cause bills to fail? One hypothesis is that political conflict oper-
ated through a specific mechanism: political tensions and conflict led to the “sudden and
unexpected end of a session” that killed bills, such as estate bills, which otherwise would
have passed (Hoppit 1996: 113). In the section, I provide evidence that conflict operated
through this mechanism.
Because the monarch decided when sessions would begin and end, parliament faced a problem
when passing estate bills because it did not have a preset or fixed amount of time to work.29
Landholders, their lawyers and agents worked with MPs and peers to decide if and when to
introduce estate bills as well as when to work on estate bills to pass a multi-layered process.
This process is summarized in Figure 1.5. The process required attention and approval
by both Houses of Parliament and had to receive the royal assent by the monarch before
becoming an Act of Parliament. Estate bills could enter in either the House of Commons or
the House of Lords during this era. The method of approval was identical in both Houses.
The legislative process formally has 12-steps. After a first and second public reading in the
first house, a bill was sent to committee, where the committee would hear all concerned
parties and make amendments (stages 1-3). It was then reported on from committee and
amendments could be made. After a third public reading, the bill was approved by the
first house (stages 4-5) and was sent to the second house for a similar process (stages 6-10).
Any amendments made in the second house would be approved by the first house (stage
11). After the legislature’s approval, a bill received the royal assent from the monarch and
became an Act (stage 12). The monarch could also withhold the royal assent and veto an
estate bill, which was only done 4 times during this era.
29This is also noted by Kemp: “the Commons’ basic procedural problem [...] was that their sittings could
be interrupted by prorogation [...] which was a matter for the King” (Kemp 1971: 4). Different from Kemp
(1971), however, I find that the Commons did have rights and chance to influence through their power of
the purse. I am grateful to Julian Hoppit for this reference.
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Figure 1.6 illustrates that sudden closures caused bills to fail. Panel A plots the legislative
life-cycle of estate bills in a normal session and Panel B plots the same in a session that was
suddenly closed. The figure plots the stage of the legislative life-cycle (1-10) as a function of
the ordered days in the session.30 Stage 1 is when a bill was introduced; Stage 5 is when the
bill was sent to the second house. Stages 2 and 7 are when the bill was sent to committee in
either of the two Houses. Stage 10 is when the bill received the royal assent. An estate bill’s
progress in a session of parliament over time is represented as a line (its legislative path).
The slope shows how quickly parliament passed a bill. Acts of Parliament, successful bills,
reached stage 10 and are full lines. The failed bills have shorter paths and are marked by
bold lines.
The session in Panel A met for about 6 months and estate bills moved relatively quickly
through parliament. On average, bills took 1.6 months to pass all 10 stages. Sets of estate
bills were given the royal assent on the same day, which only occurred on 5 times during the
session (the five “points” at stage 10). On each of those days, William III also signed at least
one supply bill or an important public measure.31 The evidence supports that parliament
endogenously passed estate bills with supply or public bills.
Parliament rejected the failed bills during this session (bold lines), possibly because a bill did
not meet legal standards.32 Table A.3 summarizes information on the failed bills: a reference
name, its house of origin, the stage and date of failure, reason for failure if recorded by the
Journals, and if the bill became an Act in a later session. About 85% of the failed bills were
rejected or have evidence of political or legal influence, e.g. a petition or counsel was heard.
Only one bill was rejected, re-introduced, and passed to become an Act in the next session,
which began 7 months later. The bill took 13 months to pass.
30Figure 1.5 shows that the legislative process formally had twelve stages. The Journals often recorded 2
stages on the same day.
31The one day he did not sign a supply bill, January 11, 1697, William signed a bill for the prosecution of
individuals after the Assassination Plot of 1696 was discovered.
32There is currently no work discussing why MPs would reject estate bills in general. Historiographies
often discuss the politics and failure of specific estate bills. For example, see Seaward (1988).
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The patterns suggest that lawyers, MPs’, and peers’ decisions to introduce and pass estate
bills were endogenous to when they passed supply bills or public measures, and possibly
expect the session to end. consistent with the strategy of “redress before supply” described
above. Estate bills were never given the royal assent by themselves: they were always
approved with supply or public bills. About 80% of sessions ended the same day a monarch
approved a supply bill.33
Debates and conflict about fiscal issues or royal policies discussed above (that were exogenous
to estate bills) could make the monarch more likely to directly interfere with parliamentary
proceedings by suddenly proroguing the session. The monarchs’ speeches in parliament are
illustrative of the decision to suddenly end a session of parliament. Charles II, for example,
admonished the House of Commons when he suddenly prorogued the sixteenth session of
parliament. He explained his reasoning to the House of Lords:
I have received an Address of such a Nature from the House of Commons, as
I cannot but resent very highly, from the ill Consequences I have lived to see
from such Addresses. I intend therefore to prorogue them for some short Time,
in Hopes they will consider better what they ought to do at their Return. I have
chosen to tell this to you first, because I would have you know I am very well
satisfied with the dutiful Behaviour of this House; and you will by that Time be
more enabled to give Me your Advice.34
Panel B of Figure 1.6 shows the legislative life-cycle for estate bills in a session of parliament
that was suddenly prorogued under Charles II. The bills’ path appear to be “cut-off” when
the session ended. It is also puzzling that two bills (marked by x’s) were introduced only
3 days before the session ended, when there was presumably not enough time to pass the
entire legislative process. Table A.2 presents information on failed bills during this session.
In contrast to the“normally prorogued session”, it shows that a majority of estate bills were
33Table A.6 provides summary information on when the monarchs approved estate, public, and supply
bills.
34Emphasis added. ‘House of Lords Journal Volume 13: 13 May 1678’, in Journal of the House of Lords:
Volume 13, 1675-1681 (London, 1767-1830): 219-220 [accessed February 2016].
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still active when the session was prorogued. It also shows that failed bills never returned
and did not become Acts of Parliament. Bills that were reintroduced were successful, but it
took about a year and a half for to become an Act.
I first use speeches by the monarchs at the end of every session (found in the Journals
of the House of Commons and Journals of the House of Lords) to code sessions that were
suddenly prorogued. I supplement this information with information on each session detailed
in historiographies, specifically in Ogg (1962), Horwitz (1977), and Smith (1999). The
description of “prorogation events” is stark. For a session meeting under Charles II, for
example, one prorogation is described as “suddenly interrupting” the proceedings (Ogg 1962:
590). For a session meeting during the Exclusion Crisis, the Black Rod’s “ominous tap at
the door” signaled the monarch’s decision (Ogg 1962: 606). Under William and Mary, “the
actual prorogation [of the second session] came as a surprise” (Horwitz 1977: 43).
The result from this coding is shown in Figure 1.2. There is a clear correlation between ses-
sions that were suddenly prorogued and estate bill failure. There is a higher concentration
of sessions that were suddenly prorogued prior to and immediately after the Glorious Revo-
lution in 1688, capturing the period of growing political instability after 1665 under Charles
II through the first few sessions of William and Mary’s new reign. Sudden prorogations no
longer occurred after 1690.
I estimate also estimate equation 1.1 but replace the conflict variables with an indicator for
sessions that were suddenly closed. I use a probit model and OLS (standard errors clustered
at session of parliament level). Table 1.4 reports estimates of the effect of sudden closures
of parliament on estate bill success.
The results show that the monarch’s decision to suddenly prorogue a session of parliament
had a significant effect on parliament’s passage of estate bills. Estate bills were about 43
percentage points more likely to fail if a session was suddenly prorogued from 1660 to 1689
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(column (1)). Sudden prorogations continued to occur until 1690. Column (2) estimates
the effect for this period and shows that the coefficient is nearly halved. Column (3) and
(4) provide estimates of the effect for the entire period (1660 to 1702) using probit and
OLS. The estimates decrease relative to the results from for the period before the Glorious
Revolution (columns (1) and (2)) and offer a lower bound of the effect of sudden prorogations
on parliament’s passage of estate bills. The sensitivity of the estimates to the sample is a
result of when sudden prorogations occurred (Figure 1.2) and that the system for passing
estate bills changed after the Glorious Revolution (discussed further below). Both bias the
estimates of sudden closures downward.
As a second exercise, I use information from the Journals on reason for bill failure as an
outcome variable. This is motivated by the pattern that less bills were rejected by parliament
in the session that was suddenly (Table A.2). We would expect bills failing in sessions
that were suddenly prorogued to have significantly less rejections. I coded three different
outcomes: (1) bills that were rejected, (2) bills rejected or failed in committee, and (3) bills
that were rejected or had a petition or counsel heard in its last stage. I use probit and
OLS models to test this hypothesis. Table A.7 in the Appendix. The statistical evidence is
less robust, but the coefficients are negative and supports the hypothesis that bills were less
likely to be outright rejected, and therefore still active, if a session was suddenly prorogued.
Table A.8 shows the economic implications of the sudden closure of parliament on three
dimensions: scarring, delay, and displacement of new bills. As shown in Panel C of Table 1.1
and discussed above, bill can be thought of as projects, where a project is defined as a bill
entering in more than one session and where the bill type and landholder’s name matched.
A project could have one of four outcomes: (1) fail after one attempt, (2) fail after multiple
attempts, (3) succeed after one attempt, and (4) succeed after multiple attempts.
Table A.8 in the Appendix reports results of the economic implications of sudden closures
of parliament. First, a sudden prorogation had scarring effects (Panel A). Projects first
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entering in a session that was suddenly prorogued were significantly less likely to succeed
and ever become an act of parliament by about 15 percent. If a bill was successful, it was still
delayed by about 7 months (Panel B). Panel C provides evidence to suggest that new bills
were displaced in sessions after a sudden prorogation. Estimates from negative binomial and
poisson regressions of counts of new bills on a lag of sessions that were suddenly prorogued
show that there were fewer new bills in a session meeting after a sudden prorogation. OLS
estimates of shares in sessions of parliament also show this effect. In total, the evidence in
Table A.8 shows that main economic impact of sudden prorogation was that most bills failed
and were not successful again.
1.4 Removing Political Barriers: Glorious Revolution
Mitigates Effect of Political Conflict
In 1688, the Glorious Revolution forced James II into exile and replaced him with William
and Mary, daughter of the deposed James II. In this section, I show that political and insti-
tutional changes with the Glorious Revolution mitigated the effects of fundamental political
conflicts between the monarch and parliament (Ogg 1962; Horwitz 1977; Roberts 1993; Hop-
pit 1996; Smith 1999; Pincus 2009; Cox 2012).
Political conflict continued to occur after 1688. Under William and Mary, in 1689, there
was disagreement in parliament over the settlement of the ordinary revenue, slowing down
the process and making amendments that “were not to William’s taste” (Horwitz 1977: 58).
Parliament had failed to act on most of the king’s recommendations regarding trade and
poor relief during sessions under William III (Horwitz 1977: 256).
Table 1.5 provides evidence on how the Glorious Revolution mitigated the effects of this
conflict. First, conflict delaying a revenue bill, ConflictRevenue is strongly associated with
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sessions that were suddenly prorogued. After the Glorious Revolution, the monarch sud-
denly closed sessions because of of debates surrounding the settlement of the new monarchs’
ordinary revenue. The question of settlement raised more “fundamental questions about the
future relationship between the crown and parliament” among the law-making MPs (Hor-
witz 1977: 27). It was an open issue for the first several sessions of William and Mary’s
reign: that William and Mary did not have “settled revenues over the first two years of their
reign alter[ed] their bargaining relationship” with parliament (Cox 2012: 573). As argued by
Cox (2012), parliament also engineered supply bills differently after the Glorious Revolution.
Parliament began using time limits on tax revenue bills that parliament could terminate, in-
creasing the monarchs’ present value of revenues sanctioned by parliament (Cox 2012: Table
1). They also legislated bills such that government debt was funded on parliament’s terms
(Cox 2012: 578-579, Table 2). The new constitutional changes regarding the ordinary rev-
enues and new types of supply bills appears to have resolved conflict sufficiently that it no
longer led to sudden prorogations after 1690.
IndirectRevenue is not associated with sessions suddenly closed once the Glorious Revolu-
tion dummy is included. This result complements the evidence on ConflictRevenue. The
historical literature suggests that this is because the settlement of the ordinary revenue in
1690 “shortened the financial leash of the monarch” (Cox 2012: 573). In 1660 parliament
settled tax revenue from customs and excise on Charles II and his heirs for life. James II
also received this ordinary revenue in 1685. Parliament, however, did not settle the ordinary
revenue on William and Mary until 1690 because it could not agree on the terms. When
it did pass the legislation, parliament made significant constitutional changes to the terms,
only settling the excise for life and the customs for a term of 4 years. Revenues from excise
for was granted for their lives; the customs, however, was limited to four years (Horwitz
1977: 53).
The results also show that ConflictMonarch loses some of its impact on the monarch’s
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decision to suddenly close sessions after the Glorious Revolution indicator is included. The
evidence shows that conflict with monarch was more frequent under the late Stuarts when
parliament was in session, and could lead the monarch to interfere with parliamentary pro-
ceedings. The findings support arguments by Roberts (1999), Pincus (2009), and Pincus and
Robinson (2014) that the Glorious Revolution changed the nature of a fundamental type of
conflict and tension in England’s government. Under Charles II, conflict with the monarch’s
policies were largely driven by religious policy and altering succession of the monarchy (Ogg
1962: 351, 370, 379, 386, 587, 589-590, 606, 619). Groups in parliament, for example, worked
on legislation to influence and alter the succession of the monarchy. The Exclusion Crisis
(1679-1681) saw a growing opposition in parliament initiate legislation that would exclude
James from becoming monarch because of his conversion to Catholicism. After the Glori-
ous Revolution, conflicts with the monarchy centered on different types of legislative and
policy issues.35 In 1699, for example, parliament “had failed to act on most of the king
[William III]’s recommendations” by not passing legislation to pay off debts incurred by
war, to provide relief of the poor, and to advance trade.36 Crucially, while conflicts with the
monarch and regarding supply did occur after 1688, they did not necessarily lead to sudden
prorogations.
Last, there is evidence that the Glorious Revolution had an impact on making sudden pro-
rogations less likely in addition to the constitutional and political changes that affected the
specific conflict variables (column (5)). This could embody new political norms in England’s
government that may not have been found in formal constitutional changes.37 Perhaps there
was an additional effect of the Glorious Revolution through who was elected to parliament
or larger societal changes (Stasavage 2007; Pincus 2009; Pincus and Robinson 2014). This
35There were threats to the new monarch’s reign, which came from Jacobites, supporters of the deposed
monarch James II. See Wells and Willis (2000).
36See his speech in ‘House of Lords Journal Volume 16: 4 May 1699’, in Journal of the House of Lords:
Volume 16, 1696-1701 (London, 1767-1830): 463-468. British History Online [accessed May 2017].
37See, for example, Murrell (2017) for recent evidence that there was little new constitutional changes with
the Glorious Revolution.
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is an important avenue for future work.
I now estimate the effect of the Glorious Revolution on estate bill success using probit and
OLS of the form:
Actit = pi0 + pi1ConflictRevenuet + pi2ConflictMonarcht + pi3IndirectRevenuet
+ pi4post1688 +X
′
tδ1 +X
′
itδ2 + νit
(1.2)
where the variables are as defined above. I test the hypothesis that the Glorious Revolution
improved parliament’s passage of estate bills independent of conflict (pi4 > 0). A second
hypothesis is that the Glorious Revolution was important in mitigating the effects of political
conflict. As such, I include interaction terms with a post-1688 indicator and the conflict
variables. I expect the interactions to have a non-negative effect.
Including the full set of controls for the entire period of analysis (1660 to 1702) may be prob-
lematic because the political and bill-level variables could also be outcomes of the Glorious
Revolution. For example, war may be correlated with bill success and political conflict, but
because the Glorious Revolution brought in a new monarch and changed England’s interna-
tional alliances, then war is also an outcome of the regime change. I address this problem
by estimating the effect of political conflict on the subsample of sessions meeting from 1660
to 1685 and from 1689 to 1702.
Table 1.6 reports results from estimating equation 1.2. Columns (1)-(4) report the average
marginal effects from probit specifications and column (5) reports OLS estimates. Column
(1) includes an indicator for sessions meeting after the Glorious Revolution (post1688) and
columns (2)-(4) introduce political conflict, political controls, and bill characteristics suc-
cessively. Column (5) reports estimates from the same specification as column (4) but uses
OLS and clusters errors at the session of parliament level.
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The results show that estate bills were more likely to succeed after the Glorious Revolution
(columns (1) and (2)), but that it is no longer significant when political controls are included.
The effect of fiscal conflict remains negative and significant. Estate bills were about 13 to 19
percentage points more likely to fail in sessions with political conflict for the entire period.
The estimate of fiscal conflict falls when using the population of estate bills (compare to the
results in Table 1.3). This is likely because the system evolved after 1688, when both sudden
closures and political conflict became less common (discussed further below).
The Glorious Revolution improved parliament’s passage of estate bills (columns (1)-(2)),
but that the effect is correlated with other political variables, like war (column (3)). This is
sensible because war and the other political variables, like days a session met and political
party, are also an outcome of the Glorious Revolution. It introduced a bundle of changes
that could improve estate bill success. For example, there was a standardization of par-
liamentary meetings and increasing administrative capacity of the state after the Glorious
Revolution (Hoppit 1996; Hodgson 2016). It is possible that Enlightenment ideas or the
growing influence of the Whig party could also influence estate bill success (Stasavage 2007;
Mokyr and Nye 2007; Pincus 2009). If and how these specific mechanisms influenced parlia-
ment’s passage of estate bills is deserving of further research. The evidence here is consistent
with the general argument that the political changes made the monarchs credibly respect
parliament’s constitutional rights (Cox 2012).38
Table 1.7 examines if the Glorious Revolution also had an effect on parliament’s operation by
mitigating political conflict. Columns (1) and (2) include the full set of controls. To address
concerns that including Xt and Xit will bias the estimates because they are endogenous to
the Glorious Revolution, columns (3) and (4) report probit and OLS estimates of political
conflict for the sample of sessions meeting from 1660 to 1685 and columns (5) and (6) report
38The argument is also a part of the larger theme that the government’s credibility improved for an
important set of economic transactions after 1688 (North and Weingast 1989; Coffman et al. 2013; Bogart
2011).
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the same for sessions meeting from 1689 to 1702.
The Glorious Revolution mitigated the effects of political conflict. Important for estate
bills, it mitigated the effect of ConflictRevenue. When including the interaction term, the
estimate of ConflictRevenue remains negative while the interaction is positive (columns (1)
and (2)). The bottom two rows of Table 1.6 report the F-statistic for the hypothesis that the
total effect of political conflict is zero after 1688. We cannot reject the null that the effect
after 1688 is zero, supporting that the Glorious Revolution mitigated the effects of political
conflict and removed political barriers to passing estate bills. Columns (3) and (4) replicate
results in Table 1.3: bills entering in sessions with fiscal conflict were more likely to fail from
1660 to 1685. The estimate of ConflictRevenue does not have an effect after the Glorious
Revolution (columns (5) and (6)).
Was the Glorious Revolution endogenous to the demand for estate bills? This would be a
novel interpretation of why the Glorious Revolution occurred and the evidence suggests this
did not happen. First, there is no explicit evidence in the Journals that estate bills were the
subject of much discussion or debate outside in the Convention Parliament of 1689 but that
the sudden interference in parliament by the monarch was an issue. Second, there was a
large increase in the number of estate bills and acts in the three sessions meeting immediately
after the Glorious Revolution in comparison to the three sessions meeting immediately before
(column (1) Panel A of Table A.12). This is likely because the last three sessions parliament
met before the Glorious Revolution saw heated conflict over general policy, e.g. the Exclusion
Crisis, and only met for a short period. When extending the period to include similar length
sessions (column (2)), the difference is no longer significant. The number of acts increases
only after the conflict no longer leads to sudden closures of parliament (column (3)).
Second, parliament appears to have adjusted how it legislated on estate bills after the Glo-
rious Revolution. The evidence suggests that petitioners, MPs, and peers adjusted the
intensive margin of when they introduced and worked on bills. Because the period from
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1660 to 1688 was a low probability of success regime, we can expect petitioners to introduce
bills early in the session to improve the likelihood of bill success. After the Glorious Revo-
lution, a new high probability of success regime, we can expect to see bills introduced later
in a session. Figure 1.3 reports the average number of bills introduced during the first 50
days of a session by each monarch. We observe this evolution in bill introduction. By 1695,
more bills on average were introduced after the first month of a session. By the end of the
period, parliament had fully standardized and streamlined the procedures for passing estate
bills through a series of standing orders. Thus, while mitigating conflict was important for
reforming property rights through estate bill success, parliament’s adjustment to the new
equilibrium (improving its capacity by adjusting the intensive margin of how it worked) may
have enabled it to take on new types of legislation, such as acts improving the England’s
transportation infrastructure. Bogart and Richardson (2011) show that statutory author-
ity acts (e.g. acts creating turnpike trusts) become far more common after the Glorious
Revolution.
As a final illustration of the impact of the Glorious Revolution on parliament’s functioning,
Figure 1.4 shows the counterfactual success rate of estate bills had the Glorious Revolution
not occurred and a “Stuart-like” system continued until 1702. Specifically, it shows how well
the model fits the data from 1660 to 1689 from estimating the effect of ConflictRevt on estate
bill success. From 1689 to 1702, it shows the forecasted (out of sample predicted success
rate). The model predicts that the success rate of estate bills would have been lower had the
Glorious Revolution not occurred. Economically, this implies that political barriers would
have continued to make it difficult to use parliament as a forum to change and reorganize
property rights in preindustrial England. Taken together, the Glorious Revolution improved
the likelihood estate bills would succeed largely by mitigating the effects of fundamental
political conflicts between the monarch and parliament over fiscal issues. It also made conflict
between the monarch and parliament over important policy issues less common and made
sudden closures of sessions of parliament less likely.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper shows that political conflict in government impeded English parliament’s passage
of estate bills, a legislation that reorganized property rights to land use, in the seventeenth
century. I document that the Glorious Revolution of 1688 removed political barriers and
improved the likelihood of estate bill success by mitigating the effects of this political conflict.
Rights that are not easily changed or transferred is a characteristic of property rights in many
contexts. Unbundling these characteristics is important for programs or organizations that
seek to alter property rights and allow groups to respond to new economic opportunities.
States and governments with robust capacity to effectively alter rights and provide public
goods have been shown to industrialize and modernize first (Epstein 2000; Dincecco 2011;
Hodgson 2015). This is important for England’s historical development given that infrequent
and sporadic meetings of parliament were endemic across preindustrial Europe (van Zanden,
et al. 2012). Further, many states today face political and fiscal conflict that hinder the
development of this capacity. This paper provides new evidence and insight to how state
capacity improved in England.
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1.6 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: The Glorious Revolution Improved Reorganization of Property Rights to Land
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset. Figure shows improvements in the
success rate of estate bills (reorganization of property rights) and number of bills introduced
after 1688. A “successful bill” was approved by House of Commons, House of Lords, and
monarch (became an Act of Parliament). Success rate is calculated by years in which an
estate bill was introduced. Average success rate is conditional on years parliament met and
had estate bills introduced. “Number Introduced”: total number of estate bills introduced
in a year. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
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Figure 1.2: Sudden Closures of Sessions of Parliament, 1660-1702
Notes: Figure shows years when monarch suddenly closed a session of parliament relative
to success rate of estate bills. Sudden closures (prorogations): author’s calculations from
Journals, Ogg (1962), Horwitz (1977), and Smith (1999). Vertical lines mark years where a
session was suddenly prorogued. Success rate: author’s calculations from estate bill dataset.
A “successful bill” was approved by House of Commons, House of Lords, and monarch
(became an Act of Parliament). Success rate is calculated by years in which an estate bill
was introduced. Average success rate is conditional on years parliament met and had estate
bills introduced. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
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Figure 1.3: Evolution of Estate Bill Introduction after Glorious Revolution
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset collected from Journals. Bills are
introduced later in sessions after the Glorious Revolution (1688). Figure reports the average
number of estate bills introduced in first 50 days of session by monarch in 10 day increments.
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Figure 1.4: Parliament’s Operation if Glorious Revolution Did Not Occur: Counterfactual
Success Rate, 1689-1702
Notes: Glorious Revolution allowed parliament to effectively reorganize property rights to
land. This figure shows the counterfactual success rate relative to the actual success rate of
estate bills. A “successful bill” was approved by House of Commons, House of Lords, and
monarch (became an Act of Parliament). Solid line shows changes in the actual success rate
from 1660 to 1702. I construct the counterfactual success rate of estate bills in two steps.
I first estimate equation (1) with fiscal conflict and political and bill-level controls on the
subsample of estate bills entering parliament from 1660 to 1688. From 1660 to 1688, the
dashed line shows the fitted success rate from this estimation. Second, I predict individual
bill success using equation (1) for estate bills entering parliament from 1689 to 1702. I then
take yearly averages to obtain the counterfactual success rate (dashed line) after 1688.
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Table 1.1: Estate Bills: Success and Failure, 1660-1702
Panel A: Bills
Number % of total
Successful bills (Acts of Parliament) 632 66.3
Failed 322 33.7
Total 954
Panel B: Failed Bills
Number % of failed
Still active when session ended 176 54.6
Rejection 83 25.7
Petition or legal counsel 63 19.5
Total 322
Panel C: Projects
Outcomes Number % of projects
Fail, one attempt 173 20.7
Fail, multiple attempts 28 3.3
Success, multiple attempts 66 7.9
Success, one attempt 567 67.9
Total 834
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset. Panel A:
“Successful bill” was approved by House of Commons, House of
Lords, and monarch (became an Act of Parliament). Panel B:
Reason for bill failure as reocrded by Journals of House of Lords
and Journals of House of Commons. Bills with no official record-
ing were still active when session of parliament ended. Panel C:
Projects are defined as bills that are introduced in multiple ses-
sions. Bill have same name (first and last) and bill type. Most
projects during this era are also bills.
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Table 1.2: Conflict, Political, and Bill Variables
Panel A: Main Conflict Variables # of sessions avg. (wtd.) st. dev. (wtd.) (min, max)
Conflict revenue 9 0.23 (0.13) 0.43 (0.34) (0,1)
Conflict monarch 8 0.21 (0.12) 0.36 (0.32) (0,1)
Indirect Revenue (£1, 000, 000s) 1.41 (1.51) 0.69 (0.89) (0.12, 2.8)
SP 15 0.44 (0.17) 0.49 (0.38) (0,1)
Total number of sessions 38
Sessions with estate bills 34
Panel B: Political Controls # of sessions avg. (wtd.) st. dev. (wtd.) (min, max)
Conflict houses 10 0.29 (0.89) 0.44 (0.30) (0,1)
War session 15 0.44 (0.35) 0.49 (0.48) (0,1)
Days (Length of Session) 116.24 (161.22) 76.87 (66.27) (8, 294)
DeficitRatio 0.13 (0.22) 0.31 (0.33) (-0.27, 1.02)
Majority Party
Opposition 3 0.08 (0.06) 0.28 (0.24)
Court 15 0.44 (0.38) 0.50 (0.48)
Tory 8 0.23 (0.24) 0.43 (0.43)
Whig 8 0.23 (0.31) 0.43 (0.46)
Panel C: Bill-Level Controls
Property-holders Failed Success (Act) difference p-value
Nobility 0.24 0.20 -0.04 [0.15]
Gentry 0.59 0.60 0.01 [0.66]
No Rank 0.24 0.19 -0.05 [0.06]*
Clergy 0.02 0.05 0.02 [0.11]
Other 0.17 0.19 0.02 [0.50]
Bill Type (selected)
Estate 0.82 0.88 0.06 [0.00]***
Sell 0.40 0.44 0.04 [0.19]
Other 0.42 0.44 0.02 [0.58]
Lease 0.04 0.06 0.02 [0.12]
Raise money 0.09 0.07 -0.02 [0.03]
Complete contract 0.09 0.10 0.01 [0.59]
Settlement 0.20 0.20 0.00 [0.91]
Purposes
Debts 0.37 0.35 -0.03 [0.37]
Payment for widow 0.04 0.05 0.01 [0.32]
Payment for children 0.06 0.09 0.03 [0.08]*
Petition on bill 0.16 0.13 -0.04 [0.12]
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset and political dataset. Panels A and B: polit-
ical variables measured at the session of parliament level. SP: sessions that were suddenly closed
(prorogued). Panel C: bill-level characteristics coded from estate bill dataset. Characteristics are
not mutually exclusive. “Successful bill” was approved by House of Commons, House of Lords, and
monarch (became an Act of Parliament). See Appendix Sections A.1.1 and A.1.4 for details on sources
and coding. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.3: The Effect of Political Conflict on Estate Bill Success, 1660-1685
Outcome: Successful Bill (Act of Parliament)
Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ConflictRevenue -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.28**
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
ConflictMonarch 0.07 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10)
IndirectRevenue 0.03 0.25 0.22 0.19
(0.06) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
observations 438 438 438 438 438 438
LR test 24.1 1.15 24.46 40.9 107.33 -
pseudo-R2 or R2 0.04 0.001 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.22
standard errors cluster
politics no no no yes yes yes
type no no no no yes yes
landowner no no no no yes yes
origin no no no no yes yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Outcome
is bill success or failure. “Successful bill” was approved by House of Commons,
House of Lords, and monarch (became an Act of Parliament). Sample: bills in-
troduced in sessions meeting from 1660 to 1685. Parliament did not meet in 1672,
1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688. Reported probit coefficients are average marginal
effects (AME). ConflictRevenue: sessions with conflict between parliament and
monarch over fiscal issues (tax bills). ConflictMonarch: sessions with conflict be-
tween monarch and parliament over general policy (legislation). IndirectRevenue:
monarch’s financial independence from parliament. Standard errors clustered at
session-level (20 clusters).
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Figure 1.5: Legislative Process
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset and Journals. There were 10 stages in
legislative process as recorded in Journals. Stage 1 is bill introduction. Stage 10 is approval
(royal assent) by the monarch. Source:
Figure 1.6: Legislative Life-cycle in Normally and Suddenly Closed Sessions of Parliament
(a) Normally Closed Session: 20 October 1696-
16 April 1697
(b) Suddenly Closed Session: 13 October-22
November 1675
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset and Journals. There were 10 stages in
legislative process as recorded in Journals. Stage 1 is bill introduction. Stage 10 is approval
(royal assent) by the monarch. Full lines denote successful bills (Acts of Parliament). Bold
lines denote failed bills. Slope of line represents speed of passage.
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Table 1.4: Effects of Sudden Prorogation on Estate Bill Success: Probit and OLS Results
OLS OLS probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SP -0.43*** -0.24*** -0.19*** -0.20***
(0.13) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Observations 485 625 954 954
pseudo-R2 (R2) 0.28 0.29 0.23 0.27
LR test 279.21 -
standard errors cluster cluster - - cluster
sample 1660-1689 1660-1690 1660-1702 1660-1702
political vars yes yes yes yes
origin yes yes yes yes
type 29.71 32.55 56.83 30.98
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
landholder 1.18 0.86 7.55 0.86
[0.35] [0.15] [0.18] [0.52]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Outcome is bill success or failure. “Successful bill” was
approved by House of Commons, House of Lords, and monarch (be-
came an Act of Parliament). Parliament did not meet in 1672,
1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688. Reported probit coefficients are aver-
age marginal effects (AME). SP: sessions that were suddenly closed
(prorogued) by the monarch.
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Table 1.5: Conflict and Sudden Prorogation: OLS Estimates
Outcome: Session is Suddenly Closed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ConflictRevenue 0.65*** 0.62*** 0.59*** 0.55***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
ConflictMonarch 0.45** 0.52*** 0.48*** 0.28*
(0.19) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
IndirectRevenue -47.40** -48.73** -31.23
(22.42) (22.90) (21.14)
post1688 -1.22***
(0.41)
Constant 0.24*** 0.30*** -57.46** -53.49* -74.62**
(0.08) (0.08) (27.32) (30.93) (28.33)
Observations 38 38 38 38 38
R2 0.32 0.14 0.64 0.65 0.73
political vars no no no yes yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Outcome is an indicator if a session was suddenly closed by
the monarch. All estimates are OLS. post1688 is an indicator for ses-
sions meeting after the Glorious Revolution. ConflictRevenue: sessions
with conflict between parliament and monarch over fiscal issues (tax
bills). ConflictMonarch: sessions with conflict between monarch and
parliament over general policy (legislation). IndirectRevenue: amount
of customs and excise capturing the monarch’s financial independence
from parliament.
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Table 1.6: Glorious Revolution and Political Conflict, 1660-1702
Outcome: Successful Bill (Act of Parliament)
Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
post1688 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.13 0.14 0.16
(0.03) (0.06) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
ConflictRevenue -0.19*** -0.14** -0.15** -0.15**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
ConflictMonarch 0.07* 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
IndirectRevenue 0.04 0.26*** 0.21** 0.23**
(0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
observations 954 954 954 954 954
LR test 104.01 125.01 145.72 232.23 -
pseudo-R2 or R2 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.19 0.23
standard errors cluster
politics no no yes yes yes
type no no no yes yes
landowner no no no yes yes
origin no no no yes yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Outcome is bill success or failure. “Successful bill” was ap-
proved by House of Commons, House of Lords, and monarch (became
an Act of Parliament). Sample: bills introduced in sessions meeting
from 1660 to 1702. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684,
1686-1688. Reported probit coefficients are average marginal effects
(AME). post1688 is an indicator for sessions meeting after the Glorious
Revolution. ConflictRevenue: sessions with conflict between parlia-
ment and monarch over fiscal issues (tax bills). ConflictMonarch: ses-
sions with conflict between monarch and parliament over general policy
(legislation). IndirectRevenue: amount of customs and excise captur-
ing the monarch’s financial independence from parliament. Standard
errors clustered at session-level.
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Table 1.7: Glorious Revolution Mitigated Effects of Political Conflict
Outcome: Successful bill (Act of Parliament)
1660-1702 1660-1685 1689-1702
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
post1688 0.04 0.06
(0.18) (0.14)
ConflictRevenue -0.18*** -0.17** -0.29** -0.28** -0.07 -0.08
(0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08)
ConflictMonarch 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 -0.18 -0.14
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.21) (0.15)
IndirectRevenue 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.31)
post1688*ConflictRevenue 0.28* 0.30**
(0.12) (0.13)
post1688*ConflictMonarch 0.06 -0.02
(0.13) (0.16)
post1688*IndirectRevenue 0.02 0.04
(0.09) (0.12)
observations 954 954 438 438 516 516
LR test 237.76 - 107.33 - 69.95 -
pseudo-R2 or R2 0.19 0.23 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.14
standard errors cluster cluster cluster
politics yes yes yes yes yes yes
type yes yes yes yes yes yes
landowner yes yes yes yes yes yes
origin yes yes yes yes yes yes
ConflictRev + post1688ConflictRev = 0
F-test 0.35 0.07
p-value [0.55] [0.79]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Outcome is bill
success or failure. “Successful bill” was approved by House of Commons, House of Lords,
and monarch (became an Act of Parliament). Sample: bills introduced in sessions meeting
as indicated above columns. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
Reported probit coefficients are average marginal effects (AME). post1688 is an indicator for
sessions meeting after the Glorious Revolution. ConflictRevenue: sessions with conflict be-
tween parliament and monarch over fiscal issues (tax bills). ConflictMonarch: sessions with
conflict between monarch and parliament over general policy (legislation). IndirectRevenue:
proxies for monarch’s financial independence from parliament from 1660 to 1685. Estimate
shows change in probability of bill success for a £100,000 increase in indirect revenue. Stan-
dard errors clustered at session-level (column (2): 34, column (4): 20, and column (6): 14
clusters).
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Chapter 2
Economic and Legal Functions of
Estate Acts
Cyriat Weslyd cannot perform the said Sale unless he be enabled thereto by Act
of Parliament1
2.1 Introduction
From 1660 to 1702, England’s parliament saw nearly a thousand appeals similar to that
of Mr. Weslyd: a sale or transaction could not be carried out without an estate act of
parliament. Estate acts largely addressed rights to land for individual families created by
family settlements, which were a type of property conveyance and key legal piece of marriage
and inheritance practices in England. You can browse through the Journals of the Houses
of Parliament and you will likely find some time devoted to an estate bill on a given day.
Despite their prominence in parliament’s records and in the Parliamentary Archives, estate
acts have been understudied relative to other types of parliamentary legislation regarding
1Weslyd Estate Act, 10 &11 WIII, c. 70.
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property rights, like enclosure acts.2 The existing literature agrees that estate acts were
central to the settlement and inheritance system from 1660 to 1882.3 No work, however, has
studied acts during the “origins” of the estate act-settlement system from 1660 to 1702. It is
possible that their form and function during this period was quite different than later estate
acts, which have been studied to some degree by other scholars.
I collect and transcribe a random sample of 65 estate acts passed from 1660 to 1702 from
the Parliamentary Archives to study their economic and legal functions. A series of standing
orders were instituted at the end of William III’s reign (1694-1702) that would regulate
how parliament processed acts until the mid-nineteenth century.4 I code and classify the
individual clauses of each act.5 My approach to classifying estate acts differs from previous
work on the legislation that relies on information contained in acts’ descriptive titles or draws
on information outside of the acts.6
The first part of the paper documents that there are four main types of estate acts using
cluster analysis on the hand-coding of clauses. Cluster analysis is a statistical method
that shows how similar clauses are to one another based on how they co-occur in acts.
I use the method as a text analysis tool.7 The results show the four types of acts stem
2See, for example, McCloskey (1972) and Tennyson (2013).
3Previous work studying estate acts are Bogart and Richardson (2009, 2010) for the period from 1660 to
1830 and McCahill (2013) for the period from 1740 to 1800. Private estate acts were no longer needed with
the passage of the Settled Land Acts of the 1880s.
4Standing orders were instituted by the House of Lords to reform the legislative process for private legis-
lation. The reforms appear to begin in 1698 with a standing order that amended the committee requirements
for processing a bill. See Remembrances. Previous work on private acts during this period has focused on
standing orders. See, for example, William (1948).
5The approach is similar to Cox (2012) who codes provisions of supply acts passed by parliament during
this era. Priest (2015) examines the economic functions of entails by studying private acts in Virginia’s
legislature. The method is also similar to work coding different legal forms for businesses. For example,
Guinnane et al. (2018) code the types of articles of association for companies in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century Britain.
6Bogart and Richardson (2009, 2010) use descriptive titles to code acts’ economic and legal functions.
McCahill (2013), the closest to my study, classifies bills and examines the rationales for the legislation using
information from a variety of sources: petitions, judges’ reports, and the text of the acts. He does not discuss
the underlying conveyance, legal constraints or the way parliament addressed landholders’ appeals for an
act. Hoppit (1996, 1997, 2011) documents the aggregate evolution of private or personal acts of parliament
and failed legislation.
7Cluster analysis is generally useful to make “a typology or classification system where one does not
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from a landholder’s underlying type of property conveyance: land held in settlements, strict
settlements, by religious corporations, or regulated by other property conveyances (e.g. wills,
decrees of Chancery, and common recoveries). While landholders had different underlying
conveyances, all four types of acts addressed legal to carrying out economic transactions:
from selling land to pay debts to making leases to shopkeepers in London. Estate acts
contain a set of enactment clauses that provide a legal framework to authorize and support
economic transactions. Each type of act has a different set of enactment clauses, suggesting
parliament had different policies to address landholders’ conveyances and appeals.
The second part of this paper examines if and how the types of acts evolved over time.
Previous work shows there was a significant increase in the number of estate acts passed
by parliament and introduced after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Hoppit 1996). The
increase in volume is connected to the mitigation of conflict in government and the onset of
standardized meetings of parliament (Dimitruk, forthcoming; Hoppit 1996). I document that
there was also a change in the composition of acts during this period. Coincident with their
legal sanctioning and subsequent adoption by landholders during the 1690s (Bonfield 1983),
landholders increasingly used estate acts to address strict settlements, which allowed trusts
to protect an entail and even more difficult to break a settlement (Bonfield 1983). The
evidence suggests there was a policy change by parliament after the Glorious Revolution
of 1688. For example, parliament began allowing landholders to make loans with purchase
money from land sales after 1688. There was also a significant change in who used estate acts.
Relatively fewer members of the nobility, upper gentry, and Members of Parliament (MPs)
petitioned for acts and relatively more lower-ranked landholders (professionals, esquires, and
gentlemen) petitioned for estate acts after the Glorious Revolution. Both the evident policy
changes and greater access to parliament are likely connected to a new political economic
equilibrium ushered in with the Glorious Revolution, which also altered England’s state
already exist” (Gore 2000). Recent work uses computational text analysis to examine states’ borrowing and
migration of the United States Civil Code during the mid-nineteenth century (Funk and Mullen 2018). See
also Klerman (forthcoming) for an overview of recent quantitative methods in legal history.
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formation and public finance (Stasavage 2007; Pincus 2009; Cox 2016; Pincus and Robinson
2014; Hodgson 2017).
The last part of the paper studies the economic implications of estate acts. I first match
30% of acts to secondary sources of topographical histories (mostly the Victoria County
Histories) to show that transactions actually took place because a family received an act.
Transactions largely took place in London and Middlesex, an important part of England’s
growing economy during the seventeenth century. I also estimate a minimum return to an act
for a family. The estimated returns to a transaction were generally large. They ranged from
a minimum 1 to at least 50% return for a project. The highest returns were for properties
in London and for members of the lower gentry (esquires and gentlemen).
The findings contribute to the economic history of estate acts and settlements. Previous
work on the legislation highlights that acts were an “essential counterpart to settlements”
but arrives at different conclusions about the functions of acts. The evidence in this paper
supports the argument that acts addressed high transaction costs of land use created by
settlements.8 The findings also show that acts facilitated debt payments, but this appears
to be connected to how English law protected land from seizure by creditors (Priest 2006)
as opposed to largely facilitating over-consumption (McCahill 2013). The types of property
holders, the geography of acts, and the scale of settled land involved is at odds with the
historical literature on settlements. It is generally agreed that entails and strict settlements
were primarily used by the nobility and upper gentry to restrict alienation and keep landed
estates together as a source of socioeconomic and political power (Habakkuk 1979, 1994;
Priest 2006).9 That many acts were for Middlesex and members of the lower gentry is
consistent with recent work showing a variety of landholders in London had settled property
at the time of the Great Fire of London in 1666 (Doolittle 2015). It is possible that a broader
cross section of landholders used settlements and entails for other economic reasons. Priest
8Bogart and Richardson (2009, 2010, 2011).
9See also Erickson (1993) and Chapter 6 in Bonfield (1983) for an overview.
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(2015), for example, argues entails were used to protect against financial risk in the American
colonies.
The evidence also connects England’s growing economy to institutional change facilitated by
parliament.10 Since North and Weingast (1989), it has been the subject of much debate if
there is any connection between property rights or parliamentary policies during this period.
The current consensus is that there was not (Ogilvie and Carus 2014: 23). This paper
provides new evidence consistent with Bogart and Richardson (2011) that parliament and
estate acts aimed to reorganize property rights, create security in transacting, and allow a
range of landholders to access England’s commercializing and urbanizing economy during
the seventeenth century.11 The evidence is important because this time period in England is
often used as the historical example to illustrate how property rights influence development
and how institutions change more generally.12 It shows how parliament commodified land at
a time it became more difficult to market because of the creation of the strict settlement. The
study thus provides insight to England’s transition from feudalism to capitalism (Hodgson
2015; 2017).
10Recent work shows that there was a series of dramatic changes in economic activity in seventeenth-
century England. See Wallis et al. (2018) for structural change, Kelly and O´ Gra´da (2016) for innovation in
production, and Broadberry and Wallis (2017) for a tempering of aggregate fluctuations in economic activity.
11On the importance of reorganizing property rights in development, see for example Rosenthal (1990),
Epstein (2000), and Lamoreaux (2011). That property rights to land were important also helps understand
why parliament, as a body of landholders, appears to have enacted policies in acts that were “good.” See
Ogilvie and Carus (2014).
12See Besley and Ghatak (2010) for an example of work citing this period for property rights and develop-
ment; see Murrell (2017) and Cox (2012) for institutional change more generally and the difference between
evolutionary vs. structural breaks in institutions.
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2.2 Background: Settlements and Estate Acts of Par-
liament
2.2.1 Purposes and Forms of Settlements
Most estate acts addressed property rights for land held in property conveyances called
settlements. I show below that few also addressed land held by religious corporations and
land regulated by other types of conveyances, like wills or decrees of chancery.13 A settlement
had origins in the medieval era practice of making financial arrangements for a family at
marriage (Bonfield 1983: 1). Families used settlements for two reasons. First, they provided
for a wife upon widowhood (creating a jointure) and, by the end of the seventeenth century,
evolved to contain provisions for other family members.14 Second, settlements ensured the
transmission of property across generations. The types of settlements available to landholders
to carry out these goals evolved over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
with transitions in English land law (Bonfield 1983: Chapters 2 and 4).
There were two main types of settlements available to landholders by the end of the seven-
teenth century: (1) the “life estate-entail mode” and (2) the strict settlement (Bonfield 1983:
Chapters 2 and 4). They both were generally created at marriage or by will and made the
current, living landholders life tenants with specific rights or powers to manage settled land
and provide for family members. Examples of powers include those to charge estates, e.g. for
jointure or provision for children (their portions or maintenances). Powers that facilitated
estate management include making leases, selling, or mortgaging land (English and Saville
1983: 17-20). Powers were given to specific persons. If a life tenant died, for example, the
power could not be exercised. If the parties did not write a specific power in the settlement,
13See Bond (1964) and Section 2.3 below.
14There was a transition of discretionary to mandatory provisions of younger sons and daughters in mar-
riage settlement (Bonfield 1983: 110-115).
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such as the power to sell land, settled land could not be sold.
The two types of settlements differed in how they ensured the transmission of property
across generations. Both types of settlements created an estate tail or entail which specified
a particular line of succession for the estate. The custom or norm was primogeniture - to
grant an entail to the line of the eldest son or male children (heirs male of the body). The
difference between a life estate-entail settlement and a strict settlement lay in how they
protected the entail, which was a specific type of contingent remainder.
A life estate-entail settlement created an entail that was secured in the eldest son who,
depending on the time of making the settlement, was unborn. The entail was contingent
because it depended on the event of the eldest son actually being born. Until the heir
was born and the entail had vested, it was precarious because the life tenant could destroy
it through a variety of legal actions and would no longer be subject to the terms of the
settlement (Bonfield 1983: 32 and 47). A strict, or restrictive, settlement created a trust
that had powers with the life tenant. The trust was charged with “preserving the contingent
remainders” to ensure the estate descended as specified in an entail. It is this type of
settlement that has received the most attention by economic historians and historians of
English landed society because it was in use for about two hundred years.15
The strict settlement was an innovation in conveyancing sometime in the mid to late seven-
teenth century. Strict settlements were available to landholders as a legal form throughout
the later seventeenth century. It was a legally dubious device until 1697, however, because
the two court systems - equity and common law - did not align in their treatment of trustees.
Chancery may have been protecting trusts before 1675,16 but the common law courts offi-
15 See Habakkuk (1994) and Bonfield (1983): Chapter 6 for a useful overview of the literature. Settlements
could create trusts for a variety of purposes related to provision for the family. A trust was employed to raise
stipends for wives (jointures) or younger children (portions). They could also be used for married women’s
separate estates (Bonfield 1983: 70, 110-115; Erickson 1993).
16Cases in 1683 and 1693 show that Chancery was protecting trusts as well as debating other matters
regarding the duty of the trustees. These are Davies v. Weld in 1683 and Platt v. Spugg in 1693 (Bonfield
1983: 77-78).
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cially sanctioned trustees to preserve contingent remainders in 1697 with the case Duncomb
v. Duncomb (Bonfield 1983: 71).17
2.2.2 Amending and Breaking Settlements
Settlements and strict settlements developed within the context of how English equitable and
common law regarded land use. Since Henry VIII, there was conflict in the courts over how
conveyances promoted or prevented the alienability of property. Throughout the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, common law was generally against restraints on alienation and
allowed for barring entails to break settlements through different legal actions. Landholders
and conveyancers sought methods of protecting land and property to keep it in tact as a
source of economic and political power. As noted above, an entail was one method to keep
land in tact across generations but it was precarious because it could be destroyed by a life
tenant through a variety of legal actions. One process available was a common recovery.
Strict settlements could only be broken by common recovery. By “suffering a recovery,” a
family would join with the heir when they turned 21 and enter into a fictitious law suit
to break a settlement. The family could then alter their estate, sell land, and write a new
settlement (English and Saville 1983: 14, 23).
The only other method for breaking or amending a (strict) settlement was by an (estate)
act of parliament (English and Saville 1983: 14, 23). Estate acts were versatile. Acts could
completely void a settlement, give life tenants or trustees new powers, or amend the charges
on an estate. From 1660 to 1702, parliament worked on 954 estate bills. A majority of the
bills (67%) were approved by the House of Commons, Lords, and monarch to become acts
of parliament (Dimitruk, forthcoming).
There is a debate on the legal and economic functions of estate acts. Some work argues that
17Legally, the case allowed estates to become vested in trustees, in turn securing the viability of the strict
settlement.
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settlements created high transaction costs of land use, which in turn prevented land from
being sold, invested in, or transformed for productive purposes (Bogart and Richardson
2009). Contemporary jurists also argued that entails prevented landholders from raising
capital by making long-term leases and that entails “could discourage purchasers because one
could not be certain of the seller’s right to convey” (cited in Bonfield 1983: 16). A different
view argues that landholders appealed to parliament to pay debts that were largely incurred
for social rather than economic reasons. Acts therefore facilitated “indulgent expenditure”
and profligacy of landholders (McCahill 2013). A related perspective is that estate acts
provided a mechanism for property holders “to raise large sums of money for a sudden need”
(Bond 1964: 326).
2.3 Economic and Legal Functions of Estate Acts
In this section, I show that there are four main types of estate acts from 1660 to 1702. The
types are found using hierarchical cluster analysis on a hand-coding of each act’s individual
clauses.
2.3.1 Coding Estate Acts
I transcribe a random sample of 65 estate acts collected from the Parliamentary Archives.18
I code several pieces of information: the economic and legal functions of the acts, the types
of landholders who used estate acts, the location and property value of the settled land. In
this section, I focus on the economic and legal functions. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss who
used estate acts and location of the settled property.
18A full list of the acts with reference number, title, year and session of passage is found in Appendix
Section B.1.
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A simple time-line, shown in Figure 2.1, helps understand the structure of estate acts and
my coding of their economic and legal functions. A family chooses to settle their land at
time t, usually at marriage or at death. The family then goes about life. They enter into
other economic transactions with unsettled property and settled property (as allowed by the
powers of a settlement). For example, a family can mortgage unsettled land, make loans, and
manage their property and rental incomes. Families also make other decisions, for example,
when and how many children (potential heirs) to have. At some later date t′ the family
encounters an event or condition that changes their life or economic situation. Examples of
events include a child’s marriage or the death of a life tenant. A family could also encounter
an opportunity to pay their debts, sell land, or make an investment in their property. They
assess the details of their settlement and find, however, that they are constrained from
carrying out a transaction. For example, if the entail has become vested in the heir and does
not contain a specific power to convey land, then the family would not be able to sell their
settled land if there was a willing purchaser.
To carry out the transaction, the family has two choices. If a family has a life estate-entail
settlement and the entail has vested (heir has been born), then they can wait to break the
settlement when the heir turns 21. If a family has a strict settlement, they can wait to
break the settlement when the heir (who may be born or unborn) turns 21. In either case,
a family can also decide to bring a proposal to parliament for an estate act. We observe
the families who decide to come to parliament. They - or their representative (a lawyer or
Member of Parliament) - appeal for an act by describing their economic situation and legal
constraint. The family also gives a brief proposal of a project or reorganization they would
like to complete. They often explain that the project is for the benefit of the entire family.
Specifically, 40% percent of acts cite either that the proposed project will be “too the benefitt
and advantage” of the current landholders, their issue, and family or that the family, naming
the life tenant, wife, children, would be greatly “damnified and ruined” without an act. The
bill goes through the parliamentary process and, if a solution is found and approved, becomes
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an act of parliament.19 The estate act is then observed at time t′′.
Estate acts have a common format. They begin with a preamble section which is followed
by an enactment section. An example of the beginning of a preamble section is shown
in Appendix Figure B.1. An example of the beginning of an enactment section is shown
in Appendix Figure B.2. Each section has a set of clauses. Preamble clauses begin with
“Whereas” and enactment clauses begin with “Be it therefore Enacted.” Each clause was
entered into a separate column in a spreadsheet. I then read each clause and coded its
content:
(1) the type of settlement or property conveyance made at time t ((I) in Figure 2.1),
(2) the types of appeals (economic and legal) a petitioner made to parliament ((II)-(IV)
in Figure 2.1), and
(3) the types of enactment clauses found in an act ((V) in Figure 2.1).
Table 2.1 reports a full list of the types clauses with summary statistics (number, share of
acts that contain the clause, standard deviation).
2.3.2 Types of Acts: Cluster Analysis
I use cluster analysis to study how the clauses in each act fit together to produce types of
acts. The approach provides a new way to classify types of estate acts using their entire
content and not only in terms of the types of economic transactions estate acts allowed.20
The method uncovers new patterns and is useful as a robustness check on the coding of
individual clauses. For example, we can expect a cluster to have an appeal citing the costs
of debts are high with a proposal to pay or reorganize their debts. Cluster analysis produces
a tree called a dendrogram that shows how similar or dissimilar clauses are to one another
based on how clauses co-occur in acts. The results mirror settlements themselves:
19See Dimitruk (forthcoming) for an overview of parliament’s process of passing estate acts during this
period.
20It builds on Bogart and Richardson (2010) who code legal functions using descriptive titles.
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“[s]ettlements were like leaves on a tree: all different, yet nevertheless recognis-
ably leaves of the same tree. A settlement could be made to do anything: ‘there
is no event, or combination of events, which can possibly happen in a family, or
whatever rank or number, but what may be provided for and met, by a family
settlement’ [...] Almost any difficulty arising in the management of a settled es-
tate could be remedied by private [estate] act” (English and Saville 1983: 18 and
50).
Cluster analysis is an agglomerative method that begins with the coding of the individual
clauses and agglomerates clusters of similar clauses.21 Each act has a set of binary indicators
if it includes the clauses recorded in Table 2.1. I therefore have an act by clause matrix (65
rows and 33 columns). There are three steps to identify clusters of clauses. First, the act by
clause matrix is transposed into a clause by act matrix to examine how clauses co-occur in
acts. I then transform the matrix into a distance matrix. The distance matrix tells us how
similar (or dissimilar) pairs of clauses are based on if they are found together in acts. Last,
I use different hierarchical clustering algorithms in R (specifically the hclust() function) to
examine how clauses go together or are found together in acts.
Figure 2.2 illustrates clusters of clauses using two different algorithms for examining the
similarity of clauses. The algorithms have different criteria for linking clusters. Panel A uses
a single linkage method; Panel B uses a complete linkage method. The single or minimum
linkage method finds loose clusters by computing pairwise dissimilarities between elements
in one cluster compared to another and then considers the minimum of the dissimilarities
as a linkage criterion. It is a “friends of friends” strategy. The complete linkage method
first computes pairwise dissimilarities between the elements in one cluster and elements in a
second cluster and then considers the maximum value of the dissimilarities to be the linkage
criterion. The resulting clusters are compact relative to the single linkage method.
21The method has similarities to factor analysis which is common social sciences to create composite indices
or scores. Factor analysis creates groups from the covariability across the individual items or variables.
Cluster analysis creates groups from scores across the set of variables (Gore 2000).
50
The results show that there are four main types of acts. The types stem from the main
property conveyance or settlement a family made, which is a mutually exclusive category: (1)
life estate entail settlements, (2) strict settlements, (3) other types of property conveyances
(e.g. wills or decrees of chancery), and (4) land held by religious corporations. The four
types of property conveyances are associated with different types of appeals and enactment
clauses. Because of the nature of appeals and enactment clauses, they are not mutually
exclusive categories. An act has a binary indicator if it contains a specific type of clause or
not.
Type 1: Life Estate Entail Settlement Acts
The first type of act addresses life estate-entail settlements (labeled (I) in Panel A and Panel
B in Figure 2.2). Most acts (about 60%) addressed this type of settlement (Panel A-1, Table
2.1). Families with life estate-entail settlements sought estate acts for a variety of economic
purposes: from selling land to pay debts and portions for their children (cluster (I-a)) to
making leases (cluster (I-b)).
Families most often cited that there was an incomplete transaction, such a land sale or
debt contract (51% of acts, Panel A-2, Table 2.1). Landholders also frequently sought to
reorganize their estate to pay their debts (40% of acts, Panel A-4, Table 2.1) because the
costs of debt servicing were high. This is most clearly seen in cluster (I-b) in Panel B of
Figure 2.2. About 50% of acts’ descriptive titles describe that the acts allowed landholders
to sell land to pay debts (Bogart and Richardson (2010): Figure 5). McCahill (2013) also
documents that about 50% of landholders in his sample appealed to parliament to pay
debts. Because of the prominence of debt payments, I discuss how acts addressed debt
and credit transactions in more detail in Section 2.3.3. Landholders with settlements also
sought to make leases or build when there was an investment opportunity (cluster (I-a),
Panel B, Figure 2.2). Previous work also documents lease acts were primarily motivated by
investment opportunities (McCahill 2013) and that lease acts are found in Middlesex and
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London, possibly related to London’s expansion (Bogart and Richardson 2009, 2010).
There were two types of constraints associated with life estate-entail settlements that pre-
vented landholders from carrying out economic transactions: (1) the heir was under 21
(constraint.minority) and therefore the entail had vested and (2) the life tenant was gener-
ally barred from carrying out the transaction, possibly because the settlement did not have a
specific power (constraint.life.tenant.barred). These two constraints are the most commonly
cited legal constraints (Panel A-3, Table 2.1).
Parliament addressed life estate-entail settlements and landholders’ appeals with a common
set of economic clauses. All acts provided a specific “economic clause” that authorized the
transaction to take place: either by empowering the landholder or vesting the property in
a set of trustees who had the authority to carry out the transactions. These clauses are
directly related to the titles of an act, allowing land to be sold, mortgaged, or leased (Panel
B, Table 2.1). The coding and clusters also show that acts have “legal enactment clauses”
that appear to have supported the transaction in other ways. Forty percent of acts contain
a clause or phrase that specified the transaction would be considered “good at law” by
protecting the transaction from potential claimants (Panel B-2, Table 2.1). This clause is
most often included in acts that allowed land to be sold or leased (clusters (I-a) and (I-b),
Figure 2.1).
At least a quarter of acts also have clauses that specifically amended the family settlement by
discharging estates on the land, amending family charges (for example jointures), or explicitly
protecting a charge from being altered (Panel B-2, Table 2.1). These “settlement amendment
clauses” are found in life estate-entail acts using the single linkage criteria (cluster (I-a) in
Panel A). It may have been necessary to compensate family members or potential losers to
carry out the proposed transaction.22 About 30% of appeals explain that the family members
or other interested parties agree or consent to the proposed transaction and reorganization.
22See Hoppit (2011) for compensation and parliamentary principles during this era.
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Type 2: Strict Settlement Acts
A life estate-entail settlement was the standard conveyance for landholding families during
this era while strict settlements were relatively new. Fewer acts addressed strict settlements
than life estate-entail settlements for the entire period (20% compared to 58%, Panel A-1,
Table 2.1). I discuss changes over time in Section 2.4. Clusters (II-a) and (II-b) in Panel
A and cluster (IV) in Panel B show that a different set of appeals and clauses are clustered
with strict settlements. There is a better defined cluster with more clauses when using the
complete linkage algorithm (Panel B).
Acts with strict settlements commonly cite that costs of managing land were high and sought
to reorganize estates by purchasing new land. McCahill (2013) finds a similar type of appeal
citing high management costs and the desire to make estates more coherent (pp. 158-159).
Families with strict settlements face two main types of legal constraints: (1) claims could be
made after any transaction by family members and (2) the trustees were without a specific
power to carry out a transaction and if they did so would be in breach of trust (cluster (IV),
Panel B).
Several clauses are found in the life estate-entail settlement (cluster (I-a), Panel A) are
also found in the strict settlement (cluster (IV), Panel B). The overlap shows that appeals
and enactment clauses were found in both types of acts. Landholders with either types of
conveyance sought to sell, lease, and mortgage their property.
Acts for strict settlements were different in that parliament appears to have created policies
that enabled landholders to make their estates more coherent. Specifically, acts addressing
strict settlements contain provisions that authorized landholders to make loans with purchase
money after selling land (cluster (II-b), Panel A; cluster (IV), Panel B). Acts in McCahill’s
study allowed landholders to invest in more liquid assets, like government bonds, but did
not allow landholders to make loans. Enactment clauses also addressed the liability of the
trustees who would carry out the transaction (cluster (II-a), Panel A; cluster (IV), Panel
53
B). Strict settlement acts also amended and protected existing charges for family members
(cluster (IV), Panel B).
Types 3 and 4: Acts for Other Conveyances and Religious Corporations
Seventeen percent of acts addressed other types of land conveyances (for example wills,
decrees of chancery, common recoveries, and previous acts of parliament). The acts appear to
have less structure than settlement acts because its cluster is sensitive to the type of algorithm
used. It is loosely connected to appeals to make settlements when a family member is upon
marriage (cluster (III), Panel A). Panel B shows it is most closely connected with the appeal
landholders had an unforeseen circumstance or accidental event that led to the need for an
act. This type of appeal was the most colorful. For example, appeals cite that a life tenant
or executor of a will had fled the country or could not be found. One family’s life tenant
suddenly died before officially signing his will. Another landholder received bad counsel or
legal advice and therefore entered into a conveyance that had unintended consequences. The
finding highlights that acts could be used to address not only settlements but a a variety of
types of contracts and circumstances.
The last type of act addressed land held by religious corporations (cluster (IV), Panel A;
cluster (III), Panel B). There are only two in the sample of 65 and both were for land held by
the Bishopric of London. The acts not only hint at the importance of London and Middlesex
property markets but also provide evidence that parliament reorganized rights for land held
in other types of restrictive conveyances that could not be changed as economic opportunities
changed. The descriptions in these acts describe a growing and changing property market.
In 1662, the Bishop of London sought to make leases of land in the heart of London, near
St. Paul’s cathedral.23 In 1692, the Bishop also sought to exchange lands with tenements
and cottages that had become intermixed and with his neighbor the Earl of Monmouth. The
same act sought to enclose a parcel of common land which was “boggy” and had become “a
23Bishop of London Estate Act, 14 CII, c. 40.
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very great Annoyance and unhealthy to the inhabitants” who lived nearby.24
2.3.3 Credit and Debt in Estate Acts
Motivated by the fact that 40% of acts appealed to reorganize estates and pay debts, this
subsection examines credit and debt transactions in acts. I first examine if and how acts
aimed to facilitate debt payments by removing legal constraints to pay debts. Second, I
discuss how acts gave landholders direct access to more liquid assets (e.g. money).
Landholders appealed to refinance their estates by paying their debts or by taking a lower
interest rate. English law protected land and estates from involuntary seizure by creditors
for payment of secured and unsecured debts (Priest 2006: 401-408). Landholders still had
incentive to pay their debts to maintain access to further credit for resources to manage
their property and provide for family members. English law in general “gave landholders
the privilege to choose [when] to sell land, and land was sold only on terms to which they
consented” (Priest 2006: 408). Landholders in my sample could have secured or unsecured
debts. The families could only have secured debts - “credit that was extended on the basis
of specific pledges of land as collateral, formalized by signatures and the debtors’ seals” - on
freehold land - and not settled land (Priest 2006: 401-408).
The acts only describe landholders settled property, but it seems likely that landhold- ers
using estate acts had mortgaged freehold property. Mortgage contracts allowed land to
remain mortgaged for years or decades. Mortgage contracts were private, individual contracts
that specify a date for repayment (usually one year from the date of the mortgage).25 Lenders
24Monmouth Estate Act, 4&5 W&M, c. 38.
25There were three main types: (1) mortgages by demise, (2) by conveyance, (3) by assign-
ment. A personal bond could also be used to secure the repayment of a sum of money. A
bond for debt was often drawn up in connection with a mortgage and were used to strengthen
the covenants for repayment in the mortgage deed. Other bonds for debt might refer to the
payment of an annuity, or simply a sum of money lent privately between two people. See
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/deedsindepth/mort-
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were “happy with the interest being paid once or twice a year” because a mortgage was viewed
as an investment in which interest payments brought in a steady income.26 A creditor or
lender would only begin to take actions in the common law courts and Court of Chancery
to recover debts if the debtor or borrower failed to pay the annual interest on the mortgage
contract (Priest 2006: 404-407). Secured debts could also be inherited with land across
generations because lenders could bind future heirs to the contract. If heirs were bound to
the contract, then a creditor could pursue a cause of action against the heir after the debtor’s
death. In this case an heir might be compelled to discharge the debt out of the real property
he inherited (Priest 2006: 404).
Table 2.2 summarizes information on credit-debt transactions found in estate acts. The
most common transaction (found in 26/65=40% of all acts) was debt payment by allowing
landholders to sell, lease, or mortgage land (Panel A). About half of appeals to pay debts
(13/26) cite that the “costs of debt maintenance” were high. This could be because the rents
were not sufficient to cover interest rate payments (6/26=23% of acts citing debt payment),
the debts were “great” or “considerable,” or that the landholder was facing an action of
ejectment by a creditor (2/26=8% of all acts citing debt payment). One appeal is explicit
that the landholders would like to refinance for a lower interest rate because the “Interest
at the rate of six pounds per cent yearely is payable for the most of the principall money
thereby secured [and can therefore gain no benefit of the land].”27 An interest rate of 6
percent is the same as the mortgage interest rate series compiled by Allen (1988) from 1651
to 1703 (Table 1). The cost of debts may have been large for specific families, but the value
of the debts they wanted to discharge were not obviously greater than other types of appeals
to pay debts (Panel A of Table 2.2).28
gaged/mortgaged.aspx
26See https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/deedsindepth/mort-
gaged/mortgaged.aspx
27Cornbury Estate Act, 2&3 W&M, c. 15.
28The value of debts recorded in acts are not as large as those found in McCahill (2013). Using information
outside of estate bills, McCahill (2013) finds that families on 53 estate bills had levels of debts between £4,000
and over £75,000; 5 estate bills had debts under £4,000. See Table 5.
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About a quarter of appeals (6/26) cite that the family has an incomplete debt contract. The
family has tried or would like to pay the debt, but are facing some legal constraint and are
therefore unable to do so. For example, an Act in 1690 appealed that landholders Henry and
Philip Hildeyard had mortgaged property (by conveyance) to John Howland, who was their
heir at law, for the sum of £1,751. John Howland, however, had since died and his daughter
and heir, Elizabeth, was under 21. She was therefore unable to effectively re-convey the
property back to the Hildeyards after they had made the payment due on the mortgage.29
An additional quarter of acts (7/26) cite that the family is facing high costs of debt and
has an incomplete transaction. For example, the Earl of Cleveland received an Act in 1666
amending a previous of act of parliament. The Act of 1666 extended his time to pay debts
(enlarging the equity of redemption), therefore helping to complete a debt payment. With
the previous act, he had already raised “summes of money bonafide paid and disbursed for
purchase of interest improvements” but that there were still a “multiplicity of interests” in
the mortgaged premises that required more time for payment.30
The types of debts recorded in appeals suggest that debt payment was a problem because
the law allowed debts to “roll over” with the estate after the death of a life tenant, similar
to that of the Hildeyard’s case discussed above. More than half of appeals (58%) cite that
they would like to pay the life tenant’s debts but are ambiguous as to why the debts were
incurred (Panel B, Table 2.2). Two-thirds of these acts (10/15) are clear that the life tenant
is deceased and that the debts have carried over with the estate. In 1695, Samuel Powell
explained that a will did not make adequate provision for debt repayment: “by reason of the
deficiency of the provision which his father had made for payment thereof [...] your supplyant
Samuel is unable to pay otherwise than by mortgage or sale of a reasonable part of the said
estate”31 Thomas Hopwood explained in 1698 that there was a lack of information about the
inherited debts: “the said Thomas Hopwood being under age at the time of the said Articles
29Hildeyard Estate Act, 2&3 W&M, c. 29.
30Cleveland Estate Act, 18&19 CII, c. 6.
31Powell Estate Act, 7&8 WIII, c. 10.
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and Marriage did not know that the said Debts were so many and great and did not take
care to make provision upon the said Marriage for payment thereof.”32
A specific type of debt is described in 42% of proposals to pay debts. The types of debts
are evenly distributed across three categories which not obviously suggestive of profligacy as
found by McCahill (2013). There was a lingering effect of the Civil Wars: 15% percent of
debts were incurred because landholders needed to pay fines or buy back land after it was
confiscated during the Civil Wars. Fifteen percent cite that debts were incurred to pay for
family charges (e.g. marriage portions or children’s maintenances). About 11% cite that
debts were incurred for of productive purposes (e.g. to work coal mines or to build).
In addition to facilitating debt payments, estate acts also facilitated landholders’ ability to
access more liquid assets by empowering them to mortgage land and by allowing them to
make loans. The evidence suggests parliament was breaking constraints landholders faced
and transforming resources to be more liquid at a time when England’s economy was com-
mercializing. The transformations are key components of economic development because
they can give landholders access to “resources such as tools, livestock, and building materi-
als in agricultural societies or money in more advanced markets” (Priest 2006: 393; Hodgson
2015). Parliament would eventually require that funds be invested in government bonds or
navy and exchequer bills with a standing order of 1762 (McCahill 2013: 158; Bogart and
Richardson 2009).
2.4 Glorious Revolution and Rise of Strict Settlements
There was large and significant increase in the number of estate acts passed by parliament
after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The increase has largely been attributed to the miti-
gation of conflict and onset of standardized meetings of parliament (Dimitruk, forthcoming;
32Hopwood Estate Act, 11&12 WIII, c. 29.
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Hoppit 1996). It is possible that the composition of acts also changed because of political and
legal developments of the era. In this section, I examine if and which types of conveyances,
appeals, and enactment clauses (and therefore types of acts) became more or less common
after 1688. I also examine if and how different landholders accessed parliament after the
Glorious Revolution. I comment on the related literature in light of the findings.
The composition of estate acts could have evolved because the period saw both legal and
political changes. First, there were important developments in general property rights in-
stitutions. As discussed in Section 2.2, the strict settlement was a legal innovation in con-
veyancing during this period that made it more difficult to sell or use land in new ways.
Strict settlements were increasingly adopted by landholders during the later seventeenth
century. Both common law and chancery courts aligned in 1697 to sanction strict settle-
ments (Bonfield 1983). The share of acts citing strict settlements as the primary type of
conveyance increases by 16% after 1688 but it is not statistically significant (Panel A, Ta-
ble 2.3).33 Figure B.5 plots the evolution in the number of acts citing a settlement, strict
settlement, religious corporation, or other type of conveyance. There appears to be a slow
evolution over the course of the period with an increasing number of strict settlements and
fewer “other” types of conveyances after 1688. Parallel to their legal validation in the court
system and subsequent adoption (Bonfield 1983: Chapter 3, Table 3), 60% of acts (8/13)
naming strict settlements are found at the end of the period from 1695 to 1702.
The analysis in Section 2.3.2 shows that settlements and strict settlements led to different
types of acts because they are clustered with a different set of economic appeals, legal
constraints, and enactment clauses. We may therefore expect to see an evolution in the
appeals landholders made to parliament. Strict settlements are clustered with appeals related
to management costs, legal issues with trusts, and proposals to purchase new property.
Relatively more acts cite high management costs after 1688, but, similar to that of strict
33There is no statistical change before and after 1697, when the common law courts approved of strict
settlements.
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settlements, it is not a statistically significant change. Legal constraints related to trusts
are only found in appeals after 1688 and there is a significant increase in the share of acts
proposing to purchase new property after 1688.34
Panel B of Table 2.3 reports differences in types of enactment clauses or policies parliament
used to address appeals. The cluster analysis shows that parliament allowed loans to be
made if a family had a strict settlement, was facing high management costs, and proposed to
purchase new property. Mortgage clauses are also found in a similar part of the trees as the
strict settlement cluster (cluster (IV), Panel B). Acts allowing mortgages and loans appear
only after 1688. There was also a change in the types of legal clauses found in acts. There was
a significant increase in the share of acts (by 0.23) with the legal clause that the transaction
would be “good at law.” Clauses specifically addressing a trust (for example, limiting the
liability of individual trustees) are only found after the Glorious Revolution. Last, there is
a significant increase in the share of acts with clauses to protect existing charges (by 0.16).
Clauses to protect existing charges are found in the strict settlement cluster when using the
complete linkage algorithm (cluster (IV), Panel B, Figure 2.2).
There was thus not a sharp or structural break in the types of conveyances found in estate
acts, nor was there a sharp change in the types of economic appeals landholders made.
Parliament rather saw a slowly increasing share of families with strict settlements over the
period. We see some (as opposed to no) strict settlements in parliament even though fewer
landholders used them from 1660 to 1690s. Parliament was thus familiar with the device and
designing acts to address them. The types of policies that allowed landholders to carry out
their proposed projects, however, appears to have significantly changed after the Glorious
Revolution.
Parliament appears to have adopted novel policies that allowed families who had strict
settlements to convert their resources to more liquid assets through mortgages and loans.
34The pattern is consistent with Figure 5 in Bogart and Richardson (2010) who use acts’ descriptive titles.
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Parliament also adopted legal clauses that would support these economic activities by en-
suring the transactions would be good at law and clarifying duties of trustees who would
carry out the transactions. Last, the evidence suggests that strict settlements created a
need for parliament to protect existing charges in order to allow landholders to break their
settlements.35 It is likely that the new policies are linked to the political changes of the era.
I discuss further below.
We may also expect to see a different composition of landholders who used estate acts after
the Glorious Revolution. I first code the characteristics of petitioners for acts.36 Panel A of
Table B.3 in the Appendix reports the social classes of petitioners: if the petition has a noble
person, a titled gentry (baronets and knights), an untitled gentry (esquires and gentlemen),
a member of the clergy (bishop or archbishop), or a professional (alderman, merchant, or
some trade like ironmonger, goldsmith, or creditor). I also code if the petitioner is a Member
of Parliament (MP) or is related to an MP, the petitioner is female, or the petitioners are
a couple.37 The distribution of the types of petitioners is consistent with the underlying
distribution of landholders in England, which was a majority gentry (Thompson 1966). A
similar distribution, with the exception of the proportion of professionals, is also found by
previous studies (Bogart and Richardson 2010; McCahill 2013). I find fewer professionals
who petitioned for acts over the course of the entire period, but I document there was a
significant change over time.
Second, I code characteristics of trustees in the enactment clauses. Acts could use the legal
35There is a possible connection to the rulings of the common law and chancery courts. According to
Bonfield (1983), the decision of the common law courts in Duncomb v. Duncomb also altered the “attitude
of Chancery” towards protecting trusts. The ruling possibly changed the nature of the cases brought forward
in Chancery. Before 1697, the Chancellor faced requests to break settlements. Thereafter, cases arose because
the contingent remaindermen who were deprived for the interest and requested relief (pg. 78).
36Acts have a petition clause that names the specific landholders requesting the act. I code the information
for any petitioners listed in this clause. The petition clause is usually found at the beginning of the preamble
or enactment sections. Acts can have more than one petitioner so the characteristics are not mutually
exclusive. See Section B.1 for details.
37A full discussion of the interests and role of women in the political, legal, and economic process of
obtaining an act is currently outside the scope of this paper but is important for future work.
61
device of a trust to carry out the economic transaction.38 For example, an Act passed in 1666
sanctioned that “the purchase money which is to bee paid [...] shall be laid out and disposed
by the right Honourable George Duke of Albermarle John Gould Esquire Mary Monck mother
of the said Elizabeth Pride and Thomas Stringer Esquire for the purchasing lands.”39 Panel
B of Table B.3 in the Appendix reports the distribution of trustees across social classes. It
is similar to that of petitioners with the exception of professionals, who are more likely to be
trustees. There are two characteristics of trustees that are not found in petitions: trustees
“of London” and trustees “of an Inn of Court” (trained in law). The trustees from London
appear to be agents of families with property outside of London because only 33% (4/12)
acts naming a trustee from London were for property in London and Middlesex. The variety
of petitioners and trustees highlights that a range of landholders used acts and were involved
in the management of property during the seventeenth century.
Table 2.4 shows that overall distribution of types of petitioners and trustees emerges after the
Glorious Revolution. There is a significant decline in the share of acts naming petitioners that
have more political and economic resources (either a noble person, a member of the upper
gentry, or an MP). The share of acts naming a member of the lower gentry or a professional
significantly increases after 1688 (by 22%). The two groups are not mutually exclusive, but
are significantly negatively correlated. A similar evolution is found for trustees. First, acts
increasingly vested property in trusts (by 40%) to allow land to be sold, mortgaged, or leased
(Panel B of Table 2.4). The share of acts naming a lower gentry as a trustee significantly
increased after 1688. Acts naming professionals, lawyers (of an inn of court), and people
from London as trustees are only found after the Glorious Revolution.
The evidence suggests the political changes of the era influenced who was able to access
parliament. While private acts had been provided to landholders from the 1600s, the late
seventeenth century was the first time parliament sat continuously since the Civil Wars and
38See Section 2.2 on trusts.
39Pride Estate Act, 18&19 CII, c. 25.
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Commonwealth era. It is not surprising this may have been less open of a system - with more
politically and economically powerful people using estate acts - after the Restoration of 1660.
Relatedly, the seventeenth century saw the dominance of courtiers in parliament from 1661
to (about) 1677 (Harris 1993). The MPs using acts before the Glorious Revolution appear
to be politically connected or active. From 1660 to 1685, about 72% (7/11) of the MPs were
at one time court supporters or were royalists during the Civil Wars.40 An Act was passed
in 1664 to make a settlement for Robert Carr who was a prominent MP prior to the Glorious
Revolution. He was politically connected - at times associated with the court party and a
gentleman of the Privy Chamber from 1671 to 1678. From 1670 to 1679, when the Court
was losing influence relative to an Opposition, 2 of the 4 acts were for MPs who would go on
to support excluding James, Duke of York, from becoming monarch. Sir William Courtenay,
who received an Act in 1670, eventually hosted William of Orange on the eve of the Glorious
Revolution.
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 is associated with ushering in a new political economic
equilibrium. This new equilibrium is characterized by the dominance of the Whig party
that was able to implement new policies regarding public finance, trade, religion, and state
formation.41 It is possible this new equilibrium influenced who used estate acts and the new
policies parliament adopted toward estate acts after 1688. Several of the MPs who used
estate acts after 1688 also supported the Glorious Revolution. The Cornburys (Act received
in 1690) were “among the first army officers to desert to William III in 1688.”42 An Act
in 1690 was for Elizabeth Montagu, daughter of MP John Pelham. Pelham “welcomed the
Revolution, advancing loans and supplying ordnance to the new regime.”43 Policies promot-
40Two noble families (but not MPs) were known catholics and received acts in 1685 and 1689.
41Stasavage (2007), Mokyr and Nye (2007), Pincus (2009), Cox (2012), Dudley (2013), Pincus and Robin-
son (2014) and Hodgson (2016).
42HYDE, Hon. Edward, Visct. Cornbury (1661-1723): http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/-
volume/1660-1690/member/hyde-edward-1661-i723 and http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/-
volume/1690-1715/member/hyde-edward-1661-1723.
43PELHAM, Sir John, 3rd Bt. (c.1623-1703), of Halland, Laughton, Suss.:
http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/pelham-sir-john-1623-1703.
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ing the liquidity of land (in terms of allowing landholders to make loans and mortgages) are
not generally associated with Tories (Pincus 2009).
Political and institutional changes with the Glorious Revolution also mitigated conflict and
was important for parliament’s functioning and meetings.44 The changes increased both
the probability of estate bill success and the time parliament had to legislate. Both of
these factors could have allowed a broader cross-section of landholders to use estate acts
by lowering the threshold of expected benefits to costs for petitioner. The rise of the lower
gentry and the change in composition of trustees could also be tied to the adoption of strict
settlement. It is possible that there was an interaction between the development of strict
settlements in the London area, which was the center of the legal profession and training in
England, and the development of estate acts.45
In sum, this section shows that there were significant changes in the economic and legal
functions of estate acts after the Glorious Revolution. The evidence suggests there was an
evolution of acts characterized by a shift away from a closed system with fewer, politically
connected families using parliament to a relatively more open system after 1688. Consistent
with a new political economic equilibrium, the changes with the Glorious Revolution appears
to have allowed more novel policies in estate acts - ones that allowed for the commodification
of land and resources - at a time when it became more difficult to use land because of the
legal sanctioning of strict settlements.
2.5 Economic Implications
The evidence thus far documents that landholders faced constraints to carrying out economic
transactions because of their family settlements and other property conveyances. Work
44See Dimitruk (forthcoming), Randall (1916), and Roberts (1993).
45The origins of the settlement are still speculated. It is possible that the legal profession in London played
an important role in the development of the device (Bonfield 1983: 66).
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examines the effects of strict settlements on land markets (Allen 1988). We know less,
however, about the effects of estate acts for families or property markets. As a starting
point to investigate the economic effects of estate acts, I first provide evidence that land was
sold, leased, or mortgaged because a family received an estate act in growing and changing
property markets. Second, I estimate that the transactions or projects in acts had high
returns to a family.
First, most acts addressed settled land in London and Middlesex which were growing urban
areas throughout the seventeenth century (Figure 2.3).46 This complements recent work
showing parts of London were settled at the time of the Great Fire in 1666 (Doolittle 2015).
It is also consistent with Bogart and Richardson (2009, 2010) who code geography of acts
from 1660 to 1800 using descriptive titles.
Second, I match 30% (19/65) of acts to information in secondary sources recording land
transactions. I use the Victoria County Histories and other topographical histories to match
acts that allowed land to be sold, leased, or mortgaged.47 Table 2.5 lists the matched sample
of transactions that took place or likely took place because a family received an estate act.
The acts most likely to be matched are those found in London and Middlesex or those whose
records are more likely to survive (such as larger landholders, MPs, government officials).
The evidence shows that most transactions did not occur immediately after receiving an
act (column (VII)). On average, transactions took place about seven years after the rights
were conferred, with some transactions taking place as soon as one year later and as late
as fourteen years later. It is possible that the time to use the rights declined over time.
Transactions authorized by acts passed from 1660 to 1688 took place nine years later on
average. Transactions authorized by acts passed from 1688 to 1702 took place six years
later on average. Four acts (in rows 1, 4, 8, and 11) have secondary sources which cite
46See Wallis et al. (2018) for recent work on structural change and urbanization in the seventeenth century.
47I therefore do not attempt to match acts that confirmed a previous transaction or those to make a
settlement. See Appendix Section B.1 for information on the matching process.
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that multiple transactions occurred over time because of the rights conferred by the act.
For example, Elizabeth Montagu and her family continued to use the act throughout the
eighteenth century to make building leases in London.
Column (IX) reports who land was sold or leased to if it is recorded in the source. The
parties are somewhat diverse. Two MPs sold land to a fellow MP (row 1 and row 4) and
one MP was lessee of the property (row 10). Sir Edward Hungerford received the rights to
make leases and to hold a market on his property in 1677. He demolished his house and
began a market in the Strand (present day Charing Cross), but soon sold to another MP, Sir
Stephen Fox who had an interest in commercial development, and one of the most famous
architects of the era, Sir Christopher Wren, who designed St. Paul’s Cathedral as it currently
stands.48 Traders and merchants were involved: including bricklayers (as lessees - row 8),
a cloth merchant and MP (lessee - row 10), and a mason (purchaser - row 11). Learned
professionals and high government officials also bought property because of estate acts. A
celebrated Dr. Busby purchased property from the Hammonds in 1670 (row 3). Later acts
were sold to government officials: the attorney general (row 13), secretary to the treasury
(row 15), clerk of the crown in chancery (row 17), and keeper of the great seal (row 18).
Estimated Returns
A last approach to estimate the economic effects of receiving an estate act is to estimate the
returns to a family of receiving an act. I estimate a minimum rate of return Ri for an act i:
Ri ×Bi −Ci ≥ 0, where Ri = 11+ri is the expected increase to annual rental income because
the family was able to carry out a project, Bi is the annual rental income found in an act,
and Ci is the cost of obtaining an act.
48Hungerford, who initially sought the lease, was known as a “spendthrift” and supported Exclusion
and the Revolution. See HUNGERFORD, Edward (1632-1711), of Corsham, Wilts.; Broadwater, Suss.
and Hungerford House, the Strand, Westminster: http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-
1690/member/hungerford-edward-1632-1711. Fox - of humble origins and a court dependent - was also a
mortagee of Hungerford, advancing £3,000 to him. Fox enjoyed a “substantial interest in Westminster, more
particularly as the property was well-situated for high-class commercial redevelopment.” See FOX, Stephen
(1627-1716), of Farley, Wilts. and Whitehall: http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-
1690/member/fox-stephen-1627-1716.
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I code the annual rental value or current rack rental of the land (Bi) from the text of an
act. It is most often found in the economic enactment clause. For example, a clause will
cite “land to be sold for the sum of one thousand pounds to purchase new land.” I convert
all sums into an annual rental value for the land by dividing by a years purchase of 25.
The distribution of property values is right skewed (Figure B.3).49 The average value for
a settled property is about £330 per annum, but most acts have rental values between the
minimum of £12 and £330 per annum. Consistent with the literature, the evidence suggests
acts addressed settled land that was only a fraction of a family’s landed portfolio (English
and Saville 1983: 53; Allen 1988: 41). The rental value of settled lands for five families
represents between 1% and 30% of their annual income.50
The total cost of going to parliament to invest in an act (Ci) during the seventeenth century
is estimated to be £100-200. An itemized “Bill of Costs For Soliciting an Estate Bill”
shows the total cost for an act passed sometime between 1794 and 1799 was 392 l. 14 s.
8 d. (Ellis 1799: 97-117). The bill of costs includes parliamentary fees from 1700. It also
includes information on solicitors’ fees for writing and preparing the petition and appeal for
an act, fees for consultation (with interested parties, MPs, and judges), and fees for going
to parliament throughout the parliamentary process. The cost of 392 l. 14 s. 8 d. for
an act from 1799 is likely to be an overestimate of the total cost of obtaining an act from
1660 to 1702 for two reasons. First, it includes fees for bringing a petition to judges. Bills
introduced to parliament from 1660 to 1702 did not have to go through this step. Excluding
all potential “judges’ fees” decreases the costs to 336 l. 19 s. 4 d. Second, the bill of costs
was for an act for the Duke of Buckingham who may have paid a premium for a solicitor.
Therefore a reasonable range of costs for an estate act from 1660 to 1702 is £100-200.
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of minimum estimated returns across annual rental incomes
49A smaller subsample of acts record the acreage of the settled land. Figure B.4 shows the distribution of
acreage is also right skewed with most acts addressing property less than 500 acres. See Appendix Section
B.1 for details on acreage.
50The families are listed in Appendix Section B.1. They are for acts of five MPs.
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of settled property under three different costs (£100, 150, and 200). Estimated returns are
largest for the properties with low annual rental values. Acts for properties in London and
Middlesex have significantly higher estimated returns than for land elsewhere. Acts for the
lower gentry and professionals have significantly higher returns than for acts for the nobility
and upper gentry.51 The two acts with largest returns were for properties in London and
Middlesex. An Act passed in 1694 allowed the Earl of Thanet to make leases to Thomas
Powell, an MP and cloth merchant who used the lease to turn the house into a market or
exchange for lace men. The Act with the second highest return completed a will to sell land
in London to pay debts of a deceased ironmonger and citizen of London, Charles Milson. It
is not surprising the estimated return is so high because the property was in London and
the appeal suggests the executor of the will, Edward Milson, would greatly benefit from the
act. He was unable to finish paying the debts of his kinsman (valued at £12 per annum)
and was therefore unable to receive any of the legacies of the will that were “reserved for the
maintenance and support of [himself] and his family.”52
2.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that families sought estate acts for economic purposes in the seventeenth
century, like refinancing estates and accessing England’s growing economy, but were con-
strained by their family settlements. There were four different types of estate acts charac-
terized by different appeals and enactment clauses approved by parliament that stem from
different types of settlements and property conveyances. The period saw an evolution in
the composition of types of acts that is linked to creation and adoption of strict settlements
and the political changes with the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Estate acts were significant
economically because they authorized transactions in the London and Middlesex property
51Estimates from regression of returns on property in Middlesex and if the petitioner is a lower gentry or
professional.
52Milson Estate Act, 8&9 WIII, c. 24.
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market and were for members of the lower gentry.
There are several areas for future work. First, parliament enacted a series of standing orders
at the end of the period that changed the procedures for passing estate acts. It is possible
that the orders are linked to the broader compositional changes in estate acts. Second, we
need to better understand the political origins of parliament’s provision of estate acts and
how the political economy changed over time. Last, future work should further investigate
the economic effects of estate acts. The acts may be useful to understand the geography
of England’s development, for example the link between urbanization and property rights
change in general and Middlesex and London in particular.
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2.7 Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Structure of an Estate Act
(I)
t
Make Land Conveyance
(II)
t′
Economic Event or Condition (Appeal)
(III)
t′
Legal Constraint (Appeal)
(IV)
t′
Proposal (Appeal)
(V)
t′′
(1) Enactment: Economic
(2) Enactment: Legal
(3) Enactment: Amend Settlement
Preamble Clauses Enactment Clauses
Notes: Figure shows a landed family’s time line as it relates to needing an estate act of parliament (I)-(IV). It also shows
information found in estate acts. Sections in curly brackets correspond to the structure of an act (preamble and enactment
clauses) and the source of each clause. See text and Appendix Section B.1 for full description.
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Table 2.1: Economic and Legal Functions of Estate Acts, 1660-1702
n share of acts st. dev. min max
Panel A: Preamble Section
1. Conveyances
strict settlement 13 0.20 0.40 0 1
life estate entail settlement 38 0.58 0.50 0 1
religious corporation 2 0.03 0.17 0 1
other conveyance 11 0.17 0.38 0 1
(e.g. will, previous act of parliament)
2. Appeal: economic condition
cost of debts or portions 20 0.31 0.47 0 1
interest rates 0.09 0.29 0 1
management costs 8 0.12 0.33 0 1
accident, mistake 14 0.22 0.41 0 1
opportunity for transaction 13 0.20 0.40 0 1
incomplete transaction 33 0.51 0.50 0 1
marriage 7 0.11 0.31 0 1
3. Appeal: legal constraint
general law 4 0.06 0.24 0 1
life tenant barred 30 0.46 0.50 0 1
heir is minority 26 0.40 0.49 0 1
trust is constrained 4 0.06 0.24 0 1
claims can be made 8 0.12 0.33 0 1
4. Proposed reorganization
pay debts 26 0.40 0.49 0 1
pay portions 15 0.23 0.42 0 1
purchase land or replace 11 0.17 0.38 0 1
Panel B: Enactment Section
1. Economic transactions clauses
sale* 34 0.52 0.50 0 1
lease* 14 0.20 0.40 0 1
make settlement* 8 0.12 0.33 0 1
mortgage* 8 0.12 0.33 0 1
other 4 0.06 0.24 0 1
loan 9 0.14 0.35 0 1
2. Legal clauses
make good at law 25 0.38 0.49 0 1
protect from claims 19 0.29 0.46 0 1
address or change title 7 0.11 0.31 0 1
limits to act 7 0.11 0.31 0 1
confirm transaction* 17 0.26 0.44 0 1
amend trust 10 0.15 0.36 0 1
3. Amend settlement clauses
discharge or void estates 16 0.25 0.43 0 1
amend family charges 11 0.17 0.38 0 1
protect existing charges 10 0.15 0.36 0 1
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: Classification of clauses in estate acts of parliament. Coded as an indicator if act
contains specific clause or not. 1. Land conveyances - mutually exclusive. 2. Appeal:
economic - not mutually exclusive. 3. Appeal: Legal Constraint - not mutually exclusive.
1. Enactment: Economic - not mutually exclusive. 2. Enactment: Legal - not mutually
exclusive. 3. Enactment: Settlement amendment - not mutually exclusive. * - type cor-
responds to title of act. All acts have either an economic or a legal clause. See Appendix
Section B.1 for details on coding and Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2 for examples of each
type.
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Figure 2.2: Clusters of Clauses in Acts
(A) Single Linkage
(B) Complete Linkage
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: Figure shows dendrograms of clauses found in estate acts created using hierarchical cluster analysis.
Panel A uses a single linkage algorithm; Panel B uses a complete linkage algorithm. See text for description.
Boxed sections correspond to four types of acts that stem from four different conveyances: (1) life estate
entail settlements, (2) strict settlements, (3) religious corporations, and (4) other types of conveyances.
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Table 2.2: Credit Transactions in Estate Acts
Panel A: Types of Transactions
n share of acts avg. value std. dev (min, max)
pay debts
cites cost of debts 13 0.2 £118 101 (28, 320)
cites incomplete transaction 6 0.09 220 293 (12, 250)
cites cost and incomplete 7 0.11 91 95 (18, 280)
receive payment 2 0.03 271 (252, 300)
make loan 9 0.14 126 84 (40, 252)
make mortgage 8 0.12
n=65
Panel B: Types of Debts
n share of pay debts
Ambiguous - life tenant 15 0.57
deceased 10 0.38
Civil Wars 4 0.15
Other - family charges 4 0.15
Productive 3 0.11
n=26
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: See text for description.
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Table 2.3: Shift to New Types of Acts after 1688
Panel A: Preamble Section
1660-1685 1688-1702 difference
1. Conveyances
settlement 0.63 0.55 -0.08
(0.10) (0.07)
strict settlement 0.09 0.25 0.16
(0.06) (0.06)
religious corporation 0.04 0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.02)
other conveyance 0.22 0.14 -0.08
(0.09) (0.05)
2. Appeal: economic
cost of debts or portions 0.41 0.25 -0.15
(0.11) (0.25)
management costs 0.04 0.16 0.12
(0.05) (0.06)
accident, mistake 0.23 0.21 -0.02
(0.09) (0.06)
opportunity 0.18 0.21 0.03
(0.08) (0.06)
incomplete transaction 0.45 0.53 0.08
(0.11) (0.07)
marriage 0.09 0.11 0.02
(0.06) (0.04)
3. Appeal: legal constraint
general law 0.09 0.04 -0.04
(0.06) (0.03)
life tenant barred 0.31 0.53 0.21*
(0.10) (0.07)
minority 0.45 0.36 -0.08
(0.11) (0.07)
trust 0 0.09
(0.04)
claims can be made 0.13 0.11 0.02
(0.07) (0.05)
4. Proposed reorganization
pay debts 0.27 0.2 -0.06
(0.09) (0.02)
pay portions 0.27 0.21 0.06
(0.09) (0.06)
purchase or replace 0.04 0.23 0.18**
(0.04) (0.07)
n 22 43
Panel B: Enactment Section
1660-1685 1689-1702 difference
1. Economic transaction
sale 0.45 0.55 0.10
(0.10) (0.07)
lease 0.18 0.20 0.02
(0.08) (0.06)
make settlement 0.13 0.11 -0.02
(0.07) (0.05)
mortgage 0 0.19 0.18**
(0.06)
other 0.14 0.02 0.11*
(0.07) (0.02)
loan 0 0.21
(0.04)
2. Legal clauses
good at law 0.22 0.46 0.23*
(0.09) (0.07)
change title 0.13 0.09 -0.04
(0.07) (0.04)
limits 0.09 0.12 0.02
(0.06) (0.05)
confirm 0.27 0.25 -0.02
(0.09) (0.08)
trust 0 0.23
(0.06)
3. Amend Settlement
discharge or void 0.13 0.3 0.17
(0.07) (0.07)
amend family charges 0.22 0.14 -0.08
(0.09) (0.05)
protect existing charges 0.05 0.21 0.16*
(0.04) (0.06)
n 22 43
Source: random sample of 65 acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: Table reports differences in shares of acts containing a specific conveyance, appeal, or enactment clause before and after 1688.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
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Table 2.4: Rise of the Lower Gentry after 1688
Panel A: Petitioners
1660-1685 1688-1702 difference
Social Class
nobility 0.22 0.18 -0.04
(0.09) (0.06)
titled gentry 0.41 0.25 -0.15
knights and baronets (0.10) (0.07)
lower gentry 0.45 0.67 0.22*
(esquires and gentlemen) (0.10) (0.07)
clergy 0.09 0.02 -0.07
(0.06) (0.02)
professional 0.04 0.11 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
nobility, titled gentry, 0.77 0.58 -0.19
MPs (0.09) (0.07)
lower gentry, 0.50 0.72 0.22*
professionals (0.10) (0.07)
Other characteristics
MP or related 0.54 0.44 -0.10
(0.10) (0.07)
female 0.09 0.13 0.05
(0.06) (0.05)
couple 0.22 0.51 0.28**
(0.09) (0.07)
n 22 43
Panel B: Trustees
1660-1685 1688-1702 difference
Social Class
names a trust 0.31 0.72 0.40***
(0.10) (0.07)
nobility 0.09 0.11 0.02
(0.06) (0.05)
titled gentry 0.14 0.25 0.12
knights and baronets (0.07) (0.06)
lower gentry 0.27 0.6 0.33**
(esquires and gentlemen) (0.09) (0.07)
professional 0 0.23
(0.06)
Other characteristics
of an inn 0 0.23
(lawyer) (0.06)
of London 0 0.3
(0.07)
female 0.04 0.09 0.07
(0.04) (0.04)
n 22 43
Source: random sample of 65 acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: Table reports differences in shares of acts with a type of petitioner or type of trustee before and after 1688. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
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Figure 2.3: Geographic Distribution of Estate Acts: Importance of Middlesex and London
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: Figure plots the counts of estate acts across counties.
77
Figure 2.4: Estimated Increased in Returns from an Estate Act
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: Figure plots the estimated return of an estate act as a function of the annual rental
income of property in an act (acts with rental income less than £1,500). Returns estimated
by: Ri = Ci/Bi for estate act i. Ci: range of costs estimated from Bill of Costs in Ellis
(1799). Hollow diamonds: assume cost of obtaining an act is £100; hollow circles: assume
cost of obtaining an act is £150; x’s: assume cost of obtaining an act is £200. Bi: annual
rental income coded from each estate act. See text and Appendix Section B.1 for description
of coding.
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Chapter 3
Political Support in the Commons:
The Role of Occupations and
Elections of Members of Parliament
3.1 Introduction
The political changes in late seventeenth-century England and their economic implications
have been the subject of much debate by economists and economic historians. Most have fo-
cused on if and how constitutional changes with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 improved the
security of domestic property rights by credibly constraining the monarch from expropriation.
The specific framework put forth by North and Weingast (1989) has been criticized (Clark
1996; Stasavage 2000; Hoppit 2011; Coffman et al. 2013). There is, however, consensus that
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was important for confirming parliamentary supremacy that
began with the Civil Wars and Commonwealth periods (Hoppit 2011; O’Brien 2011; Pincus
and Robinson 2014; Jha 2015).
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There are three main themes in the literature. First, work argues that the Glorious Rev-
olution ushered in a new political economic equilibrium with the development of political
parties after 1690 (Stasavage 2007; Pincus 2009; Pincus and Robinson 2014). Second, histori-
ans have also emphasized that the public played an important role influencing parliamentary
composition as it saw increasing political awareness at the national level and England’s econ-
omy was growing and transforming.1 Elections, for example, became increasingly important
events during this era (Kishlansky 1986; Harris 1993). Last, much of the work by economists
emphasizes the role of new wealth holders or commercial and financial interests in opposing
the monarch and leading to institutional change (e.g. through leading to a stronger parlia-
ment) throughout the medieval and early modern era (North and Weingast 1989; Stasavage
2007; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Jha 2015; Angelucci et al. 2017).
Part of our understanding of how the political economy of the late seventeenth century
is constrained by limited and inaccessible individual-level data on the political, economic,
and social interests within parliament and specifically within the House of Commons. In this
paper, I present evidence on the three themes above by examining how MP occupations (e.g.
merchants) and electoral interests (e.g. type of constituency an MP represented) influenced
their political support in parliament. I use a new panel dataset of the population of MPs
(approximately 3,000 unique individuals) who were elected to parliament from 1660 (the
Restoration of the Monarchy) to 1702 (the succession of Anne, as settled by Parliament with
the 1701 Act of Settlement).2
First, I use multinomial logit models to examine the choice to support the Court and Op-
position from 1660 to 1685. The Court were considered supporters of the monarch; the
Opposition (also called Country) members generally supported a stronger parliament and
1See Chapter 3 in Pincus (2009), Broadberry and Wallis (2017), Wallis et al. (2018), Kelly and O´ Gra´da
(2016), and for recent work on the economic changes of the era related to growth, structural change, and
innovation and productivity.
2It is part of a larger project compiling information on the population of MPs elected from the fourteenth
to the mid nineteenth century. The data are collected and compiled from the History of Parliament research
project. For this paper, I use data collected from Henning (1983) and Hayton et al. (2002).
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were against the extravagance and Catholicism of the Court. I code political party affiliation
from contemporary division lists for the period and then combine this information with the
panel dataset. The evidence shows that the occupation of MPs was important in the choice
of political support. MPs holding positions in the military and overseas trading companies
are more likely to support the Court. Regarding elections, the Court also gained support
from MPs representing borough constituencies, which could have limited franchises as well
as be under the influence of large landholders.
The Opposition, in contrast, drew support from MPs who held positions in domestic com-
panies (e.g. Mercers’ Company) and from MPs who had been elected during the Civil War
or Commonwealth eras (an important type of parliamentary experience). The evidence sug-
gests that electoral interests were important for the Opposition to garner support. MPs who
were elected via contest or represented counties, which often had a broader franchise, are
more likely to support the Opposition.
In a complementary exercise, I use information on voting to show that political party support
could also translate into policy change that would have given parliament a significant power
over the monarchy. I specifically examine how MP occupation and electoral interests influ-
enced voting on the First Exclusion Bill, which sought to alter the succession of the monarchy
by excluding James, Duke of York, from becoming monarch. MPs who were against the bill
(supported the monarch) were also likely to be affiliated with the Court (e.g., military).
Support for the Bill (for a stronger parliament) was larger than the groups that supported
the Opposition. MPs who had inherited an estate or represented a constituency in Middlesex
supported Exclusion. The evidence suggests that the Opposition coalition changed and that
geography of political support was important by 1679.
In general the patterns are consistent with the monarch’s use of patronage to influence
support for the Court. Additional estimates show that MPs who held positions in the royal
household or in local governments from 1679 to 1685 were more likely to support the Court.
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The evidence suggests that James II attempted to target MPs holding local government
positions that were absent on the Exclusion Bill. The patterns also suggest that the political
changes were not only amongst elite but also tied to the public sphere and electoral politics
(Harris 1993; Pincus 2009). Without any general elections from 1661 to 1679, the Opposition
increasingly grew from contested by-elections.
The second part of the paper examines who supported the Whigs and Tories from 1689 to
1702. The development of the two-party system was “the most significant development in
parliamentary history during this period” (Henning 1983) but it is still the subject of debate
as to whether and how the Opposition led to the development of the Whigs and the Court
led to the development of the Tories (Harris 1993). Tories sought to protect the interests
of the Church of England and the rights of the monarch. Whigs promoted toleration of
religious Dissenters and had a contractual theory of the monarchy (Bogart 2016). The two
also had a different vision of the development of the English state. Tories favored a political
economy based on land and the Whigs favored a political economy based on finance and
commerce (Pincus 2009). I combine political party information from Bogart (2016) with the
MP panel to examine if and how support for the Whigs and Tories changed from the groups
that supported the Court and Opposition.
The patterns suggest that there was both continuity and change in political support from
Opposition to Whig and Court to Tory, which is consistent with a new political economic
equilibrium after the Glorious Revolution (Pincus 2009; Pincus and Robinson 2014). There
was more continuity in occupations for support for the Court and Tories. For example,
MPs who held positions in local governments, military, and overseas trading companies were
more likely to be affiliated with the Court and the Tory party. Different from the previous
era, however, Tories were more likely to gain support from occupations that were a-political
before the Glorious Revolution, e.g. lawyers. There appears to have been more change from
Opposition to Whig. None of the occupations (e.g. domestic companies) that supported the
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Opposition continued to be affiliated with the Whigs. Second, there was a change in the role
of elections and types of constituencies influenced an MP’s political support. For example,
there was a switch in the role of boroughs v. county constituencies. MPs representing
boroughs were more likely to support the Court from 1661 to 1685 but were more likely to
support the Whigs from 1689 to 1702.
The first contribution of the paper is to document new facts about the interests in parliament
for the period from 1660 to 1702: “so few studies have attempted to span the Glorious
Revolution” (Harris 1993: 3). The literature often focuses on the significance or insignificance
of the Glorious Revolution or studies specific periods before or after the Glorious Revolution.3
I am able to examine political support for the entire period because of the new dataset on
MPs. Previous work on the interests in parliament often relies on lists and information in
the History of Parliament research project, The House of Commons, 1660-1690 (Henning
1983) and The House of Commons, 1690-1715 (Hayton et al. 2002),4 which is the main
source for the data used in this paper. While comprehensive, it was inaccessible and difficult
to use because it was not available in a tabular or computerized format. Research was thus
limited in the types of patterns that could be documented and analyses that could be done.
Second, the paper contributes to our substantive knowledge of the era, which also informs
our understanding of more general research questions. There has been much debate about
if and how institutions changed with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and if it subsequently
influenced England’s development. Most work by economists focuses on the framework of
credible commitment, constitutional change, and security of property rights (North and
Weingast 1989; Clark 1996; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Coffman et al. 2013;
Jha 2015; Murrell 2017). This paper instead revisits the role of MPs’ occupations and
also examines if elections were important for political support. The findings are consistent
3Pincus (2009) summarizes the historiography. For examples of period studies on Charles II’s reign, see
Ogg (1962) and Seaward (1988).
4See Erickson and Hamilton (2018), Bogart (2018), and Angelucci et al. (2017) for recent work using
information on constituencies, lists found in the surveys, and MP biographies.
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with an increasingly important role of elections, the broader public, and a new political
economic equilibrium after the Glorious Revolution (Kishlansky 1986; Harris 1993; Pincus
and Robinson 2014).
3.2 Historical Background: Parliament and Develop-
ment of Political Parties
This section first provides background on parliamentary meetings and electoral institutions.
It then summarizes the history of the Court and Opposition and Whigs and Tories in Eng-
land’s government at the end of the seventeenth century.
Parliamentary Meetings and Electoral Institutions: 1660-1702
Four different monarchs reigned from 1660 to 1702: (1) Charles II from the Restoration of
the Monarchy in 1660 to his death in 1685; (2) James II from 1685 to this forced exile with
the Glorious Revolution of 1688; (3) William and Mary with their coronation in 1689 until
Mary’s death in 1694; (4) William III until his death in 1702. Table 3.1 presents summary
information on each monarch’s reign and changes in parliamentary meetings during this
era. Elections and parliamentary meetings - their beginnings and endings - were technically
decided by the monarch. The monarch decided when to call and dissolve parliaments which
required general elections. In general the monarch called parliament to receive revenue (also
called supply).
There is a noticeable difference in the length of parliaments and timing of general elections.
There were twelve parliaments from 1660 to 1702 (column (III)). There were five parliaments
and six general elections over twenty four years under Charles II (column (III)).5 After the
passage of the Triennial Act of 1664, the monarch was not required to dissolve or call a
5One in 1660, in 1661, two in 1679 and one in 1681.
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parliament after any length of time. The Cavalier Parliament lasted until 1679 and it did
not convene for several years, specifically in 1672 and 1676. Parliament was not called at
the end of Charles II’s reign from 1682 to 1684 and for most of James II’s reign from 1686
to 1688.
Parliamentary meetings and elections changed after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. There
were more general elections per year (six parliaments and six general elections over thirteen
years) from 1689 to 1702. After the passage of the Mutiny Act and more restrictive supply
bills, the monarch was required to call parliament annually for renewals to power of court-
martial over the army and to receive extraordinary revenue (supply) (Randall 1916: 665;
Cox 2012). The Triennial Act of 1694 ensured more frequent elections. After its passage,
parliaments had a maximum life of three years, i.e. an election had to be called at least
every three years. The monarch, however, could still decide to dissolve a parliament anytime
in a three year window.
The Commons and Lords passed legislation during individual sessions, which were ended via
prorogation by the monarch or a commission. There were 39 different sessions of parliament
with varying lengths (columns (IV) and (V)) from 1660 to 1702. Parliamentary sessions
became significantly longer like because of institutional changes after the Glorious Revolution
that mitigated conflict between the monarch and parliament.6
Parliament, and the Commons in particular, was not a unitary actor always against the
monarch during this period. The House of Commons was a body of elected representatives
from two types of constituencies: boroughs (217) and counties (52). There were approxi-
mately 500 different MPs elected to each parliament (column (VII)). In general, Harris (1993)
concludes the franchise was broad and that by the early eighteenth century about one in four
6Recent work suggests that the length of time of a session was an outcome of how parliament passed
supply bills and the conflict between the monarch and parliament in a session under Charles II and James
II. Resolving this conflict improved parliament’s passage of legislation and likely increased the length of
sessions. See Dimitruk (forthcoming).
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adult males had the right to vote. For example, landholders with a 40 shilling freehold could
vote in counties. It was not a particularly restrictive qualification: in Yorkshire, about 8,000
property holders could vote during this period (Harris 1993: 17). Boroughs, however, saw
significant variation in the franchise depending on the type of property held. Westminster’s
franchise of “inhabitant householders” enabled 25,000 men to vote in 1679. Shaftesbury, a
borough in Wiltshire, had a franchise granted to people paying scot and lot, allowing 332
men to vote in 1679 and 12 men after it was restricted to members of the corporation in
1685 (Harris 1993: 18).
While the franchise may have been broad for the era, the choice to elect an a specific person at
election time was often limited (Harris 1993: 19). Several types of boroughs, such as pocket
boroughs (those “controlled by local families with large landholdings”) and venal boroughs
(“where candidates were able to bribe their way into the Commons”), are evidence of how
landlords could influence parliamentary selection and electoral outcomes (Harris 1993). The
period did see significant changes to elections. Not only were there more frequent elections
after the Glorious Revolution, but there was an increase in contests (competitive elections)
towards the end of the Cavalier Parliament (discussed below). More competitive elections
and transitions in electoral institutions to support the competitions have been argued to be
important for determining political support during this era (Kishlansky 1986: Chapter 7).
From Court to Party
The monarchy and House of Lords were restored with Charles II in 1660 after the Civil
Wars and Commonwealth under Oliver Cromwell. Charles II’s reign was marked by general
support from Cavaliers or Royalists in parliament but also increasing instability. He generally
sought to call parliament to grant revenue to fight the First and Second Anglo Dutch War and
disband with parliament once it was no longer in session. In general, parliament’s incentive
was to legislate on supply so that they could meet and pass other legislative initiatives.7
7See Dimitruk (forthcoming) for an overview.
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Charles II sought to influence parliament through patronage (creating a Court) so that
parliament would support and finance efforts to fight the Anglo Dutch Wars. He also relied
on the cooperation of the royalist gentry in parliament to re-establish royal authority over the
militia and “crack down on potential [domestic] enemies” (Seaward 1988; Malcolm 1992).
His reign, however, saw a growing Opposition (sometimes called Country) in parliament.
The Opposition during the Cavalier Parliament was a loose coalition of members of a variety
of religions who were against Charles II’s Court and administration as well as arbitrary
government (Harris 1993: 75).
The first general election in eighteen years (in 1679) saw an organized Opposition win a
majority in the Commons. The win has been attributed to new methods of organizing MPs
at elections by Lord Shaftesbury (Ashley Cooper) and their strategy to include the public
via “popular petitions and addresses to the Crown, and instructions to newly-elected MPs
informing them how their constituents wanted them to act in the ensuing parliament” in
opposing a Catholic monarch (Harris 1993: 91).
After the general election in 1679, the Opposition initiated legislation in the Commons to
exclude James, Duke of York, and heir to the throne from inheriting the monarchy leading
to the Exclusion Crisis (1679-81) whereby the monarch successively closed parliament in
order to end the bill. A “language of party, and the terms Whig and Tory” developed with
the Exclusion Crisis (Harris 1993: 81). Contemporaries noted that a majority of MPs could
be called Whigs and there was an identifiable opposite called Tories. Whigs during this
period supported some version of parliamentary supremacy: from radical anti-monarchists
or republicans to parliamentary constitutionalists. Tories favored a strong monarchy: from
championing divine right of the monarch and royal absolutism to a legal monarchy and
founded on rule of law (Harris 1993: 82).8 The Whig-Opposition lost support of the public
8There was a religious dimension to their views. Whigs were sympathetic to religious Dissenters (for
greater toleration within protestantism) and Tories supported the Anglican church. Both Whigs and Tories
were violently anti-Catholic (Harris 1993: 82).
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‘out of doors’ with the 1681 Parliament (the last of Charles II’s reign), with an orchestrated
effort by Tories to show support for Charles II both in parliament and publicly (Pincus 2009:
92; Harris 1993: 105-106). Charles II died after ruling without parliament from 1681 to 1685.
James II became monarch (as a Catholic) in 1685 after Charles II’s death with large popular
and parliamentary support (Pincus 2009: Chapter 4). His reign was short but saw significant
political changes. He called parliament to re-grant revenue from customs and excise. James
II ended the session after about two months and ruled without parliament for the rest of
his reign. Current work argues that he sought to create an absolutist state by building an
unconstrained military as well as asserting royal control over localities, corporations, and
packing parliament. One way he sought to accomplish this goal was through re-chartering
of local boroughs and companies (Pincus 2009).
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 forced James II to leave England and made Mary and
William, rulers of the Dutch Republic, monarchs. While work has debated the constitu-
tional significance of the event, the period under William and Mary confirmed parliamentary
supremacy and saw the development of the two party system. The 1690s were divided and
contentious between Whigs and Tories. They drew support from different bases: the landed
gentry supported the Tories; larger aristocrats and financial interests supported the Whigs
(Bogart 2016). There is a debate as to whether the Tories had origins in the Court and the
Whigs and origins in the Opposition from the previous era (Harris 1993). If and how they
did would provide insight to the role of the Glorious Revolution in generating a new politi-
cal economic equilibrium. For example, work argues that Whigs were ultimately successful
during this era and were able to implement a new vision for the English state with policies
favoring finance and trade instead of policies favoring landed wealth (Pincus 2009; Pincus
and Robinson 2014).
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3.3 Political Support of Members of Parliament: Data
and Methodology
Despite the rich history on the political developments of the era, our understanding is limited
by lack of accessible, comprehensive data on Members of Parliament (MPs) elected to the
House. For example, economists emphasize the importance of domestic wealth holders or
commercial and financial interests in leading political and institutional changes to constrain
the monarch and support parliament. Historians, however, have also emphasized changes
in the public sphere, which was seeing a growing and transforming economy and increasing
political awareness at the national level. The public played an important role influencing
parliamentary composition particularly via elections. I use a new dataset of MPs to provide
evidence on these arguments.
The aim is to estimate the role of an MP’s occupation or electoral interests in choosing
to support a particular political group. We may expect MPs with different occupations to
support different political groups. For example, commercial interests or merchants may in
general support the Opposition because a stronger parliament would be better for secure
trading rights. There may be variation across commercial interests because some trades
(e.g. overseas) may have been subject to greater expropriation risk from the monarch (Jha
2015). If so, MPs with commercial interests in overseas trade may have been more likely to
support the Court to secure their trading rights under the current regime.
Data
I use a new dataset of the population of MPs elected to parliament to examine who supported
the Court or Opposition and Whigs or Tories.9 It is a panel dataset of approximately 3,000
unique MPs sitting in 39 sessions of parliament (approximately 20,000 MP-session observa-
9The dataset is part of a larger project compiling the same information for all MPs elected from 1386-1832
with gaps from 1422 to 1504 and during the Civil War and Interregnum era (1640-1659).
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tions). It contains details on each MP’s constituency as well as a variety of time-varying and
fixed characteristics.10 The characteristics are coded from two fields: (1) background, with
information on family and education and (2) offices, with information on an MP’s positions
and offices, which are broadly defined. The background field is an MP-background-time list
and the office field is an MP-position-time list. The office list, for example, has approximately
30,000 unique data points.
The dataset can be used in additional applications by geo-coding the constituencies and
positions in local government to use with GIS. It is also possible to format and organize
the dataset to use with social network tools, for example to illustrate and study familial
networks of MPs or shared connections via committees or commissions.
Methodology and Summary Statistics
To investigate how occupation and electoral interests influenced an MPs decision to support
the Court or Opposition and the Whigs and Tories, I use multinomial logit models of the
form:
Partyitj = α +Occupation
′
iβ + Election
′
itjγ +X
′
iδ + Ψj + itj, (3.1)
for an MP i, sitting in a session of parliament t in a parliament j.
Because of the change from Court and Opposition to Tory and Whig after 1688, I split
the sample and estimate two separate specifications. From 1661 to 1685, Partyitj is a
categorical variable equal to 0 if an MP is unaffiliated, to 1 if an MP is affiliated with the
Court, and to 2 if an MP is affiliated with the Opposition. I do not include data from
the Convention Parliament of 1660 because only Opposition lists exist, which the historical
literature emphasizes was different than the Opposition or Country members of the 1670s
10The original database contains a list of MPs elected from 1660 to 1690 and from 1690 to 1715. I format
and compile the two lists to create the panel.
90
and 1680s (Jones 1964). From 1689 to 1702, Partyitj is a categorical variable equal to 0
if an MP is unaffiliated, to 1 if an MP is affiliated with the Tories, and to 2 if an MP is
affiliated with the Whigs. Xi contains an MP’s occupation, Electionitj contains an MP’s
election information, Xi contains other MP fixed characteristics (education, birth order) that
could be correlated with either an MP’s occupation or electoral interests, and Ψj is a set of
parliament fixed effects. The estimates of β and γ reported below are thus interpreted as
deviations from the mean within a specific parliament.
All occupations in Occupationi are defined as an MP holding a specific position before enter-
ing parliament. It is thus not likely an outcome of an MP’s political support. For example,
and MP did not become a member of company after supporting the Opposition or Court.
The electoral variables, however, are likely influenced by unobservables. For example, new
organizational techniques during this era made targeting elections or specific constituencies
possible to ensure an MP was elected who would support the party of interest. While par-
liament fixed effects may address some of these concerns, there are likely unobservables that
cannot be directly controlled for at this time. I use the correlations here as a starting point
for further work.
I code political party affiliations from 1661 to 1685 using contemporary division lists like
previous historical studies.11 Division lists during this era were compiled to identify MPs
that would likely support a piece of legislation or as part of political satire on corruption
in parliament. For example, one list Flagellum Parliamentarian was a “Sarcastic Notice”
identifying MPs who were pensioners or placemen in the government. In total, I code a set
of fourteen contemporary division lists. I code Opposition MPs and Court MPs. Guided by
the historical literature, which argues parties were not organizationally coherent during this
period, an MP is considered unaffiliated until a session has a list. The MP is then becomes a
supporter of the party if they are found on a session list. If he is not found on a session list,
11See Bogart (2016) for an overview of division lists.
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he becomes unaffiliated. MPs can switch between parties across sessions but can only be a
supporter of one party during a session. Only one session has MPs who are both affiliated
with the Court and Opposition (in 1677), because of the timing of the lists, I assume MPs
switched from the Court to the Opposition.
Bogart (2016, 2018) codes political party membership for Whigs and Tories from 1690 to
1754. I merge this dataset to the MP dataset and follow the conservative coding for MPs
elected from 1690 to 1702: an MP has to be found on all division lists in a given parliament
to be considered a member of the party. I then merge the political party dataset to the MP
dataset. An MP can be a member of the majority party, either a Whig or a Tory, in a given
parliament. Current work is coding division lists for the Convention Parliament of 1689.
Panel A of Table 3.2 reports shares of MPs who are affiliated with the Court or Opposition
from 1661 to 1685 and with the Tories and Whigs from 1689 to 1702. About 29% of MPs
were affiliated with the Court from 1661 to 1685 while only 7% were affiliated with the
Opposition.
Figure 3.1 shows how the share of MPs with political party affiliations evolved from 1660
to 1702. Throughout the entire period, at least 30% and at most 60% of MPs are affiliated
with a political group. The Court grew under Charles II. This is more clearly seen in the
share of MPs who held positions in the royal household under Charles II (Figure C.4 in the
Appendix). While the Court technically had a majority and grew, the historical literature
emphasizes the strength and successes of the Opposition by the end of the period. Lists
exist which identify a large number of MPs who were in Opposition by 1677. Consistent
with Kishlansky (1986), Figure C.1 in the Appendix shows that a growing share of MPs
gained seats in contested by-elections from 1661 to 1679, which could be partly responsible
for the success of the Opposition. The general elections of 1679, leading to the First Exclusion
Parliament in 1679, changed the political composition of parliament: many Court MPs lost
their seats and Opposition MPs were elected.
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The Tories were relatively stronger after the general election of 1690 - a contentious political
event - that also coincided with a Tory ministry. Around 1693, the “Whig Junto” ministry
was beginning to be established by William. The ministry change was complete after 1694.
The Whigs held the majority after the general election of 1695, but had lost influence by
the end of the William’s reign. The general elections of 1701 gave the Tories the advantage
but there was not a clear majority in the Commons (Hayton et al. 2002). The patterns are
consistent with Pincus (2009) and Pincus and Robinson (2014) who emphasize the eventual
success of the Whig vision of England’s state formation by 1696. The patterns also support
that any constitutional changes immediately after the Glorious Revolution with respect to
public finance needed support from the Tories (Cox 2012).
Building on the historical literature, I examine how different types of MP occupation influ-
enced political support: professional lawyers, commercial interests, military, and if an MP
had inherited land. I code MP occupation from the background and office fields. I pull the
occupation of interest (e.g. a position in a company) and create a list of all MPs with the
occupation from either the background field or the offices field. The list is then merged to
the panel.
I code four main times of occupations. Professional lawyers are MPs who were qualified
to practice common law (called to the bar). MPs with commercial interests are defined as
holding a position in a domestic, overseas, mining, or banking company (Bank of England
after its creation in 1694). MPs with military positions are defined as ever holding a position
(colonel, major) in a local militia (county) or other type of regiment (2nd Dragoon Guards).
MPs who had inherited land are those that had succeeded to an estate anytime before
entering parliament.
As an example, Figure C.2 reports the shares of MPs who held different types of commercial
interests before entering parliament: domestic companies (e.g. Haberdashers’ Company,
Mercers’ Company); overseas trading companies (e.g. East India Company, Royal African
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Company, Levant Company); local merchant companies (Merchant Adventurers of Newcastle
or Bristol); and MPs who held a directorship in the Bank of England. Local merchant
companies were corporations associated with a specific geographic area (e.g. Newcastle or
Bristol) but were also given monopoly trading on overseas trade. A full list of the companies
are found in Appendix C.1.
Most work by economists on the political economy of the era studies and emphasizes the
importance of commercial and financial interests in opposing or supporting the monarch
as well as aligning with different parties in order to secure their trading rights (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Jha 2015; Bogart 2018). Jha (2015) finds that MPs with
financial interests in overseas trading companies were affiliated with the Court to secure
royal favor before rebelling and supporting parliament at the Civil Wars. Bogart (2018)
examines how the East India Company supported the Tories from 1690 to 1694, but lost
influence with the election of a Whig majority in 1695. Erikson and Hamilton (2018) argue
that the merchant and trading interests were not well integrated into the English state,
leading them to make public appeals to build support for their commercial policies.
Commercial representation was low in absolute numbers. Only 5% of MPs had been a
member of a company at the Restoration, but the share increases and grows over the course
of the Cavalier Parliament (1661-1678) reaching a little over 10% (or about 50 MPs) in
1678. Commercial representation falls with the general election leading to the Exclusion
Parliament of 1679, but increases during James II’s reign. The commercial interest does not
immediately increase with the Glorious Revolution, but builds under the Tory administration
and plateaus at the end of William’s reign and under Whig majority. Representation appears
to fall and be closely tied to elections at the end of the period. The dynamics of commercial
representation in parliament is similar to that coded by Erickson and Hamilton (2018) for
the period 1660 to 1688.12 The value of the information in Figure C.2 is that we can merge
12See their Figure 3. Different from their work, however, I show that commercial representation eventually
recovered after the Glorious Revolution and saw overall gains from 1690 to 1702. The discrepancies are the
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the individual level data to examine how an MP’s company position influence their political
support and examine heterogeneity across companies.
MPs holding positions in overseas trading companies had the largest representation in par-
liament. Changes in their representation are largely associated with general elections, par-
ticularly after the general election in 1679 and the general election of 1690. Their steadily
growing representation during the Cavalier Parliament could be a result of companies mak-
ing new appointments to MPs already elected. Domestic companies and local merchant
companies had relatively low representation and the evolution is relatively stable over time.
Figure C.2 also shows the shares of MPs who held directorship of the Bank of England after
its founding by parliament in 1694. While a small share of MPs were personally connected
to the Bank of England through the directorship, the timing and growth after 1694 is coin-
cident with the Whig majority parliament and ministry after the general elections in 1694
and 1698. The connections between the financiers and Whig Party have been established
and this Figure shows one part of their connection in England’s government.
The second type of variable of interest - electoral influence - is coded from their constituency
and electoral information. For each MP I use information on the type of constituency the
represented (county or borough), how they were elected (in a contested election when more
than one candidate ran or), and if they represented a constituency in Middlesex (London,
Westminster, or Middlesex county). I also examine the role of parliamentary experience in
their political support by coding if an MP had been elected to parliament during the Civil
Wars or Commonwealth era (before 1660).
A full list and summary statistics on occupations, election information, and other covariates
are found in Panels B and C of Table 3.2. Panel B reports the occupation shares and if they
result of fewer MPs having commercial or trading interests from 1660 to 1688 in my coding. The discrepancy
could stem from differences in coding merchant interests. The authors use aggregate information of merchant
representation for each parliament compiled across separate volumes by Henning (1983) and Hayton et al.
(2002). The volumes use biographical information to classify MPs with trading or commercial interests,
which may allow the biographers to identify more commercial interests than my more conservative coding.
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changed from 1661-1685 to 1689-1702. Only 10% ever held a position in a company anytime
before or while in parliament from 1661 to 1685 and only 4% held a position while elected for
the same period. Confirming the patterns in Figure C.2, there was a statistically significant
increase to 13% for MPs who ever held a position in a company. Significantly more MPs
(41%) had ever held a position in the military anytime before or while in parliament from
1661 to 1685. Military representation, however, dropped to 26% from 1689 to 1702.
Panel C reports summary statistics for different electoral variables, for example if an MP was
elected at a by-election, in a contested election, sat in parliament before 1660, represented
a borough or a constituency in Middlesex (London, Westminster, and Middlesex). From
1661 to 1685, 13% of all elections were by-elections and thus most MPs were elected at
general elections. Fewer elections (10%) were by-elections from 1689 to 1702 which reflects
the increasing frequency of general elections after the Glorious Revolution. Consistent with
Figure C.1, about 32% of all elections were contested from 1661 to 1685 and this increases
slightly to 34% from 1689 to 1702.
Other covariates (birth order and education) are found in Panel D. The share of MPs that
were first sons was large and stable for the period. About 55% of MPs were first sons from
1661 to 1685 and 51% were first sons from 1689 to 1702. Most MPs attended either Oxford
or Cambridge. A larger and increasing share attended Oxford while a smaller and declining
share attended Cambridge. After 1660, Oxford became a center for Anglican and royal
support (discussed below).
3.4 Court and Opposition
Results in Table 3.3 show that occupation did lead to different political support for MPs.
Using the estimates from Table 3.3, Figure 3.2 reports the predicted share of MPs supporting
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the Court and Opposition for each of the occupations compared to MPs who did not have the
occupation. The Court disproportionately drew support from the MPs who held positions
in the military and those with commercial interests (Panel (a) and (d) of Figure 3.2). In
general the results are consistent with Seaward (1988) and Malcolm (1993). The monarchs
re-established royal authority over the militia during this era. MPs who held positions in
companies may have aligned with the Court in order to protect their trading rights.
The Opposition also drew more support from MPs who held ever held position in a company,
however, suggesting that some may have supported a parliamentary regime as protection
against the monarch. I provide evidence on heterogeneity across commercial interests below.
While they did not actively support the Opposition, MPs who were professional lawyers
or had inherited land were significantly less likely to be affiliated with the Court. They
were likely independently wealthy MPs and did not seek patronage from the Court. While
positive, it is surprising that the coefficient for MPs who had inherited land is not significant
because the Opposition drew support from plain country gentlemen or so-called Country
MPs during this period (Henning 1983). There may be measurement error in this variable
and could be combined with residential information to more accurately capture “Country”
MPs.
In other characteristics, MPs who had attended Oxford were more likely to support the
Opposition (Column (2) of Table 3.3). This is somewhat at odds with the historical literature.
Oxford was generally considered a stronghold of Cavalier Anglicanism (Aston 1984). It is
possible that the MPs who attended Oxford represent more of a Country element, who were
more familiar with the Court’s lean towards Catholicism.
MPs with commercial interests were likely to be affiliated with both the Court and Op-
position. Panel A of Table 3.4 examines if there is heterogeneity across different types of
commercial interests in their political support. For example, we may expect to see MPs with
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overseas trading companies supporting the Court (Jha 2015; Bogart 2018). MPs who ever
held a position in a domestic company or overseas merchant company were more likely to
support the Opposition. The correlations provides nuance to the picture of the Opposition
as “plain country gentlemen” (Henning 1983).
MPs who held positions in overseas companies, were more likely to support the Court,
however. MPs holding positions in overseas companies were more likely to be affiliated with
the Court. MPs who ever and overseas trading companies are affiliated with the Court. The
patterns are broadly consistent with companies aligning with different political groups to
protect their overseas trading rights. For example, Jha (2015) shows that MPs with overseas
trading interests were likely to be affiliated with the Court, likely to protect their rights
through royal patronage.
Panel B shows that there was heterogeneity within the overseas companies. MPs who held
positions in the Royal African Company (called the Royal Adventurers to Africa from 1660
to 1671) were significantly more likely to be members of the Court under Charles II and
James II. The company was created by the monarch and London merchant groups at the
Restoration and the evidence highlights the connection between the monarch, parliament,
and the Royal African Company. MPs currently holding positions in the East India Company,
however, were significantly less likely to be affiliated with the Court and no more or less likely
to be affiliated with the Opposition. The results are consistent with the conflict within the
company. It was largely connected to the Charles II and James II, but the connections with
the monarch was “a source of controversy within the company” because some of the directors
were affiliated with the growing Opposition (Bogart 2018: 13).
Elections
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.5 reports estimates for how MPs with different electoral
interests supported the Court and Opposition parties. It confirms that elections and electoral
interests played a role in generating support for the different groups. First, estimates in
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Table 3.5 show that MPs who had been elected before 1660 (during the Civil Wars or
Commonwealth era) were more likely to be affiliated with the Opposition and less likely to
be affiliated with the Court. The evidence suggests that there was some continuity from the
previous rebellion.
Figure 3.3 reports predicted shares from the estimates in Table 3.5. The Opposition appears
to have gained support from a broader set of constituents. MPs elected via contest were
more likely to be affiliated with the Opposition, while many Court MPs were not elected
via election (Panel (a) of Figure 3.3). Figure C.1 shows that, in the absence of any general
election, by-elections were increasingly contested from 1661 to 1679. The evidence is con-
sistent with Kishlansky (1986) who argues that the growing importance of contests was an
important component of political changes during this era.
MPs who represented counties were more likely to be affiliated with the Opposition (Panel
(b)). Counties held the same franchise requirements (40 shilling freehold) which could lead
to a broad electorate. Boroughs were also subject to the influence of the monarch or local
control from powerful families because their charters could be influenced by the monarch
and their franchise requirements (Harris 1993: 19). Patronage was a “dominant force in the
process of borough selections [for MPs]” (Kishlansky 1986: 148). Recent work shows that
there was heterogeneity across boroughs depending on their autonomy from the monarch
depending on their medieval rights which could be important for support during this era
as well (Angelucci et al. 2017). MPs representing a growing urban interest and populous
constituencies in Middlesex (London, Westminster, and Middlesex) were less likely to be
affiliated with the Court but were not more or less likely to be affiliated with the Opposition.
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3.4.1 Voting on Exclusion
Did support for different groups translate to support for different policies? I examine how
MPs voted on the First Exclusion Bill to provide insight to this question. The results show
that party affiliation could also influence support for different policies. The Opposition in
parliament took legislative action against the monarchy with the introduction of the first
Exclusion Bill in 1679. The bill was introduced in May 1679 and sought to alter the succession
of the monarchy. Specifically, it sought to exclude James, Charles II’s brother and a Catholic,
from inheriting the throne. The bill did not spell out any specific line of succession or other
constitutional changes to England’s government. It only included provision that James,
Duke of York, would not inherit the throne. Charles II killed the bill by suddenly ending
the session and dissolving the Parliament. There was a second attempt to pass an Exclusion
Bill in the following Parliament but Charles II ended the efforts through the same means as
before.
Two lists were drawn up by Roger Morrice - MP and chaplain to two Whigs - in May 1679
that record the MPs who were absent, for, or against the first Exclusion Bill. They were
compiled by Browning and Milne (1950). The division on the Exclusion Bill is important
not only because it was on a policy (though unsuccessful) that sought to significantly alter
England’s government but it is also one of the only pieces of information on how MPs voted
during this era.
There has been relatively little systematic examination of the determinants of voting on this
attempt at drastic change to England’s government structure. How MPs voted on Exclusion
could capture a variety of political and economic mechanisms. Most historians emphasize
how consistent the votes align with previous Court and Opposition lists as well as MPs’
religious affiliations (Henning 1983). In the original study of the lists, Browning and Milne
(1950) note that support for the bill appears to be geographically concentrated with most
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MPs representing the London, the Southwest, and Northern midlands voting for the measure.
Most (80%) of MPs who voted for the bill were also re-elected in the following parliament
while 55% of those who voted against lost their seats. Many MPs were absent on the vote
suggesting deliberate attempts by MPs to avoid the controversy.
How an MP voted could signal his attitude towards constitutional and religious issues as
well as the future development of England’s government. Voting for exclusion endorsed a
significant and novel parliamentary check on the monarchy: the ability to alter the succession
of the monarchy via legislative statute. Supporting the bill asserted that parliament and “the
people” had the right to decide the monarch. Those who voted against the bill believed the
monarchy was a divine right. Voting for Exclusion was also a statement against the current
administration under Charles II: he was unable to form policy or raise taxes, managed
through courtiers and pensioners, and saw growing opposition in the public sphere (Harris
1997: 205-206).
Panel A of Table 3.2 reports shares of MPs who were for Exclusion (support parliament),
against Exclusion (support the monarch), and who were absent on voting for the bill. The
bill had support in the House of Commons: 41% of MPs who sat in the Exclusion Parliament
voted for the Exclusion Bill. Twenty-four percent of MPs voted against the measure while
32% were absent during the vote.
Tables 3.6 reports estimates for how MPs with different occupations voted for, against, or
was absent on the first Exclusion Bill. The results complement those for political support.
MPs who had inherited an estate were more likely to support exclusion even though they
were no more likely to be affiliated with the Opposition. MPs who held positions in the
military supported the monarch by voting against the bill.
The results for commercial interests and voting on exclusion are also consistent the estimate
for commercial interests and party support in Table 3.4. While not statistically significant,
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the coefficient for MPs who ever held a position in a domestic company is positive for
supporting exclusion and the coefficient for MPs holding position in an overseas trading
company is positive for voting against exclusion. MPs who ever held positions in merchant
companies (e.g. Merchant Adventurers’ of Newcastle) were more likely to be absent on the
vote. Thus even though some overseas interests were affiliated with both the Opposition
(Panel B of Table 3.4) and Court (Panel C of Table 3.4), at the time of Exclusion, MPs were
largely against the measure or not willing to go against the monarch. Interestingly, MPs
who held mining interests were more likely to support the measure.
Table 3.7 reports estimates of the role of different electoral variables and voting on exclusion.
Similar to being affiliated with the Opposition, MPs who had been elected to parliament
during the Civil Wars or during the Commonwealth were more likely to vote for exclusion.
While MPs who represented constituencies in Middlesex were not more likely to be affiliated
with the Opposition, they were significantly more likely to support Exclusion. This evidence
is consistent with Browning and Milne (1950) who also emphasize the geographic patterns
of voting on the bill. Last, in contrast to their political affiliations, MPs who represented
boroughs were not more likely to vote for or against the measure.
3.4.2 Building a Court and an Opposition: Discussion
A large literature emphasizes that the monarchs’ attempted to build support in parliament
through patronage and borough re-chartering. The large support from MPs with military
positions and positions in overseas trading companies is consistent with patronage. There
are two additional types of occupationsI can use the MP dataset to better shed light on
these claims. The first, positions in the royal household, is a good measure of the monarch’s
influence in parliament. The second, local government positions, is more ambiguous. Town
and borough charters were issued and renewed by the monarch. A charter provided the
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governing framework for the localities, e.g. how governing positions were chosen. For most
of Charles II’s reign, towns and boroughs petitioned the government for new or to renew
their charter. The could also petition to clarify old charters.
The monarchs held rights to assign positions in borough governments with the Corporation
Act of 1661. The Corporation Act of 1661 gave power to royal commissioners to settle
the composition of the town councils. It enabled the crown to nominate all first aldermen,
recorders (judicial officer who recorded local court proceedings), and town clerks as well as
future recorders and town clerks and vacant places on common councils (Miller 1985: 58).
Table ?? confirms that MPs who held positions in the royal household were likely to support
the Court. MPs who held positions in local governments were no more or less likely to
support the Court. This is consistent with historical work arguing that there was no single
policy by Charles II to politically influence boroughs through the issuing of new town charters
from 1661 to 1664 (Miller 1985).
Historians have noted a difference in strategy and approach towards local boroughs under
Charles II’s reign and under James II. The strength of the Opposition became evident to
Charles II with the Exclusion Crisis leading him to “reassert control [in London and] over
officers in other towns via issuing writs of quo warranto [requiring the corporation to present
evidence to a royal court they have some right or privilege] [...] against all types of corporate
bodies, including trading companies. The primary aim was royal control at the municipal
and company levels [and gain advantage at elections]” (Henning 1983). Issuing of the writs
led to surrender of the charters and remodeling of parliamentary boroughs.
Figure C.3 reports the share of MPs holding positions in local governments. It shows that
there were jumps in the share of MPs with local positions at the end of Charles II’s reign (in
1679) and under James II (1685). Table C.1 reports estimates for political party affiliation
during the end of Charles II’s reign (1679-1681) and under James II (1685). The evidence
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suggests that under Charles II, MPs with positions in local governments were more likely to
be affiliated with the Court. Under James II they are significantly less likely to be affiliated
with the Opposition and more likely to be affiliated with the Court.
This is important because MPs who held positions in local governments were more likely
to be absent on the First Exclusion Bill (Table 3.6). The evidence is consistent with the
argument that James II continued this strategy of encroachment on localities, which was a
key factor leading to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Pincus 2009). It is possible that the
patterns in absenteeism amongst local officials and those who voted for exclusion (domestic
companies) provided the signal to the monarchs’ of how to assert royal authority.
In general, the evidence on who supported the Opposition and Court as well as voted for
or against Exclusion provides insight to the political economy of the era. First, it is largely
consistent with the historical literature that the Court and monarch used patronage and
traditionally royal groups to build support. Patronage and re-chartering of local boroughs
was an important element of the political economy of the era (Miller 1985; Malcolm 1993;
Pincus 2009). MPs who represented boroughs, which could have a more restrictive franchise
or be under the influence of local landlords, in general were also supportive of the Court.
Support for the Opposition group is more nuanced. In building support against the monarch
and Court, the Opposition relied on MPs who held positions in domestic companies and MPs
who had experience the Civil Wars and Commonwealth era. MPs who had succeeded to an
estate or held positions in domestic companies were also more likely to support Opposition
policies (First Exclusion Bill). The Opposition also used electoral politics to build support.
Contests became more common and MPs who were elected via contest were more likely to
support the Opposition. MPs who represented counties, which could have lower franchise
requirements, were more likely to support the Opposition.
While not directly comparable to recent work by Jha (2015), who examines financial asset
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holdings of MPs, the results for commercial interests currently stand in contrast to evidence
that overseas commercial and merchant interests were always the most important agents of
political and institutional change in England (Acemoglu et al. 2005; Angelucci et al. 2017).
It would be interesting to examine the mechanisms put forth by Jha (2015) and Angelucci
(et al. 2017) by combining the MP data with financial asset holdings as well as type of
constituency representation in determining an MP’s political support.
3.5 Political Support after the Glorious Revolution:
Tories and Whigs
Did the political affiliations of the Court and Opposition translate to support for the Tory
and Whig parties after the Glorious Revolution? The development of the two party system
in England was one of the most significant elements of the political economic changes of this
era, but the transition from 1660 to 1702 has not been studied. In this section, I present
evidence that there was both continuity and change in the connection between the Court and
Tories and the Opposition and Whigs. The findings are consistent with the historiography
“[the Exclusion Crisis] and the strife between Country [Opposition] and Court [fed into]
but did not directly overlap with the [Whig-Tory divide]” (Harris 1993: 147) The evidence
supports that there was a new political economic equilibrium after the Glorious Revolution
(Pincus 2009; Pincus and Robinson 2014).
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.3 reports estimates for the the role of MP occupation in
generating support for the Tories and Whigs. The Tories continued to draw support from
the military. Different from the Court, the Tories also drew support from lawyers perhaps.
This may be because the Tory platform eventually became identified with the Country
platform (Harris 1993: 162).
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The Tories also drew support from commercial interests, but, consistent with work on the
East India Company (Bogart 2018), column (3) in Table 3.4 shows this is largely driven by
MPs who held positions in merchant and overseas trading companies (Panels A). It is not
insignificant that the East India Company and Royal African Company were not members
of or did not support the Whigs (Panel B). Both had maintained the monopoly trading
privileges since their inception, using parliament and other strategies to protect their rights
(Bogart 2018). The Whig administration was responsible for enacting new trading policies
(Pincus 2009). It allowed more competition in the East Indian trade with an Act that allowed
a new East India Company in 1697 and also opened up trade to Africa with the Slave Trade
Act in 1698 (Pettigrew 2007).
The Tories also drew support from MPs holding positions associated with patronage under
Charles II and James II: positions in the royal household and local governments. Columns (3)
and (4) show that both were more likely to support the Tory party. The share of MPs holding
positions in the monarch’s household fell significantly with the general election in 1679 and
continued to stay low with parliament’s efforts to limit the monarch’s influence in parliament
after the Glorious Revolution. The results are consistent with the monarch’s continued
attempt to build support in parliament and that parliament was never fully successful in
removing royal patronage during this era (Horwitz 1977). It is possible that the result for
local government was a lasting effect of the re-chartering under Charles II and James II.
Whigs saw little overlap with MPs who supported the Opposition. MPs who held positions
in the military, for example, supported the Whigs. This may be because William and the
Whigs aligned in their efforts to fight the Nine Years’ War and the Whigs saw a Court
element. In general, Whigs drew support from their base of financiers and large aristocrats,
reflected in the fact that only MPs who held directorships in the Bank of England were more
likely to be affiliated with the Whigs (Panel B of Table 3.4). Different from the period before
the Glorious Revolution, MPs who held positions in domestic merchant companies were no
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more or less likely to support the Tories (Panel B).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.3 suggest that electorate also changed after the Glorious
Revolution. While contested elections gave the Opposition support under Charles II and
James II, they were no more or less likely to favor the Whigs and Tories in aggregate in the
Commons. It is also possible that contested elections changed the political party affiliation
at the constituent level (Bogart 2016). Figure C.1 shows that the share of contested elections
remained stable after the Glorious Revolution. The evidence suggests that as contests became
a regular occurrence in political life, both parties adapted to electoral politics and thus no
longer favored one party over the other (Kishlansky 1986).
Also different from the previous era, there was a switch in how the different types of con-
stituencies influence an MPs’ political support. MPs who represented counties were more
likely to support the Opposition before the Glorious Revolution but support the Tories after.
Whigs, therefore, gained support from the MPs representing boroughs. It is possible that
country support for the Tories represents their base of the landed gentry as well as their
more close alignment with the Country divisions. Borough support for the Whigs may be
related to their growing association with more traditional Court strong-holds (Harris 1993:
162-163). To fully interpret and compare the results from the previous era, however, one
could code different types of boroughs.
Last, constituencies in Middlesex appear to be relatively a-political for most of Charles
II’s reign but significantly favored the Exclusion Bill. After the Glorious Revolution, the
constituencies are aligned with both majority parties. The pattern is consistent with the
historical literature. The greater London area was wealthy and populous. The constituencies
saw competitive and bitter elections that were not dominated by either the Whigs or the
Tories. The election of 1690 in London for example, “saw much controversy as Tories and
Whigs continued their struggle for control of the City” (Hayton et al. 2002). Middlesex
county, representing the growing suburbs of London, also saw competitiveness in local parties
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as well as an active electorate (Hayton et al. 2002).
Discussion
In total the patterns are consistent with a new political economic equilibrium after the
Glorious Revolution. Specifically, the period from 1660 to 1685 was characterized by a
dominance of the Court faction - supported by military and placement - and influence of
the monarch via patronage and re-chartering of boroughs to pack parliament. The Country
Opposition during the era gained support from domestic groups and relied on contests and
elections to build opposition against the monarch.
The Glorious Revolution not only caused a regime change of the monarchy, but also ushered
in institutional changes that altered how support was gained or lost by political groups in
parliament. Parliament asserted control over the military during the Convention Parliament
of 1689 with the Militia Act and groups in parliament remained opposed to William’s at-
tempts to retain a standing army and power during the Nine Years’ War. Patronage by
the monarch and influence of the Court in parliament was curtailed by several measures. In
general they lost support at elections and particularly with the general election of 1679 (see
Figure C.4). Consistent with Cox (2012) who argues changes in ministerial accountability
was important for public finance with the Glorious Revolution, there were many attempts,
and some were successful, to ensure there was a shift towards elections and away from the
monarch and Court. There were also attempts to exclude different types of placemen from
parliament. Reforms were “introduced on average once every session between 1692 and 1714”
(Harris 1993: 163).
The period also saw significant change in electoral institutions as contests became more
regular during the late 1670s and elections with the Triennial Act of 1694 (Figure C.1; Table
3.1). Kishlansky (1986) argues: “As elections became more regular so did their procedures.
The acceptance of contests as a common occurrence necessitated the transformation of the
cumbersome methods of conducting electoral contests” (180-181). This occurred at the local
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level to ensure an “equitable resolution” of a contested election by accepting the poll or a
public count of votes (Kishlansky 1986: 180-182). Reform to bar placemen and patronage was
limited at the national level, but reform to elections did take place with Acts of Parliament
in 1696. These aimed to keep prices of elections low and prevent changes to local franchise
requirements that would have restricted voting (Harris 1993: 163).
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper uses a new individual level dataset to examine the types of Members of Parliament
(MPs) that supported the major political groups in parliament from 1660 to 1702. The
evidence supports that the late seventeenth century saw a significant transition in English
political institutions. It confirmed parliamentary supremacy by shifting power away from
the court and monarch and towards a new political economic equilibrium that was supported
by changes in electoral institutions. The findings also provide a point of contrast to work
studying how commercial, financial, and merchant interests influenced institutional change in
England. The evidence for the late seventeenth century suggests that the coalitions were not
always centered around merchant or commercial elite but required support from a broader
cross-section of the public via elections.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Parliamentary Meetings: 1660-1702
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
selected
years monarch sessions sessions (average) days events number of MPs at election
1660 Charles II Parliament 1660 1 294 Restoration, 1660 547
1661-1679 Charles II Parliament 1661 18 93 Triennial Act 1664 539
1679 Charles II Parliament 1679, 1 1 71 Exclusion Crisis, 1679-81 522
1679 Charles II Parliament 1679, 1 1 79 Exclusion Crisis, 1679-81 541
1681 Charles II Parliament 1681 1 8 Exclusion Crisis, 1679-81 502
1685 James II Parliament 1685 1 57 Glorious Revolution, 1688 526
1689-1690 William & Mary Parliament 1689 2 185 Revolution Settlement 556
1690-1695 William & Mary Parliament 1690 6 126 Triennial Act 1694 613
1695-1698 William III Parliament 1695 3 182 548
1698-1701 William III Parliament 1698 2 135 486
1701 William III Parliament 1701, 1 1 139 1701 Act of Settlement 486
1701-1702 William III Parliament 1701, 2 1 147 500
Source: Henning (1983), Hayton et al. (2002) and author’s calculations from Journals and MP dataset. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684,
1686-1688.
110
Table 3.2: Members of Parliament: Political Affiliations, Occupations, and Elections
1661-1685 1689-1702
share std. dev. share std. dev. diff.
Panel A: Outcomes
court 0.28 0.45 tory 0.21 0.40
opposition 0.07 0.26 whig 0.19 0.39
for exclusion 0.41 0.49
against exclusion 0.24 0.42
absent 0.32 0.46
Panel B: Occupations
inherited an estate 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.47 0.02*
professional lawyer 0.43 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.01
military 0.41 0.49 0.26 0.43 0.14***
position in company 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.03***
before entering parl.
position in company 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.001
while in parl.
Panel C: Electoral variables
contest 0.32 0.45 0.34 0.47 0.02*
elected before 1660 0.24 0.42 0.03 0.16 0.21***
borough 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.32 0.001
middlesex constituency 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.0003
Panel D: Other Covariates
first son 0.55 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.04***
attended Oxford 0.31 0.46 0.35 0.47 0.03***
attended Cambridge 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.02***
Notes: Table reports main variables in the analysis and their change over time. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Panel A: Outcome of interest is political party support or policy support
(for, against, or absent on Exclusion). Panel B: main occupation variables. Panel C: main electoral variables.
Panel D: Other covariates (education and birth order) included in the analysis.
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Table 3.3: Occupation and Political Support: Multinomial Estimates
1661-1685 1689-1702
(1) (2) (3) (4)
court opposition tory whig
military 0.62*** -0.02 0.49*** 0.18**
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
company position 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.31*** 0.07
(0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.11)
estate -0.43*** 0.09 0.07 -0.25***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
lawyer -0.10** 0.00 0.36*** -0.20**
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
oxford -0.10* 0.23*** 0.12 -0.33***
(0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
cambridge -0.06 0.03 -0.20** -0.26***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
first son 0.19*** -0.07 -0.02 -0.05
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Observations 11,056 11,056 8,044 8,044
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
All specifications report multinomial estimates relative to baseline of no party
affiliation. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
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Figure 3.1: Political Party Affiliations
Source: Author’s calculations from MP dataset and Bogart (2016).
Notes: Figure shows share of MPs with affiliated with a political party in a session of parliament. Vertical
lines mark general elections and new parliaments. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-
1688. See text for coding political party.
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Figure 3.2: Occupation and Predicted Political Support: 1660-1685
(a) Military (b) Estate
(c) Lawyers (d) Ever Held Position in Company
Notes: Predicted shares of political party support for different occupations from multinomial
regression of political party in equation 1.
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Table 3.4: Political Support: Heterogeneity Across Commercial Interests
1661-1685 1689-1702
(1) (2) (3) (4)
court opposition tory whig
Panel A: ever held position before elected
domestic company -0.54*** 0.41* -0.38* -0.14
(0.17) (0.23) (0.20) (0.21)
merchant overseas 0.28 0.59* 0.74*** 0.29
(0.23) (0.31) (0.24) (0.27)
overseas 0.32*** 0.27 0.49*** -0.10
(0.11) (0.18) (0.13) (0.15)
mining interest -0.20 0.16 -0.05 0.30*
(0.16) (0.26) (0.16) (0.15)
bank of england -14.18 2.10***
(521.66) (0.40)
Panel B: east india and royal africa companies
east india co. (ever) -0.67*** -0.20 0.30 -0.50**
(0.20) (0.28) (0.18) (0.23)
royal africa co. (ever) 1.07*** 0.19 0.58*** -0.27
(0.13) (0.25) (0.16) (0.21)
east india co. (while elected) -1.08*** 0.16 0.91*** -0.6
(0.30) (0.37) (0.27) (0.41)
royal africa co. (while elected) 1.06*** -0.39 -0.13 -2.18***
(0.20) (0.54) (0.33) (0.76)
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. All specifications report multinomial
estimates where the baseline group are MPs with no party affiliation in a session of parliament. Parliament did
not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
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Table 3.5: Elections and Political Support: Multinomial Estimates
1661-1685 1689-1702
(1) (2) (3) (4)
court opposition tory whig
elected before 1660 -0.15*** 0.17* -0.42** 0.45
(0.06) (0.09) (0.19) (0.30)
contest -0.41*** 1.01*** 0.01 -0.01
(0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09)
borough 0.20*** -0.26*** -0.16* 0.25***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
middlesex -0.63*** -0.52 1.68*** 1.56***
(0.21) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35)
Observations 11,056 11,056 8,044 8,044
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. All
specifications report multinomial estimates relative to baseline of no party af-
filiation. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
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Figure 3.3: Elections and Predicted Political Support: 1660-1685
(a) Contested Election (b) Constituencies: County and Boroughs
(c) Middlesex Constituencies
Notes: Predicted shares of political party support for different occupations from multinomial
regression of political party in equation 1.
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Table 3.6: Occupation and Voting on Exclusion
(1) (2) (3)
for against absent
exclusion exclusion on vote
succeeded to estate 0.10* -0.13*** 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
military -0.21*** 0.18*** 0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
domestic company 0.24 -0.10 -0.12
(0.15) (0.13) (0.15)
overseas company -0.01 0.10 -0.09
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
merchant -0.42** -0.01 0.46**
(0.21) (0.18) (0.20)
mining 0.27* -0.21 -0.05
(0.16) (0.14) (0.15)
royal household -0.14 0.17** -0.03
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
local position -0.16*** 0.03 0.11*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Constant 0.07 0.23 0.45*
(0.23) (0.20) (0.23)
Observations 503 503 503
R-squared 0.12 0.10 0.05
lawyer yes yes yes
education yes yes yes
electoral yes yes yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in
parentheses. All specifications report OLS estimates. Outcomes
are indicators if MP voted for excluding James II from becoming
monarch (column 1), against the measure (column 2), or was
absent on the measure (column 3).
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Table 3.7: Elections and Voting on Exclusion
(1) (2) (3)
for against absent
exclusion exclusion on vote
elected before 1660 0.16** -0.08 -0.08
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
contest 0.15 -0.44 0.30
(0.39) (0.34) (0.38)
middlesex 0.37** -0.26* -0.10
(0.18) (0.16) (0.18)
borough -0.01 -0.01 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.07 0.23 0.45*
(0.23) (0.20) (0.23)
Observations 503 503 503
R-squared 0.12 0.10 0.05
lawyer yes yes yes
education yes yes yes
company yes yes yes
military yes yes yes
estate yes yes yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in
parentheses. All specifications report OLS estimates. Outcomes
are indicators if MP voted for excluding James II from becoming
monarch (column 1), against the measure (column 2), or was
absent on the measure (column 3).
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Appendix A
Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 Estate Bills: Sources and Coding
I compiled the population of bills from a dataset of failed bills (Hoppit 1997) and a dataset
of estate acts (Bogart and Richardson 2010). I then used the Journals of the House of
Commons and Journals of the House of Lords to collect entries for each bill in the legislative
process. The final dataset includes information on bill characteristics, such as bill type and
landholder type, and information on each bill’s legislative life-cycle.
I coded information from a bill’s first entry. For example, a bill was read for the first time
in the House of Lords on February 22, 1677 with the title: “An Act to enable the Sale of
certain Lands in Winterborne Whitechurch in the County of Dorsett, lately belonging to
Lawrence Squib Esquire, deceased.”1
I used a bill’s first entry in the legislative process to code the property holders and types
of bills. To identify the interests on bills, a keyword search was conducted for the specific
1‘House of Lords Journal Volume 13: 22 February 1677’, in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume
13, 1675-1681 (London, 1767-1830): 49-51. British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/lords-
jrnl/vol13/pp49-51 [accessed January 2017].
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titles. General categories were then aggregated from this coding. The coding is not mutually
exclusive.
Landholders
• Nobility - The nobility consists of dukes, marquesses, lords, countesses, duchesses,
earls, viscounts, barons, and ladies (nobility). Lord was a common way to refer to a
member of the peerage. As such, some entries refer to a single person with multiple
titles. For example, a bill naming a Lord and Baron was for “restoring [land] to Charles
Lord Gerrard, Baron of Brandon.” In this event, I coded the individual by the more
specific title. In the previous example, Baron. Some individuals had titles Marquis and
Earls. These individuals are infrequent; as such they are coded as separate titles, but
I include a dummy for multiple titles. A Lady could refer to a woman in the nobility
or the gentry. This was inferred if she was also referred to as a Dame, a title given to
a woman in the gentry, or if the bill named her in relationship to a gentry man or a
noble man. For example, a bill in 1670 named the “Lord Viscount of Stafford and the
Lady Mary his Wife.”2 Thus, Lady Mary is a member of the nobility.
• Gentry - Individuals titled sir, knight, dame, baronet, ladies (gentry), esquires, or
gentleman fall into the landed gentry. The distinction of a Lady was inferred from
other information in the first reading (e.g. if her husband was named; if a woman was
referred to a Dame and a Lady, the bill is coded as having a ‘Dame.’) Some individuals
are referred to as Sir only, Sir Knight, Sir Baronet, or Sir Knight and Baronet. Because
these cases are more numerous I code them separately.
• Without Rank - The third category, those with no rank, contains untitled individuals,
professionals, individuals addressed as ‘Mrs.’ or ‘Mr.’ While ‘Mr.’ can also refer to
someone as “Master” indicative of legal training, or as a type landholder. An argument
can be made for including ‘Mr.’ as a gentry, but the reasoning is to distinguish between
those given the title of esquire and Mr., perhaps due to subtleties in norms. Some bills
refer to the same person as a ‘Mr.’ and as an Esquire. These are coded as ‘esquire’
only. Some individuals did not have their own title but were “daughter of” or “son
of” a titled individual. These individuals were not classified as untitled. Individuals
without rank were identified as Mrs., Mr., untitled, and a single yeoman.
• Other interests - Other interests includes individuals who were not a part of the social
and political ranking system but interests were important in English society. These
are government officials (serjeants at law, clerks and aldermen), military (colonels and
captains), copyholders, creditors, infants, and Royalty, and professionals. Professionals
are doctors, merchants, ironmonger and scrivener. Copyholder held ancient rights and
also held special legal status.
Bill Types
2‘House of Lords Journal Volume 12: 7 November 1670’, in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 12,
1666-1675 (London, 1767-1830): 358-359.
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• Non-estate - “Event” bills that were introduced because of questions of landowner-
ship created by the Civil Wars and Glorious Revolution. Some landowners needed
clarification after the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660 because of a series of land
confiscations and fines that were carried out during the Civil Wars, Commonwealth,
and in Ireland after 1688.
• Estate bills - Estate bills as classified by Bogart and Richardson (2010) and Hoppit
(1996).
• Sale bills - I first coded bills for selling land and then treated all other bills as “other.”
This could be recorded as a bill to sell, a bill to allow trustees to sell, a bill for the sale
of, etc.
• Other - Non-sale bills.
– Lease - Bills to allow leases.
– Raise money - Unspecified transaction that allows a property holder to raise
money for one of the purposes listed below. From the text of the acts, these could
be sell, mortgage, or lease.
– Complete contract - Confirm a transaction, previous act, or rectify a mistake in
a settlement.
– Settlement - Allow landholders to make a settlement or alter a previous one.
• Purposes
– Debts - Unclear nature from title or first reading from text.
– Jointures - Payments or to legally provide for widows (jointures).
– Equal or more value - Allows a landholder to purchase land of equal or more
value.
– Portions - For payments for younger children (often daughters and younger sons)
or other types of family members.
– Improvement - Improving the land. Coded if first reading says improvement,
improved, or improving. E.g. “rendering the improved Rent.”
Petitions
The Journals record if a petition or counsel were heard on a bill. To code bills with petitions,
I conducted a keyword search for “petition” on the legislative life-cycle data. I also conducted
a keyword search for “counsel” to code which bills had legal counsel called in. About 14%
of all estate bills had at least one petition regarding its content. As a type of constituent
service legislation, theory predicts that estate bills in general should generate little influence
activity, like lobbying (Baron 1994). This could be an understatement because petitions by
family members or other interested parties could be reported in committee but not recorded
in the Journals.
129
A.1.2 Estate Bills: Summary Information
Table A.1 provides information on social ranks and house of origin for estate bills.
Panel A of Table A.1 shows most bills named a member of the gentry (570/954=60%) with
esquires, like Lawrence Squib above, named the most often. Approximately the same number
of bills entered the House of Commons and House of Lords (Panel B of Table A.1). This was
before a series of standing orders made the House of Lords the single house of origin. Bills
that entered the House of Lords were also more successful, potential evidence of selection
by landholders’ ranking into the two Houses or better organization in the House of Lords,
which had fewer members.3 It could also be that bills introduced in House of Lords represent
better quality bills or more connected and powerful families. There was also selection into
different Houses by social rankings. A greater share of bills naming the nobility and clergy
entered the Lords more while a greater share of bills naming members of gentry and no rank
entered the Commons more.
A.1.3 Legislative Life-cycle Data
Parliament faced a problem when passing estate bills because it did not have a preset or
fixed amount of time to work. The monarch decided when to end a session, which was,
in theory, unknown. Landholders, their lawyers and agents worked with MPs and peers to
decide if and when to introduce estate bills as well as when to work on estate bills to pass
a multi-layered process. This process is summarized in Figure 1.5. The process required
attention and approval by both Houses of Parliament and had to receive the royal assent
by the monarch before becoming an Act of Parliament. Estate bills could be introduced
in either house, but the process was similar. Bills were approved by a committee where
amendments could be made and the whole house. After the legislature’s approval, a bill
3Hoppit (1997).
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received the royal assent from the monarch and became an act. The monarch could also
withhold the royal assent and veto an estate bill, which was only done 4 times during this
era.
A.1.4 Political Variables: Coding
Conflict Variables
• SP (Sudden Prorogation): Ogg (1962) gives a summary of the events in each session
under Charles II from 1665 to 1681. Horwitz (1977) does the same from 1688 to 1702.
Both include information on the main issues in each session as well as the proximate
reasons why and how the monarch ended each session with a brief description of the
prorogation event. I used James II’s speeches recorded in the Journals of the House
of Lords and Smith (1999) for the session meeting during his reign. The dataset is
available from the author.
• ConflictRevenue & ConflictMonarch - coded from Ogg (1962), Horwitz (1977) and
Smith (1999).
• IndirectRevenue - From the European State Finance Database provided by Professor
P. K. O’Brien and Mr. P. A. Hunt.
Political Variables
• ConflictHouses - Conflict between the two Houses of Parliament, often over general
legislation or constitutional court cases, could cause congestion of or deliberate blocking
of estate bills. Coded from Ogg (1962) and Horwitz (1977).
• WarSession - sessions meeting during war years could have made parliament more
effective or less effective depending on the support for the specific war effort. A near
majority of sessions met while England was at war (40%). The influence of war on
estate bill success could be positive or negative and also correlate with the monarch’s
decision to end a session. For example, the need for resources could influence the
monarch’s decision to keep a session open longer, giving parliament more time to
legislate on estate bills.
• Days - time parliament had to legislate is a main alternative factor hypothesized to
influence estate bill success. I include days a session met as a proxy for time parliament
had to legislate. I thank Dan Bogart for kindly sharing this data with me.
• PoliticalParty - a categorical variable for the majority party of parliament. From 1660
to 1689: Opposition or Court; from 1689 to 1702: Tory or Whig.
• DeficitRatio - changes in England’s fiscal capacity could also account for changes in
its legislative functioning. Improving fiscal prudence could also improve parliament’s
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organization or administration and thus parliament’s organizational capacity to pass
estate bills.4 I use the government deficit ratio from Dincecco (2011) to proxy for
changes in state and fiscal capacity. It will account for changes in parliament’s fiscal
prudence and also capture relative improvements in its ability to collect revenues. The
deficit ratio series is measured at yearly intervals rather than by session of parliament.
To account for the discrepancy, I used the corresponding year observation for sessions
of parliament meeting only once during a single year. I took the simple average of the
yearly data for sessions of parliament spanning multiple years.
Royal Assent
There were 38 sessions of parliament from 1660 to 1702. The distribution of this activity
under the four monarchs is insightful. Columns (1) and (2) show that the 8 sessions that
were prorogued without a supply or public measure occurred under Charles II and James
II. Columns (1) and (3) support Hoppit (1996) on the changes on parliamentary meetings.
Parliament had more time to legislate after the Glorious Revolution. It shows that sessions
under Charles II and James II were shorter, meeting for about 77 days, than under William
and Mary and William III, meeting for about 148 days.
While parliament had more time to legislate after the Glorious Revolution, it still faced the
problem of not knowing how to allocate its time because it did not know when the session
would end. Columns (4)-(7) provide more detail on how the time was used. Column (4)
shows that there was differences in how often the monarch’s came to parliament to pass
estate, supply, and public bills. Charles II and James II came to parliament about once a
session to pass estate bills, while after the Glorious Revolution the monarchs came to pass
estate bills more often to also receive supply or public bills. Under all monarchs, parliament
always had estate bills ready for approval when the monarch came to parliament for supply
or public bills (columns (6) and (7)). The evidence suggests that changes on this dimension
of crown-parliament politics with the Glorious Revolution was important for parliament’s
functioning.
4See Chandaman, C.D., The English Public Revenue, 1660-1688 and Johnson, Noel D. and Mark Koyama.
2014. “Tax farming and the origins of state capacity in England and France.” Explorations in Economic
History 41: 1-20.
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A.2 Structural Break Tests
The historical literature and evidence in Figure 1.1 shows a significant shift in the success
rate of estate bills after 1688. Further analysis using structural break tests also allows to
recover additional information on changes in the parliamentary system during this era.5
Figures A.2 and A.3 the OLS-based CUSUM process has a trough around sessions 23 to 24
(after the Glorious Revolution of 1688). The tests using F statistics show similar evidence
(supF test at 5% level).
Given there is evidence of at least one structural break, I use the the dynamic programming
algorithm developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to date structural changes. The BIC shows
that the model has 2 breakpoints. In addition to 1688, there is also a structural change
the parliamentary system from 1671 to 1673. This occurred after the first year Charles II
did not call parliament and suddenly ended 87% of sessions for the rest of his reign. The
historiography shows this was the beginning of when parliament and the monarch began
open conflict over religious policy: “Hitherto 1671 Charles had yielded in order to obtain
supplies but even thus the supplies were insufficient to enable him to pay his creditors; and
there was now a prospect that parliament would force him to sacrifice not Dissenters, but
the Papists, in return for such inadequate grants” (Ogg 1962: 351).
5Bai, Jushan and Pierre Perron. 1998. “Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple Structural
Changes.” Econometrica 66 (1998): 47-78 and Zeilies et al. 2003. “Testing and dating of structural changes
in practice.” Computational Statistics & Data Analysis 44: 109-123.
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A.3 Appendix Figures and Tables
Table A.1: Summary Information on Social Ranks and House of Origin
Panel A: Social Rank
Total % of Total
Nobility 206 0.22
Gentry 574 0.6
No Rank 204 0.19
Clergy 37 0.04
Other 198 0.22
Panel B: House of Origin
Failed Act % of Total
House of Commons 202 261 0.48
House of Lords 120 371 0.52
Panel C: Selection into House By Social Rank
Commons Lords difference p-value
Nobility 0.12 0.30 0.18 [0.00]***
Gentry 0.68 0.52 -0.15 [0.00]***
No Rank 0.24 0.18 -0.07 [0.01]**
Clergy 0.02 0.06 0.04 [0.00]***
Other 0.22 0.19 -0.03 [0.20]
Total 463 491
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset. Panel A: Number of
bills naming families from different social ranks. These are not mutually
exclusive categories. Panel B: Bill failure and success (approved by House
of Commons, House of Lords, and monarch) by House of Origin. Panel C:
Differences in shares of bills introduced in House of Commons and House of
Lords by social rank. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.2: Reason for Failure, Session 15 (13 October 1675 - 22 November 1675)
name origin stage failed date reason failed future Act? - session passed months to pass
Robinson’s Estate C H1 - comm 13/11/1675 still active - in comm no
Barkley’s Estate C H1 - comm 13/11/1675 still active - in comm yes - 16 17.6
Henry Marchant’s Estate C H1 - comm 16/11/1675 still active - in comm no
Squib, Laurence, Estate L H1 - report/recommitted 17/11/1675 still active - re-comm yes - 16 17.3
Lord Kilmorey’s Estate C H1 to H2 19/11/1675 still active yes - 16 23.7
Lord Cullen’s Estate C H1 - 1st R 19/11/1675 still active yes - 16 28.4
Plater’s Estate C H1 - 1st R 20/11/1675 still active yes - 16 32.2
Lord Maynard’s Estate L H2 - comm 20/11/1675 still active - in comm yes - 16 22.9
session average 1
Source: Estate bill dataset and Journals.
Notes: Reason failed is as recorded in the Journals. Future Act records if bill became an Act of Parliament in a later session and the specific session
it was passed. Sessions are numbered from the first session with restoration of the monarchy.
Table A.3: Reason for Failure, Session 33 (20 October 1696 - 16 April 1697)
name origin stage failed date reason failed future Act? months to pass
Courtney’s Estate C H1 - comm 14/1/1697 pet to comm no
Stopford’s Estates C H1 - 3rd R 16/2/1697 pass neg no
Knott’s Estate L H2 - 2nd R 27/2/1697 pet & rejected yes - 34 13
Cock’s Estate L H2 - 1st R 11/3/1697 still active no
Warburton’s Estate L H2 - 3rd R 1/4/1697 pass neg no
Moyle’s Estate L H2 - comm 12/4/1697 still active - in comm no
Lord Fairfax’s Estate C H2 - 2nd R 13/4/1697 counsel to full house no
session average 1.6
Source: Estate bill dataset and Journals.
Notes: Reason failed is as recorded in the Journals. Future Act records if bill became an Act of Parliament in a later
session and the specific session it was passed. Sessions are numbered from the first session with restoration of the
monarchy.
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Figure A.1: Bills Not Introduced Earlier in Sessions Suddenly Closed, 1660-1685
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset and Journals. Figure compares the
average number of bills introduced in the first 50 days of a session (10-day increments) in
sessions that were suddenly closed and those that were not. NP: normally closed (prorogued)
sessions. SP: suddenly closed (prorogued) sessions.
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Table A.4: Anticipation: Average Speed of Passage by Stage in
Legislative Life-cycle, 1660-1685
Avg.# of days
NP SP difference p-value
days from stage 1 to 2 11.03 39.4 28.4 [0.34]
(1.81) (32.89)
days from stage 2 to 3 22.4 16.1 -6.32 [0.38]
(4.93) (4.98)
days from stage 3 to 4 7.38 8.91 1.53 [0.68]
(1.2) (3.9)
days from stage 4 to 5 2.34 0.48 -1.8 [0.09]*
(0.85) (0.15)
days from stage 5 to 6 5.9 4.8 -1.07 [0.75]
(1.69) (3.15)
days from stage 6 to 7 4.49 8.22 3.72 [0.34]
(0.95) (4.42)
days from stage 7 to 8 9.12 8.13 0.98 [0.80]
(1.57) (4.07)
days from stage 8 to 9 6.99 2.21 -4.77 [0.01]**
(1.04) (1.22)
days from stage 9 to 10 13.64 6.32 -7.31 [0.08]*
avg. speed (slope) 28.22 43.72 15.51 [0.14]
(7.41) (7.12)
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Slope:
last date - first date. Means for each stage calculated at session-
level first. NP: normally closed (prorogued) sessions. SP: sud-
denly closed (prorogued) sessions.
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Table A.5: Differences in Observables By Sudden
Closure (Prorogation), 1660-1685
Shares of bills introduced
NP SP difference p-value
Nobility 0.28 0.27 0.006 [0.88]
(0.01) (0.04)
Gentry 0.57 0.54 0.03 [0.55]
(0.03) (0.04)
No Rank 0.21 0.16 0.05 [0.25]
(0.02) (0.03)
Clergy 0.04 0.02 0.01 [0.46]
(0.01) (0.01)
Other 0.2 0.19 0.009 [0.83]
(0.02) (0.04)
Estate 0.79 0.95 0.16 [0.00]***
(0.02) (0.02)
enter HoL 0.41 0.42 0.01 [0.80]
(0.03) (0.05)
Total Bills 321 117
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill
dataset. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p
<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. NP: sessions that were
normally closed (prorogued). SP: sessions that were
suddenly closed (prorogued) by monarch.
Table A.6: Royal Assent: Estate Bills and Supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
given RA on estate bill
prorogue & RA avg # days avg. # RA days, # days RA, # days RA, # days RA
sessions supply, public per session per session estate supply & estate public & estate
Charles II 23 16 96.9 1.2 27 19 7
James II 1 1 57 2 2 2 0
William & Mary 7 7 135.7 4 28 24 4
William III 8 8 159.6 3.27 27 22 4
Notes: Author’s coding from the Journals of the House of Lords. RA: Royal Assent, days when monarch (or royal commission)
gave assent to bills (bills became Acts of Parliament). The types of legislation were identified from the Journals because there
were different phrases of approval from Norman French that were used for three types of legislation. For supply bills: La Roy [or
Reine] remercie ses bons Subjects [or Clergy], accepte leur Benevolence, et ainsi le veult ; private bills: Soit fait come il est desire´.
public bills: La Roy [or Reine] le veult ; private bills: Soit fait come il est desire´.
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Table A.8: Economic Effects of Sudden Prorogation
Panel A: Scarring of Projects If entered
NP SP difference p-value n
% success of bills 0.66 0.32 -0.34 [0.00]*** 954
(0.04) (0.08)
% success, if 0.77 0.63 -0.14 [0.00]*** 833
first entry (0.04) (0.01)
Panel B: Delay of Projects If entered
NP SP difference p-value
years 0.32 0.89 0.57 [0.00]***
(0.02) (0.21)
months 4 11
Panel C: Displacement of New Projects
# new bills
neg binomial poisson
SPt−1 -0.63** -1.43* -0.63*** -1.43***
(0.25) (0.77) (0.08) (0.38)
SPt−2 0.84 0.84*
(0.78) (0.38)
OLS
share new bill log share new bill
SPt−1 -0.085 0.02 -0.17*** -0.03
(0.06) (0.19) (0.04) (0.12)
SPt−2 -0.11 -0.15
(0.19) (0.12)
n=33
Notes: Author’s calculations from estate bill dataset. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Projects defined as a bill with same name (first and last)
and legal type. NP: sessions that were normally closed (prorogued). SP: sessions that
were suddenly closed (prorogued) by monarch. Panel A: If a project was first introduced
in a session that was suddenly closed, it had a lower longer term success rate. Panel B:
If a project was first introduced in a session that was suddenly prorogued, it took longer
to pass. Panel C: Sessions meeting after those that were suddenly prorogued had fewer
new bills.
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Table A.9: Political Conflict and Sudden Prorogation: Correlations
Panel A: Charles II and James II
n SP ConflictRevenue ConflictMonarch IndirectRevenue
SP 12 1
ConflictRevenue 5 0.5 1
ConflictMonarch 7 0.44 -0.35 1
IndirectRevenue 0.62 0.17 0.38 1
sessions 23
Panel B: William & Mary and William III
n SP ConflictRevenue ConflictMonarch IndirectRevenue
SP 3 1
ConflictRevenue 4 0.82 1
ConflictMonarch 1 -0.13 0.44 1
IndirectRevenue -0.55 -0.27 0.40 1
sessions 15
Notes: Author’s calculations from political dataset. See Appendix Section A.1.4. There
were 38 sessions; 34 had at least one estate bill introduced. SP: sessions that were sud-
denly closed (prorogued) by the monarch. ConflictRevenue: sessions with conflict between
parliament and monarch over fiscal issues (tax bills). ConflictMonarch: sessions with con-
flict between monarch and parliament over general policy (legislation). IndirectRevenue:
monarch’s financial independence from parliament.
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Table A.10: Estimates of Success by Social Rank
Outcome: Successful Bill (Act of Parliament)
Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nobility -0.13** -0.10** -0.05 -0.04 -0.11
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
Gentry -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
NoRank -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.10** -0.10** -0.28**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.11)
Clergy 0.10 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19)
Other 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
post1688*Nobility 0.07 0.11
(0.09) (0.11)
post1688*Gentry 0.01 0.08
(0.08) (0.10)
post1688*NoRank 0.17 0.25*
(0.09) (0.13)
post1688*Clergy -0.08 -0.08
(0.15) (0.21)
post1688*Other -0.04 -0.05
(0.07) (0.06)
Constant 25.64**
(12.12)
observations 954 954 954 954 954
pseudo R2 or R2 0.01 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.23
LR test 14.24 158.9 275.1 288.63 -
political variables no yes yes yes yes
bill types no no yes yes yes
NoRank difference 0.13 0.22
p-value [0.72] [0.64]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Clustered at session of parliament (34 sessions). Reported probit coeffi-
cients are average marginal effects (AME).
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Table A.11: Esquires and Gentlemen More Likely to Enter Commons after Glorious Revo-
lution
Outcome: Bill Naming Esquire or Gentleman
1660-1685 1689-1702
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
enter HoL -0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.13***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 438 438 438 516 516 516
pseudo-R2 or R2 0.04 0.23 0.25 0.04 0.31 0.33
politics no no yes no no yes
property holder no yes yes no yes yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Outcome is one if bill names an esquire or gentlemen and zero otherwise.
Enter HoL is an indicator if bill was introduced into House of Lords (HoL).
Reported probit coefficients are average marginal effects (AME).
Table A.12: Timing of Improvement in Bill Entry
Panel A: Timing of Improvement in Number of Bills and Acts in Sessions of Parliament
(1) (2) (3)
1679-1685 1689-1690 diff. 1675-1685 1689-1690 diff. 1675-1685 1689-1692 diff.
Number of bills 8.6 15.6 7 16.5 15.6 0.83 16.5 25 8.5
[0.05]* [0.93] [0.38]
Number of acts 2 10.6 8.6 7.5 10.6 3.1 7.5 18.4 11
[0.01]** [0.64] [0.15]
Total Sessions‡ 3 3 6 3 6 5
Number of bills 6.5 15.6 9.1 11 15.6 4.6 11 25 14
[0.04]** [0.61] [0.11]
Number of acts 1.5 10.6 9.1 5 10.6 5.6 5 18.4 13.4
[0.00]*** [0.33] [0.04]**
Total Sessions 4 3 9 3 9 5
Notes: Table reports information on when participation improved after the Glorious Revolution (1688). ‡: conditional on estate bills
introduced in a session. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Panel A: Reports differences in means for all bills and acts at three different
time intervals or bandwidths before and after 1688. Panel B: Reports differences in means for shares of bills naming the two groups of
the gentry: baronets and knights and esquires and gentlemen at three different time intervals or bandwidths before and after 1688.
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Figure A.2: Structural Break: OLS-CUSUM
Notes: See text.
Figure A.3: Structural Break: F-stats
Notes: See text.
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Appendix B
Appendix: Chapter 2
B.1 Data Appendix
B.1.1 Coding Economic and Legal Functions
Estate acts during this era can generally be divided into two parts: (1) a set of “preamble”
clauses and (2) a set of “enactment” clauses. The preamble describes or re-writes any
contracts or conveyances on a set of lands or property. These clauses are separated by the
use of “Whereas.” From this section I identify a primary property conveyance and a section
where the landholder appeals to parliament for an act. The appeal section describes a
family’s economic condition, the legal constraint, and the proposal for a reorganization. The
enactment section sets out a series of clauses that address the appeals and the underlying
conveyance. The enactment clauses are separated by the use of “Be it therefore Enacted.” I
include provisos in the enactment clauses. Individual clauses of each act were entered into a
separate column in a spread sheet. On average acts have 3 (min 1, max 8) preamble clauses
and 3 (min 1, max 11) enactment clauses.
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Asterisks (*) denote types of clauses that can usually be found in the descriptive titles of
acts.
Preamble Clauses: Conveyances and Appeals
Conveyances
From the preamble section I identify a primary conveyance for each act: life estate-entail
settlement, strict settlement, religious corporation, or other conveyance. Acts can describe
more than one contract or conveyance on a property. If a settlement is listed, this is the
primary conveyance. For the remaining acts, land is held by a religious corporation, or the
conveyance is a different type of contract.
• life estate-entail settlement: follows Bonfield (1983). Life estate-entail model: con-
veyance lists life estate followed by an entail (specifically cites “entail”, “in taile” or
variation thereof). Possible that settlement created a trust for a family charge, e.g. for
jointure or portions.
• strict settlement: Follows Bonfield (1983). Settlement describes life estate and specif-
ically that there is a “trust to preserve contingent remainders.”
• religious corporation: for this random sample, land held by the Church of England
(Bishop of London).
• other conveyance: previous estate act, decree of Chancery, will (not creating a set-
tlement), common recovery, mortgage, (1) previous partition, and (1) award for a
dukedom.
Appeals
From the preamble section, I identify an appeal section. The appeal section begins with
a shift from describing contracts and conveyances to problems or events and ends before a
petition to the monarch and the enactment clauses. Some acts’ preamble and appeal section
are the same. Some acts describe additional conveyances within the appeal section. Some
acts contain further “appeals” after the initial set of enactments. These “secondary” appeals
are followed by a “secondary” set of enactments. For simplicity I treat these secondary
appeals as a part of the initial appeal section and their enactments as a part of the initial
enactment section. In the dataset they are coded with one asterisk (*) if it is the first set
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“secondary appeal and enactment” and two asterisks (**) if it is the second set of second
set of “secondary appeal and enactment.”
An act is coded as “having an appeal of the type” or not (some acts contain multiple clauses
falling into a single category).
Economic events or concerns- not mutually exclusive
Landholder(s) appeals...
• incomplete or outstanding transaction - that previous or current conveyance or trans-
action has been made but that it is incomplete or outstanding. The appeal refers to a
specific conveyance, agreement, or purchaser. Conveyances or transactions: contracts
or conveyances for sale, wills, loans, marriage settlements, partition, common recov-
ery, building contract. For example: sales: “purchase moneyes are still deteyend” or
“purchase money not paid”; loan: “cannot hand a loyall discharge nor can the said Sir
William Juxon in any loyall way obtaine from them satisfaction of the said moneyes”;
marriage settlements: “cannot be perfectly and speedily settled according to the said
Agreement”; will (to pay portions): “who is Desirous to performe the said Decree
Relating to the satisfieing his said Brothers and Sisters portions.”
• opportunity for economic improvement - that there is an opportunity to build, im-
prove property for the advantage or benefit of family members. Acts that describe that
have opportunity to sell land or “conceive” that they would like to sell land without
specifying for payment of debts, family charges or purchasing land.
• costs of debt - cites interest payments are greater than rental income, the debts are
“great” or “considerable,” or that creditors have brought forth an action of ejectment
or on the property (2).
• management cost - that the property, buildings, or land is ruinous, decayed, managed
at great cost, inconvenient to manage.
• marriage - there is an opportunity for marriage of a family member.
• unforeseen circumstance, accident, and war - there was an unforeseen circumstance,
accident. Circumstances include a life tenant’s sudden death (2), an executor or life
tenant has run away (2), the London fire of 1666 (1), there was an unintended conse-
quence because the family “did not know” about specifics of their estate or settlement
(4). Civil Wars play a role in economic or legal appeal. For Civil War, the appeal
use the phrases war (wiarr), the late (unhappy) troubles, the late times of
usurpation, or cite fines or delinquency.
Legal constraints - not mutually exclusive
Landholder(s) appeals...
• heir under 21 - that “by reason of the minority of the said issues male [heirs, male]” or
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that the heir is under 21 or an infant. Land had become vested in the remaindermen
or entail.
• life tenant or executor of will is barred - that there is no one with the powers or right to
carry out the proposal or that the life tenant or executor of a will is somehow prevented
from carrying out the transaction.
• trust - legal issue with trust: trustees are concerned with liability, do not have powers,
or want to be excused or added to trust.
• protect from claims - claims can still be made by heirs or other family members with
an estate; land or property is still liable to existing estates or claims
• general law - appeal cites they will be in violation of a general law or are constrained
because there is a previous act of parliament (which can only be amended by parlia-
ment)
Proposed reorganization - not mutually exclusive
• *pay debts - to pay debts either generic or to complete a credit transaction.
• *pay family charges - to pay family charges (portions, jointures, life annuities, legacies).
• *purchase land of higher value - to purchase land of higher value or replace land in
settlement.
Enactment Clauses
There are three types of enactment clauses: economic, legal, and amend settlement. The
three categories are not mutually exclusive: a single clause can contain information that is
classified as economic, legal, and amend settlement. An act is coded as “having a clause of
the type” or not. Some acts have multiple clauses falling into a single category, but it is
coded as a binary variable.
Economic transactions - not mutually exclusive
The enactment clause...
• *sale - allows a life tenant or trust to sell land.
• *lease - allows a life tenant or trust to make leases.
• *mortgage - allows a life tenant or trust to mortgage property.
• *settlement - allows family to make a settlement, either life estate-entail model or strict
settlement.
• *other - allows for unique transactions. Specifically, clauses for: restoring a duke to
his estates at the Restoration, exchanging land, purchasing land for Bishop of London,
giving power to pay bonds and obligations, enclosing land, and securing payment of a
loan.
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Legal - not mutually exclusive
The enactment clause...
• good at law - specifies that an economic transaction will be good at law either by (1)
protecting the transaction from claims by potential claimants (remaindermen or family
members with estates on the property) or by specifying that the transaction was made
(2) “as if” the life tenant held the property in fee simple or was over 21.
• *confirm - confirms a contract, conveyance, or transaction (e.g. will, a sale, settlement)
or amends a previous act of parliament.
• title or rights - transfers a title to another part (either person or trust); addresses the
rights of tenants or other third party stakeholders.
• limits on act or transaction - either (1) contains the phrase “as if the Act had not been
made” in regards to the economic transaction, (2) specifies some other condition on
the transaction (e.g. time limit to when it can take place), (2) specifies some other
unique stipulation (e.g. paid in Chancery or subject to government renewal).
• amend trust or trustees - alters or clarifies powers of the trust. Examples: liability,
adds new trustee.
Amend settlement - not mutually exclusive
The enactment clause...
• discharge or void - discharges land from a trust or voids a transaction.
• amend or make new family charges - adds a new charge (e.g. a jointure) or alters an
existing charge.
• protect existing charges - specifies an existing charge or estate on the land, usually
associated with a person’s name, and the phrase “as if the Act had not been made.”
B.1.2 Geography, Property Values, and Petitioners
Geography and Acreage
The location of the land or property can be found in either the (1) preamble section or (2) in
the enactment clauses which record or describe the property of the landholders. I first enter
the property listed in the enactment section - those to be sold, leased, mortgaged, settled, or
in question. All acts refer to some property in the enactment section. It either gives a full
list of the property or it provides a summary and refers to lands or property “as aforesaid”
or as “recited [in the] Indenture mentioned and comprised” in the preamble section. If it lists
the property as aforesaid, I enter the property from the preamble section in a new column.
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Acreage is recorded in about 30% of acts. Most settled land in acts was less than 500 acres.
It thus appears that acts were not in general for large estates. Spring (1967), in studying the
settlement practices of aristocrats, documents that one aristocratic family had settled land
totaling over 180,000 acres in 1767,1 another held 30,000 acres as tenant for life in 1780,2 and
a last family had approximately 140,000 acres of settled property.3 This evidence, however,
may be reflecting the “drift towards great estates” of the eighteenth century (Thompson
1966; Habakkuk 1994). Thompson (1966) estimates that 4.5 million acres was distributed
among 200 “great landowning families” in 1641. If we assume half of this land was settled or
entailed, then on average great landowners had 11,250 acres of settled land that was possibly
under the purview of estate acts. If acts addressed only a fraction of a great landholders’
settled property, between 1% and 30%, then we would expect to see acts listing between
112 and 3,375 acres of land. There are is only one act that is close to the upper bound: an
act passed in 1688 for a large landholder, the Earl of Peterborough, to confirm a common
recovery for 3,500 acres in Bedfordshire.4
Property Values
Property values were coded from the preamble and the enactment clauses. I calculate the
annual rental income of the property that landholders wanted to sell, lease, or mortgage.
Some acts record a sales price or a purchase price. Others list charges on the estate (debts,
portions, or jointures) or what the proceeds of a sale will be used for. I first look for
purchase or sales prices in the enactment section or appeal section. I then look for a charge
the proceeds of a sale is used for - e.g. sale land to pay portions of “x” pounds. Last I
expand the search to look for information on any charge on the estate. The charges listed
are usually for portions or jointures, but also legacies from a will, life annuities, or stipends
to trustees or executors. If a purchase price is listed, I use the amount to calculate the rental
1The estates of the Percies, Dukes of Northumberland in Northumberland and Middlesex (pp. 216-217).
2Land in Durham and Northumberland of the Lambtons, who were future Earls of Durham (pp. 219-220).
3The Fitzwilliams, earls of Fitzwilliam whose estates in West Riding of Yorkshire and estates in Ireland
were settled (pp. 219-220).
4Earl of Peterborough’s Estate Act, 1 W&M s1, c. 37.
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value. If there is a single charge and no purchase price, I use the amount to calculate the
rental value. If there are multiple charges, I sum all charges and use the amount to calculate
the rental value. Coding value in this way is likely to serve as a lower bound for the rental
income of the estates or property of the landholders.
The values are either recorded as lump sums or in terms of the annual rental income. I use
all information on the charges and sales price to calculate the annual rental income for the
property in question. The coding captures the value of the property released for transactions.
I enter all charges in separate columns. I sum all transactions and divide the total value
by 25 to get an estimate of the annual rental income. This follows from the practice of
multiplying prices by 25 as a common conversion tool to calculate annual rental income.
Costs of an Estate Bill
The total cost includes parliamentary fees that were recorded in the Journals in 1700. It also
includes information on solicitors’ fees for writing and preparing the petition and appeal for
an act, fees for consultation (with interested parties, MPs, and judges), and fees for amending
the estate bill throughout the parliamentary process.5 To take instructions for the bill it
cost 13 s. 4 d., to meet with an MP to manage the bill - 15 l. 5 s., and for any subsequent
“attendance” or meeting with the MP - 13 s. 4 d. Drawing an abstract of the deeds and
petition for a bill cost 4 l. 17 s. total. The total fee for the House of Lords was 70 l. and 5
s.; the total fee for the House of Commons was 28 l. and 14 s.
The cost of 392 l. 14 s. 8 d. for an act from 1799 is likely to be an overestimate of the total
cost of investing in an act from 1660 to 1702 for at least two reasons. First, the bill of costs
5It is an itemized set of costs that was taxed by a Master of Chancery in “pursuance of a clause” in the
resulting Act of Parliament. The manual by Ellis also includes a Schedule of Parliamentary Fees (Rate of
the List of Fees) that were first recorded in 1700. The schedule of fees was officially sanctioned by a standing
order in 1731 to “be printed, and hung up in the Speaker’s Chambers, in the Lobby, and in the Clerk’s Office
in Parliament.” The standing order may have been in response to MPs charging fees of their own because
the standing order also specifies “[t]hat if any Officer or Servant of this House shall presume to demand or
take any greater Fee than what shall be contained in the said printed Tables, this House will proceed against
such Officer or Servant with the utmost Severity” quoted in Ellis (1799), pg. 93.
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includes fees to go to judges before a bill could be introduced into parliament, as required
by standing order of 1702. Bills introduced from 1660 to 1702 did not have to go to judges.
Excluding all potential “judges’ fees” decreases the costs to 336 l. 19 s. 4 d. Excluding all
fees charged prior to going to the Houses of Parliament decreases the costs to 223 l. 4 s. 8
d. Second, it is likely to be an over estimate of the costs to obtain an act because it was for
the Duke of Buckingham, who may have been able to pay or would have paid a premium
for a solicitor. Therefore a reasonable range of costs for an estate act from 1660 to 1702 is
£100-200.
Contemporary evidence suggests this may be a reasonable approximation of the costs of
an act for the late seventeenth century. In a letter from a Middlesex MP to his nephew,
Oliver Le Neve, on 5 Dec, 1696, Ralph Hawtrey, recommends two solicitors and counsel for
Le Neve’s private bill and notes that “the fees must be paid before the second reading.”
Hawtrey also notes the importance of consulting with counsel: “[Mr. Walker] is best seen at
9 a.m., at the Parliament Office in Old Palace Yard, before he goes to the House.”6
Types of Property Holders
Petitioners
For each act I identify a petitioner or set of petitioners. This usually found in the preamble
section: either at the beginning of the section or at the end of the section before the enact-
ment section. It is usually found with the phrase “at the humble petition” or describes the
“petitioners or supplyants [suppliants].” If no petition clause is found, I code the names of
parties in the appeal section as the petitioners for the act.
Most acts (60%) have at least one petitioner who is an untitled gentry. The nobility peti-
tioned for 20% of acts and a titled gentry petitioned on 31% of acts. Professionals petitioned
on 8% of acts.They find that the number of “professionals, merchants, and other property
6Calendar of Correspondence and Documents Relating to the Family of Oliver Le Neve, of Witchingham,
Norfolk, 1675-1743.
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owners” petitioning parliament or named in descriptive titles is 21.4% (McCahill 2013) and
17.8% (Bogart and Richardson 2010).7 Members of the clergy, whose land was held by re-
ligious corporations and also subject to legal constraints, petitioned on 3 acts (5%). The
clergy members during this period held large tracts of land: 2 were for the Bishop of London
and 1 was for the Archbishop of Canterbury.
Nearly half of acts name at least one petitioner who is or was a Member of Parliament (MP)
or is related to an MP. This may be an understatement of MP involvement because it does
not match male or female petitioners who are related to MPs through the maternal line,
cousins, etc. I also have not coded trustees who were MPs. Fifty percent is also significantly
higher than the late eighteenth century where 12% of bills (50/428) had an MP “elected
from the ranks of the upper gentry.”8 That many MPs used estate acts during this era is not
surprising for several reasons. First, parliament was a majority landholders or wealth holders
who were familiar with and used settlements. The evidence also suggests that merchants and
MPs with more commercial interests used the conveyance. Second, it is likely this period
had different political barriers than the later system of estate acts that was regulated by a
set of standing orders and required petitions be sent to two judges first.
Trustees
Acts either empower life tenants or vest the property in a trust to carry out an economic
transaction. I read each enactment clause and identified the trustees by the phrase: “to bee
settled and vested in the [names of trustees] upon trust [or in trust].”
Thirty-seven acts named 122 trustees to carry out an economic transaction (on average 3
trustees per act, max=7, min=2). About 50% of trustees were members of the lower gentry
(esquires and gentlemen). The second two largest groups were the titled gentry (22% of
trustees) and professionals (15% of trustees). The nobility were less represented as trustees
7Table 4 in McCahill (2013).
8McCahill (2013), pg. 153.
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than as petitioners (11% of trustees). I also code if the trustee was “of London” or “of an
Inn of Court” (trained in law). Of the esquires and gentlemen trustees, 30% were from the
London area and 8% were lawyers.
Social class of Petitioners and Trustees
• nobility - the petitioner has a title (e.g. duke, earl, lord, duchess, countess, viscount,
viscountess)
• upper gentry - petitioner is a baronet, knight, dame
• lower gentry - petitioner is an esquire or gentlemen
• professional - petitioner is a merchant, creditor, ironmonger, alderman, goldsmith,
apothecary, woolen draper, citizen, clothworker, doctor in phisick, haberdasher
Members of Parliament
I use the History of Parliament website (http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/research/
members/) to identify if a petitioner was a Member of Parliament (MP). For both male and
female petitioners, I search the database for a common last name. I use information in an
MP’s “Family and Background”, his biography, and his residence to confirm if the petitioner
is an MP or related to an MP.
5 MPs with annual income in biography
1. FAUNT, George (d.1697), of Foston, Leics.
• petitioner
• £2,000 per annum - The income of 2,000 p.a. with which he was credited in
the Leicestershire list for the projected order of the Royal Oak was probably
exaggerated.
• http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/faunt-george-
1697
2. OKEOVER, Rowland (1651-1730), of Okeover, Staffs.
• petitioner
• £800 per annum - His income was estimated at 800 p.a., but may have been
further reduced by the private Act of 1662 which enabled him to sell land in
Derbyshire for payment of debts.
154
• http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/okeover-rowland-
1651-1730
3. HILDYARD, Henry (1610-74), of Winestead, Yorks. and East Horsley, Surr.
• father of petitioner Phillip Hildeyard
• £2,357 per annum - His estate was valued at 2,357 p.a.
• http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/hildyard-henry-
1610-74
4. GODOLPHIN, William (1635-96), of Spargor, St. Mabyn, Cornw.
• brother of petitioners
• £3,200 per annum - But these represented only a quarter of his wealth, estimated
at 80,000 (sum).
• http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/godolphin-
william-1635-96
5. BAMPFYLDE, Sir Coplestone, 2nd Bt. (c.1633-92), of Poltimore, Devon.
• brother or uncle of petitioner
• £1,900 per annum - He had earned nomination as knight of the Royal Oak, for
which his estate was reckoned at 1,900 p.a. (1660-61)
• http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/bampfylde-
sir-coplestone-1633-92
Matching Acts to Land Transactions
I match 30% of acts to secondary sources of family or county histories that records trans-
actions. I first searched the Victoria County Histories (available at British History Online).
For properties in London, I also searched the Survey of London (available at British History
Online). I then searched information from an MP’s biography. Last I conducted a gen-
eral internet search for records in topographical studies of counties or parishes and family
histories.
Main Sources
1. Victoria County Histories - “Founded in 1899 and originally dedicated to Queen Victo-
ria, the Victoria County History (VCH) is an encyclopaedic record of England’s places
and people from earliest times to the present day. It has been described as the greatest
publishing project in English local history.”
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• Available at: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/catalogue/secondary-texts
2. Survey of London - “The Survey of London, founded in the 1890s, is the nearest
thing there is to an official history of London’s buildings. This series provides detailed
architectural and topographical studies of the capital’s built environment.”
• Available at: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/search/series/survey-london
3. MP Biographies - A database that “contains the 21,420 articles published so far by the
History of Parliament covering the careers of Members of Parliament.”
• Available at: http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/research/members
Other Sources - topographical histories and other records.
1. Magna Britannia - “A topographical and historical account of a number of British coun-
ties, published by the antiquary Daniel Lysons (1762-1834) and his brother Samuel
(bap. 1763, d. 1819). It covers the counties of Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Bucking-
hamshire, Cambridgeshire, Cheshire, Cornwall, Cumberland, Derbyshire, and Devon.”
• Available at: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/search/series/magna-britannia
2. The Environs of London - “A topographical account of parishes within 12 miles of
London, written by the antiquary Daniel Lysons (1762-1834). The publication was
dedicated to author and politician Horace Walpole.”
• Available at: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/search/series/london-environs
3. London, Past and Present: Its History, Associations, and Traditions - topographical
account of London by Henry Benjamin Wheatley (1891).
• Available through google books
4. A Survey of the Cities of London and Westminster, Borough of Southwark, and Parts
Adjacent ..., Being an Improvement of Mr. Stow’s, and Other Surveys, by Adding
Whatever Alterations Have Happened in the Said Cities, &c. to the Present Year -
topographical account of London by John Stow (1733).
• Available through google books.
5. Norfolk, Topographical History - “A topographical history of the county of Norfolk by
historian and Church of England clergyman Francis Blomefield (1705-52).”
• Available at: http://www.british-history.ac.uk/search/series/topographical-hist-
norfolk
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B.1.3 Random Sample of Estate Acts of Parliament
Title, archives reference number, year passed (session of parliament)
1660
1. An Act for restoring of the Marquess of Hertford to the Dukedom of Somerset,
HL/PO/PB/1/1660/12C2n24, 1660 (1)
2. An Act for enabling of John Newton the Younger and William Oakely to make Sale of
Lands for Payment of Debts and raising Portions,
HL/PO/PB/1/1660/12C2n68, 1660 (1)
3. An Act enabling George Faunt of Foston, in the County of Leicester, Esquire, to sell
and convey Part of his Lands for Payment of several Debts and Legacies charged upon
his Estate by Sir William Faunt, Knight, deceased, and for the raising of Portion for
his younger Children, and making his wife a Jointure,
HL/PO/PB/1/1660/12C2n69, 1660 (1)
1661
4. An Act for confirming a Sale made by Sir Thomas Prestwich and others, of the Manor
of Holm, and certain Lands in the Parish of Manchester in the County of Lancaster,
unto Sir Edward Mosley, Baronet,
HL/PO/PB/1/1661/13C2n23, 1661 (2)
5. An Act for the reviving a Settlement of certain Lands on John Orlibeare for Life,
the Remainder to the Sons of the said John successively and the Heirs Males of their
Bodies, &c.,
HL/PO/PB/1/1661/13C2n27, 1661 (2)
1662
6. An Act to enable the Bishop of London to lease out the Tenements, new built upon
the Scite of his Palace in London,
HL/PO/PB/1/1662/14C2n40, 1662 (2)
7. An Act to enable Rowland Okeover Esquire, to sell certain Lands in the County of
Derby,
HL/PO/PB/1/1662/14C2n67, 1662 (2)
1663
8. An Act to enable Sir John Packington and his Trustees, to sell or otherwise dispose
of certain Lands, for the Payment of his Debts, and raising Portions for his younger
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Children,
HL/PO/PB/1/1663/15C2n32, 1663 (3)
1665
9. An Act for settling the Estate of Sir Robert Carr, Baronet,
HL/PO/PB/1/1664/16&17C2n20, 1665 (4)
1667
10. An Act to enable a Sale of Lands for Payment of the Debts of Henry Kendall Esquire,
HL/PO/PB/1/1666/18&19C2n29, 1667 (7)
11. An Act for settling an Estate in Trust for the Benefit of Mrs. Elizabeth Pride and her
Children,
HL/PO/PB/1/1666/18&19C2n25, 1667 (7)
12. An Act for Sale of a Messuage in Chiswicke, for Payment of the Debts of Edward
Russell Esquire,
HL/PO/PB/1/1666/18&19C2n22, 1667 (7)
13. An Act to enlarge the Time given by a former Act, for Redemption of Mortgages made
by the Earl of Cleaveland,
HL/PO/PB/1/1666/18&19C2n6, 1667 (7)
1668
14. An Act for enabling of Sir William Juxon Knight and Baronet, Executor of the last
Will and Testament of William Juxon, late Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, to recover
Part of his Estate,
HL/PO/PB/1/1667/20C2n15, 1668 (8)
15. An Act for Confirmation of the Settlement of Sir Kingsmyll Lucy Baronet, in the said
Act mentioned, and for transferring over some other Part of the real Estate of Sir
Richard Lucy Knight and Baronet deceased, from Francis Lucy Esquire,
HL/PO/PB/1/1667/20C2n12, 1668 (8)
1670
16. An Act to enable Francis Courtney Esquire, to join with Sir William Courtney his
Father, in a Conveyance for settling their Estate,
HL/PO/PB/1/1670/22&23C2n16, 1670 (10)
17. An Act to enable Elizabeth, Mary and Letitia Hammond, to sell certain Lands in the
Bill mentioned,
HL/PO/PB/1/1670/22&23C2n21, 1670 (10)
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18. An Act for confirming Purchasers Estates, and for settling the Differences between the
Lady Elizabeth Lee and the Daughters and Coheirs of the late Earl of Downe,
HL/PO/PB/1/1670/22C2n18, 1670 (10)
1677
19. An Act to enable Sir Edward Hungerford Knight of the Bath, to make Leases for Years
of Hungerford House in the Strand, in the Parish of Saint Martins in the Fields in the
County of Middlesex, and of certain Houses and Tenements thereunto adjoining,
HL/PO/PB/1/1677/29C2n16, 1670 (16)
20. An Act to enable Herbert Awbrey and his Trustees to sell Lands for Payment of his
Debts,
HL/PO/PB/1/1677/29C2n18, 1670 (16)
1678
21. An Act to make good a Mortgage made by John Forth, deceased, to Thomas Cooke
and Nicholas Carey, and for making Provision for Henry Forth Son of the said John
Forth,
HL/PO/PB/1/1678/30C2n18, 1678 (17)
1685
22. An Act for rebuilding the Earl of Powis’s House in Lincoln’s Inn Fields lately demol-
ished by Fire,
HL/PO/PB/1/1685/1J2n22, 1685 (23)
1689
23. An Act to make good a Recovery suffered by the Earl of Peterborough and Lord
Mordant,
HL/PO/PB/1/1688/1W&Ms1n37, 1689 (24)
24. An Act for the better assuring the Manor of Silton, and demising other Lands and
Tenements in Silton in the County of Salop, unto Joseph Soley Gent. and his Heirs,
HL/PO/PB/1/1688/1W&Ms1n35, 1689 (24)
1690
25. An Act to enable Sir Edwin Sadler to sell Lands for Payment of Debts,
HL/PO/PB/1/1689/2W&Mn27, 1690 (25)
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26. An Act to enable Philip Hildeyard Esquire, to sell Lands in Surrey, and to settle Lands
in Lincolnshire in lieu thereof,
HL/PO/PB/1/1690/2&3W&Mn29, 1690 (27)
27. An Act to give Catherine Lady Cornbury certain Powers to act as if she were of full
Age,
HL/PO/PB/1/1690/2&3W&Mn15, 1690 (27)
28. An Act to enable Elizabeth Montague Widow, to let Leases for Years of Houses and
Ground in Stepney, in the County of Middlesex,
HL/PO/PB/1/1690/2&3W&Mn9, 1690 (27)
1692
29. An Act to vest the Estate late of Henry Drax Esquire, deceased, in Thomas Shatterden
Gentleman, and to enable the said Thomas Shatterden and others, to whom the said
Estate is devised, to make a Jointure,
HL/PO/PB/1/1691/3&4W&Mn43, 1692 (28)
30. An Act for enabling Sir Dudley Cullum Baronet, to raise Monies to pay his Brothers
and Sisters Portions,
HL/PO/PB/1/1691/3&4W&Mn23 1692 (28)
31. An Act to vest certain Messuages, Lands and Tenements, in Thorp Langton, and
elsewhere, in the County of Leicester, in Trustees, to be sold for Payment of the Debts
of Richard Roberts Esquire, and for raising Portions for his Daughters,
HL/PO/PB/1/1691/3W&Mn13, 1692 (28)
32. An Act for the vesting several Manors, Lands and Rents in the Counties of Lincoln,
Berks and Devon, in Trustees, to be sold for the buying other Manors and Lands to
be settled for the same, or the like Uses, as those to be sold are now settled,
HL/PO/PB/1/1691/3&4W&Mn16, 1692 (28)
33. An Act to vest certain Lands of William Molyneux Gentleman, in Trustees, for raising
the Sum of 2,000l. for paying the Portions to his younger Brothers and Sisters, pursuant
to a Decree in the Court of Chancery,
HL/PO/PB/1/1691/3&4W&Mn26, 1692 (28)
1693
34. An Act for exchanging of several small Parcels of Land in the Parish and Manor of
Fulham, belonging to the Bishoprick of London, and Part of the Bishoprick of London,
for other Lands of the like Value, to Charles Earl of Monmouth, and his Heirs,
HL/PO/PB/1/1692/4&5W&Mn38, 1693 (29)
1694
35. An Act to enable Sir Charles Barrington Baronet, to settle a Jointure on Dame Bridget
his Wife, and to make Provision for their younger Children,
HL/PO/PB/1/1694/5&6W&Mn18, 1694 (30)
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36. An Act to enable Thomas Earl of Thanet, and the Honourable Sackville Tufton his
Brother, to make a Lease for sixty Years of Thanet House in the Parish of St. Botolph,
Aldersgate, to commence after the Remainder of the Term of one and thirty Years now
in being, &c.
HL/PO/PB/1/1694/5&6W&Mn19, 1694 (30)
1695
37. An Act for confirming two Indentures tripartite, the one of Lease, the other of Release,
made between the Right Honourable Thomas Earl of Thanet Island of the first Part,
the Honorable Sackville Tufton Esquire, of the second Part, the Honourable William
Cheyne Esquire, and Sir Charles Tufton Knight, of the third Part, and the Estates
thereby settled,
HL/PO/PB/1/1694/6&7W&Mn22, 1695 (31)
1696
38. An Act for making good the last Will of Sir William Barkham Baronet, deceased, and
vesting of Lands in Trustees, to be sold for Payment of his Debts, and making Provision
for his Children,
HL/PO/PB/1/1695/7&8W3n59, 1696 (32)
39. An Act for vesting several Messuages and Lands belonging to Samuel Powel Esquire,
in Trustees, for Payment of his Debts,
HL/PO/PB/1/1695/7&8W3n10, 1696 (32)
40. An Act to enable John Fownes Esquire, to sell certain Lands in the County of Devon,
which were settled on his Marriage, and to settle other Lands of an equal Value to the
same Uses, HL/PO/PB/1/1695/7&8W3n24,
1696 (32)
41. An Act for vesting the Manor of Madely, in the County of Salop, in Trustees, for certain
Purposes therein mentioned,
HL/PO/PB/1/1695/7&8W3n8, 1696 (32)
42. An Act to enable Trustees to sell Part of the Manor of Barkhamstead, and pay off the
Incumbrances charged on the same, and to lay out the Overplus in an Estate to be
settled as the said Manor is now vested,
HL/PO/PB/1/1695/7&8W3n20, 1696 (32)
43. An Act to enable Trustees to sell a Messuage, Garden and Out House, in Lincoln’s Inn
Fields, late Sir Robert Sawyer’s Knight, deceased, and for purchasing other Lands and
Tenements to be settled to the same Uses,
HL/PO/PB/1/1695/7&8W3n54, 1696 (32)
44. An Act to enable Sir Thomas Pope Blount Baronet, to make a Settlement upon the
Marriage of his eldest Son, HL/PO/PB/1/1695/7&8W3n7,
1696 (32)
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45. An Act to enable Trustees to raise Money for the making a wet Dock, and improving the
Estate of the Marquess and Marchioness of Tavistock, at Rotherhithe, in the County
of Surrey,
HL/PO/PB/1/1695/7&8W3n51, 1696 (32)
1697
46. An Act to enable Nicholas Goodwin the Elder, and Nicholas Goodwin the Younger,
to sell the Manor of Winslow in the County of Bucke, and with the Monies arising
thereby, and other Monies to be advanced by the said Nicholas Goodwin the Elder, to
purchase Lands of a greater yearly Value, to be settled to the same Uses as the said
Manor is now settled,
HL/PO/PB/1/1696/8&9W3n25, 1697 (33)
47. An Act for settling the Estate of Mary Savile an Infant, upon her Marriage,
HL/PO/PB/1/1696/8&9W3n22
48. An Act to supply a Defect in an Act for enabling Oliver Neve Esquire, to sell two
Houses in London, and for settling Lands in the County of Norfolk, of greater Value,
to the same Uses,
HL/PO/PB/1/1696/8&9W3n42, 1697 (33)
49. An Act for vesting certain Messuages, Lands and Tenements, late of Charles Milson
deceased, in Trustees, to sell for Payment of Debts and Legacies, and lay out the
Surplus Money in a Purchase of Lands for the Use of Edward Milson and his Heirs,
according to the Will of the said Charles Milson,
HL/PO/PB/1/1696/8&9W3n24, 1697 (33)
1698
50. An Act for vesting in Trustees, to be sold, certain Lands of George Hewit Esquire,
lying in the County of Middlesex, settled upon his Marriage, and with Money arising
thereby, for purchasing other Lands in Leicestershire, where his Estate and Seat lies,
to be settled to the same Uses,
HL/PO/PB/1/1697/9&10W3n34, 1698 (34)
51. An Act for the better enabling Sir Ralph Hare Baronet, to make a Jointure, and settle
his Estate, and raise Portions and Maintenances for his younger Children,
HL/PO/PB/1/1697/9&10W3n33, 1698 (34)
52. An Act for settling the Estate of John Hall, a Lunatick, subject to a Debt charged
thereon,
HL/PO/PB/1/1697/9&10W3n28, 1698 (34)
53. An Act for confirming and establishing the Administration of the Goods and Chattels
of Sir William Godolphin Knight, deceased,
HL/PO/PB/1/1697/9&10W3n31, 1698 (34)
54. An Act to enable certain Trustees therein named, to make, renew and fill up Leases of
the Estate of Sir Coppleston Warwick Bamfylde, during the Minority of the said Sir
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Coppleston Warwick Bamfylde, and John Bamfylde his Brother,
HL/PO/PB/1/1697/9&10W3n27, 1698 (34)
55. An Act for securing the Portions intended by Sir William Walter Baronet, deceased, for
his Children by the Lady Mary Walter, his second Wife, and for preventing all Doubts
which might arise upon the Construction of the Articles and Will therein mentioned,
HL/PO/PB/1/1697/9&10W3n87, 1698 (34)
1699
56. An Act for the enabling Cyriat Weslyd Esquire, to sell some Part of his Estate, which
by Articles upon his Marriage was agreed to be settled upon his Wife and Children,
and for settling of other Part of his Estate, of better Value, to the same Uses,
HL/PO/PB/1/1698/10&11W3n70, 1699 (35)
57. An Act for the sale of the Manor of Lordington alias Lurtington and Whitwey, and
divers Lands in the County of Sussex, and for laying out 5,000l. in purchasing other
Lands to be settled in lieu thereof,
HL/PO/PB/1/1698/10&11W3n63, 1699 (35)
58. An Act for Sale of the Estate of Zenebia Hough, for the Payment of the Debts of the
Husband, and other Uses,
HL/PO/PB/1/1698/10&11W3n77, 1699 (35)
1700
59. An Act for rectifying a Mistake in the Marriage Settlement of Thomas Hopwood Gen-
tleman, on Elizabeth his Wife in order to raise Portions for younger Children, and to
pay Debts,
HL/PO/PB/1/1700/13W3n18, 1700 (36)
1701
60. An Act for the vesting and settling certain Manors and Lands in south Pickenham,
and other Places in the County of Norfolk, in Trustees, to be sold, and for laying out
the Monies arising by Sale thereof, in the Purchase of other Lands to be settled to
such and the same Uses as the said Manors and Lands, so to be vested, are and stand
settled,
HL/PO/PB/1/1700/13W3n18, 1701 (38)
61. An Act for vesting a Messuage and Lands in Stevenage, in the County of Hertford, the
Estate of Richard Nodes, in Trustees, to be sold for making a Provision for his Wife
and Children, equal to the Provision secured to them out of the said Estate,
HL/PO/PB/1/1700/13W3n23, 1701 (38)
1702 - began under William III, ended under Anne
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62. An Act to enable Trustees to sell certain Lands, Tithes and Tenements, for the Payment
of the Debts of Francis Purefoy Esquire, deceased,
HL/PO/PB/1/1702/13&14W3&1As1n17, 1702 (38)
63. An Act for the settling and vesting divers Manors and Lands of Francis Wightwicke,
an Infant, lying in the County of Stafford, in Trustees, to enable them to settle and
convey the same, upon the Marriage of the said Francis Wightwicke,
HL/PO/PB/1/1702/13&14W3&1As1n20, 1702 (38)
64. An Act for vesting certain Messuages and Tenements in the County of Bedford and
Middlesex, in Trustees, to be sold, and for purchasing Lands or Rents, to be settled to
the same Uses,
HL/PO/PB/1/1702/13&14W3&1As1n51, 1702 (38)
65. An Act for vesting several Messuages, Lands and Tenements in the Parish of Whitchurch,
in the County of Chester, in Trustees, to be sold for paying off the Incumbrances
charged thereon, and for other Uses therein mentioned,
HL/PO/PB/1/1702/13&14W3&1As1n18, 1702 (38)
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B.2 Appendix Figures & Tables
Table B.1: Preamble Clauses: Examples of Conveyances and Appeals
n share of acts coding or example
1. Primary Conveyance
life estate-entail settlement 38 0.58 settle land with entail, remainders,
or trust for charges
strict settlement 13 0.2 trust to preserve contingent remainders
other conveyance 11 0.17 wills, previous acts of parliament,
decrees in chancery
religious corporation 2 0.03 Church of England (Bishop of London)
2. Appeal: Economic event or condition
incomplete transaction 33 0.51 have sithence sould the said lands [...]
soe the Purchaser received
the profitts of the said Lands
and the purchase money not paid now
costs
debts or family charges 20 0.31 [rents] not being sufficient to discharge
and pay the interest and Burthens
management 8 0.12 [lands] lye at a great distance from the dwelling house [...]
and cannot be soe conveniently managed by him [...]
and will cost a great Summe of Money
to put the same into repair
accident, mistake 14 0.21 the said John Pozy absconding
himselfe and being run away into parts beyond the seas
is credibly reported and decaying in his or his Agents hands
opportunity for sale, investment 13 0.2 conceiveing that he may make to himselfe
and his family a great advantage
marriage 7 0.11 A marriage is intended to be had
none stated 2 0.03
3. Appeal: Legal constraint
life tenant barred 30 0.46 by reason of the aforesaid Settlement
minority 26 0.4 which cannot be done by your said subjects
they beinge [...] under the age of one and twenty yeares
breach of trust 4 0.06 But for asmuch as the said [trustees] cannot sell
[...] without being guilty of a breach of the trust
general law 4 0.06 according to the Lawes of this realm no man can give power
pretense or claims can be made 8 0.12 some pretence of clayme may be made by the daughters
none stated 2 0.03
4. Proposed reorganization
*pay debts 26 0.40 to sell some part thereof to raise moneyes
whereby to discharge the debts
*pay family charges 15 0.23 and is disabled to provide for them [children]
e.g. for children (portions), widows (jointures) without the sale of some part of his lands
*purchase land or replace 11 0.17 being willing imediately upon sale thereof to purchase
and settle some other estate of an equall value
none stated 26 0.40
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: Classification of clauses in estate acts of parliament. Coded as an indicator if clause falls into certain category, i.e. act contains specific
clause or not. 1. Land conveyances - mutually exclusive. 2. Appeal: economic - not mutually exclusive. 3. Appeal: legal constraint - not
mutually exclusive. * - type usually corresponds to title of act. See Appendix Section B.1 for details on coding.
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Figure B.1: Example of Preamble Section
Notes: Forth Estate Act, 30 CII, c. 18. Figure shows the beginning of a preamble section of
estate act.
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Figure B.2: Example of Enactment Section
Notes: Hough Estate Act, 10&11 WIII, c. 77. Figure shows the beginning of an enactment
section of estate act.
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Table B.2: Enactment Clauses: Examples of Economic, Legal, and Amendment Clauses
n share of acts coding or example
1. Economic transactions
*sale 34 0.52 shall and may as speedilie and as soone as may be
sell the reversion of the said Manor
*lease 13 0.2 from time to time to demise or lease the [...]
Tenements shopps grounds and yards warehouses edifices
*mortgage 8 0.12 to make any Lease or Leases mortgage or mortgages
of all or any part or parts of the messuages
loan 9 0.14 shall and may lend out the said one thousand pounds
and every part thereof upon the best securities and at the best
rate of interest that they by reasonable endeavour can obtaine
*settlement 8 0.12 are hereby adjudged and Enacted subject
to the Provision herein after mentioned to [...]
heire apparent of the said Sir Robert Carr the Elder for and
during the Terme of his naturall Life
without impeachment of or for any mannor of wast
and after the Determination of the Estate
in the Actuall possession and Seisin [upon trust]
for supporting contingent remainders
other 4 0.06 restore to estates (1), exchange lands (1),
power to discharge bonds, obligations (1), enclose and drain land (1)
none stated 10 0.15
2. Legal clauses
good at law 25 0.38 every such surrender and surrendered and the use and uses
therein [] shall be good and effectuall in the law
protect transaction 19 0.29 shall and may peaceably and quietly have hold
and enjoy the said premisses [...] as he or they shall so purchase
for such estate or estates [...] against the said John Fownes [...]
and all other person and persons whatsoever claiming
or to claime by from or under him the foresaid deed of settlement
*confirm 17 0.26 all and every the grants [...] and agreements therein conteyend
doe stand and bee ratified and confirmed
amend title or rights 7 0.11 bonds and obligations are hereby transferred unto and vested
trust 10 0.15 That each of the said Trustees shall be only answerable
for his own respective Act and Acts and
not for the act or acts of the other of them
limits to act 7 0.11 that this Act nor any clause or sentence
herein contained shall extend or bee construed
none stated 19 0.30
3. Amend settlement
discharge 16 0.24 the severall termes of five hundred yeares [...] for raysing portions
for the said Daughters shall be and are hereby
utterly extinguished and made voyd and that no further
or other portions shall or may be charged or chargeable
amend family charges 11 0.17 that it shall and may be lawfull to [...]
by and writeing under his hand [...] to limitt and appoint
any part of the said mannors [...]
not exceeding one thousand pounds per anno to any wife or wives
protect family charges 10 0.15 that nothing in this Act contained
shall extend or be construed to extend in an wise
to lessen or diminish any estate or security
[] hath on the premisses
none stated 36 0.55
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702. All acts have either an economic or a legal clause.
Notes: Classification of clauses in estate acts of parliament. Coded as an indicator if clause falls into certain category, i.e.
act contains specific clause or not. 1. Enactment: economic - not mutually exclusive. 2. Enactment: legal - not mutually
exclusive. 3. Enactment: amend settlement - not mutually exclusive. * - type usually corresponds to title of act. See
Appendix Section B.1 for details on coding.
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Figure B.3: Annual Rental Income Recorded in Acts
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: 48 acts record an annual rental income of a property. Histogram is binned at 50
income intervals.
Figure B.4: Acreage Recorded in Acts
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: 18 acts record acreage of their property. Histogram is binned at 10 acre intervals.
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Table B.3: Types of Petitioners and Trustees in Estate Acts, 1660-1702
n share of acts st. dev. min max
Panel A: Petitioners
nobility 13 0.20 0.40 0 1
titled gentry 20 0.31 0.47 0 1
esquires or gentlemen 39 0.60 0.49 0 1
clergy 3 0.05 0.21 0 1
professional 5 0.08 0.29 0 1
mp or related 31 0.48 0.50 0 1
couple 27 0.42 0.50 0 1
female 8 0.12 0.33 0 1
Panel B: Trustees
nobility 7 0.11 0.31 0 1
titled gentry 14 0.22 0.41 0 1
esquires or gentlemen 32 0.49 0.50 0 1
professional 10 0.15 0.36 0 1
of an inn (lawyer) 6 0.09 0.29 0 1
of London 12 0.18 0.39 0 1
female 5 0.08 0.27 0 1
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: No classification is mutually exclusive. Acts are coded as having
a type of petitioner or trustee or not. See Appendix Section B.1 for
details.
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Figure B.5: Evolution in Types of Conveyances addressed by Estate Acts, 1660-1702
Source: random sample of 65 estate acts, 1660-1702.
Notes: Number of acts naming primary type of conveyance binned at five year intervals. See
appendix for coding. Settlements: life estate-entail settlements. Strict settlement: settle-
ment with clause “trust to preserve contingent remainders.” Other conveyances: other types
of conveyances (e.g. bargain and sale, Act of Parliament, common recovery). Parliament
did not meet 1668, 1671-72, 1676, 1680, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
171
Appendix C
Appendix: Chapter 3
C.1 Data Appendix
C.1.1 Coding and Description of Main Variables
This appendix provides a list, brief background, and references for MP characteristics.
Political parties
• 1660-1689: Court and Opposition from division lists. See list below.
• 1690-1702: Whig and Tory from Bogart (2016).
Occupations
• lawyer: indicator if an MP had been called to the bench (qualified as a barrister)
or an ancient at an inn of court before or during a given year. See Inner Temple
Archives on the legal profession and glossary (http://www.innertemplearchives.org.uk/
legal profession.html).
• local government - positions regulated by a town or borough’ charter; see Encyclopaedia
Britannica (1911) for brief background on the positions.
– Recorder: indicator if an MP was a town recorder during a given year. Judicial
officer who recorded local court proceedings.
– Custos rotulorum: indicator if an MP was a custos rotulorum during a given year.
an important county official who kept a county’s records.
– Mayor and alderman - indicator if an MP held position during a given year. Both
held prerogatives in towns and governments.
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– Common councilman - indicator if an MP served on a town’s common council in
a given year. Represented the voice of the commonality in local governments.
• commercial and trading interests - MPs who held a position in a trading or merchant
company, association, or society before or while they were elected to parliament.
– I code any MP who held a position in a “company”, “merchant”, “adventurers”,
“mineral society” or “bank.”
– overseas trading companies - East India Company; Royal African Company; Hud-
son Bay Company; Levant Company; Muscovy Company; Virginia Company;
New England Company; N.W. America Trading Company; Eastland Company of
Newcastle.
– domestic corporations - Goldsmith’s Company; Haberdashers’ Company; Scriven-
ers’ Company; Royal Fishery Company; Drapers’ Company; Grocers’ Company;
Clothworkers’ Company; Cutlers’ Company; Saltmakers’ Company; Shipwrights’
Company; Skinners’ Company; Fishmongers’ Company; Mercers’ Company; Brew-
ers’ Company.
– merchant - Merchant Adventurers of Newcastle or Bristol; Merchant Taylors’
Company.
– mines and minerals - Society for Mineral and Battery Works; Royal Mines Com-
pany; Mines Company; Hostmens’ Company; Saltpetre Company
– included in all companies: Bank of Scotland, Bank of England; Company of
Scotland; Honorable Artillery Company.
• state offices - see list in Henning (1983): Surveys: Appendix V: Officers of State.
• royal household - selected positions from ‘Introduction: Administrative structure and
work’, in Office-Holders in Modern Britain: Volume 11 (Revised); Court Officers,
1660-1837, ed. R O Bucholz (London, 2006), pp. xx-xxxvii. British History Online
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/office-holders/vol11/xx-xxxvii.
– Gentlemen or groom of the bedchamber - “One gentleman of the Bedchamber
provided close attendance on the Sovereign per week. His duties included assisting
the King at his dressing, waiting on him when he ate in private, guarding access to
him in his bedchamber and closet and providing noble companionship, generally.
The offices of gentleman of the bedchamber were in the gift of the Crown.”
– Groom of the privy chamber - responsible for manning the doors into the privy
chamber.
– secretary or treasurer to a member of the royal family
– cofferer of the household -“ was the principal accounting officer of the Household
Below Stairs and paid the wages and board wages of all servants below stairs
and in the stables, and many in the chamber as well. He was appointed by royal
warrant. The remuneration amounted to £500 consisting of wages of £100 and
board wages of £400. This officer was also allowed lodgings and the right to take
poundage of 6d. in the pound on the bills and salaries which passed through his
office. Early in the eighteenth century this came to over £2,000 per annum.”
Other characteristics: education and birth order
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• Cambridge: indicator if MP attended Cambridge before or during a given year.
• Oxford: indicator if MP attended Oxford before or during a given year.
• first son: indicator if MP was the first or only son.
Electoral variables
• before 1660 - indicator if MP was elected to parliament anytime before 1660.
• borough - indicator if MP represented a borough.
• contest - indicator if MP was elected in a contest. Collected from B.D. Henning (1983):
Appendix IX: Franchises and Contested Elections and Hayton et al. (2002): Appendix
XXII: Contested elections.
• constituency in Middlesex: indicator if MP represented London, Westminster, or Mid-
dlesex.
C.1.2 Political Party from 1660 to 1689: Division Lists
Format
• year; title; source
Court
1. 1661; list, by Wharton, of ’Moderate men’; Jones, GF Trevallyn. 1964. “Composition
and Leadership of the Presbyterian Party in the Convention.” The English Historical
Review 79: 332-54.
2. 1664; Court Dependants; Jones, JR. 1961. “Court Dependants in 1664.” Bulletin of
Institute for Historical Research 34: 84-91.
3. Sept.-Nov. 1669; Court Supporters; Browning, A. Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby
and Duke of Leeds, 1632-1712 Vol. III: 34-44.
4. c. May 1671; list of Court supporters with satirical notices; Browning, A. Thomas
Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds, 1632-1712 Vol. III: 33.
5. c. 1673; list of the Court party with satirical notices; de Beer, ES. 1933-34. “Members
of the Court Party in the House of Commons, 1670-1678.” Bulletin of Institute for
Historical Research 11: 1-2.
6. Apr. 1675-Feb. 1676; King’s Servants and dependants’; Browning, A. Thomas Os-
borne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds, 1632-1712 Vol. III: 62-5.
7. 1677. list of Court supporters with satirical comments; de Beer, ES. 1933-34. “Mem-
bers of the Court Party in the House of Commons, 1670-1678.” Bulletin of Institute
for Historical Research 11: 1-2.
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Opposition
8. (not used in analysis) 1660; Names of the members of the Commons howse, 1660;
Jones, GF Trevallyn. 1964. “Composition and Leadership of the Presbyterian Party
in the Convention.” The English Historical Review 79: 307-30.
9. (not used in analysis) 6 Nov. 1660; List of persons to whom papers are delivered in
and to be delivered; The English Historical Review 79: 348-49.
10. 1661; “Wharton’s friends”; Jones, GF Trevallyn. 1964. “Composition and Leadership
of the Presbyterian Party in the Convention.” The English Historical Review 79: 332-
54.
11. 1677-8; the Earl of Shaftesbury’s list of supporters and opponents of the Court; Haley,
KHD. “Shaftesbury’s Lists of the Lay Peers and Members of the House of Commons,
1677-8.” Bulletin of Institute for Historical Research 42: 95-105.
12. 1679; Shaftesbury’s ‘Worthy Men’, those likely to support the Exclusion Bill; Jones,
JR. 1957. “Shaftesbury’s Worthy Men: A Whig View of the Parliament of 1679”
Bulletin of Institute for Historical Research 30: 236-41.
13. 1686-7. Danby’s list of the opposition to James II in Parliament; Browning, A. Thomas
Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds, 1632-1712 Vol. III: 155-7.
Exclusion (for, against, absent)
14. 21 May 1679; An Exclusion Bill Division List; Browning, A and DJ Milne. 1950. “An
Exclusion Bill Division List” Bulletin of Institute for Historical Research 23: 207-25.
C.2 Appendix Figures and Tables
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Figure C.1: Contested Elections
Source: Author’s calculations from MP dataset.
Notes: Figure shows share of elections that were contested (more than one candidate ran for the seat).
Vertical lines mark general elections and new parliaments. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-
1684, 1686-1688.
Table C.1: Royal Patronage
1661-1685 1689-1702
(1) (2) (3) (4)
court opposition tory whig
royal household 0.88*** -0.20 0.37** -0.02
(0.07) (0.15) (0.16) (0.22)
local government 0.00 -0.00 0.33*** -0.32***
(0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
Observations 11,056 11,056 8,044 8,044
occupation yes yes yes yes
other characteristics yes yes yes yes
electoral yes yes yes yes
parliament FE yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. All
specifications report multinomial estimates relative to baseline of no party affil-
iation. Parliament did not meet in 1672, 1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688.
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Figure C.2: Members with Commercial and Trading Interests
Source: Author’s calculations from MP dataset.
Notes: Figure shows share of MPs that held a position in a company before or while they were elected to
parliament. Vertical lines mark general elections and new parliaments. Parliament did not meet in 1672,
1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688. Commercial or trading interests is defined as an MP who held or was currently
holding a position in a trading or merchant company (e.g. East India Company, Scriveners’ Company, Royal
African Company), a merchant association (e.g. Merchant Adventurers), mining society (e.g. Society of
Mineral and Battery Works), and the Bank of England.
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Figure C.3: Local and State Officials
Source: Author’s calculations from MP dataset.
Notes: Figure shows share of MPs who held a position in local or state government while also elected to
parliament. Vertical lines mark general elections and new parliaments. Parliament did not meet in 1672,
1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688. Local officials - MP was also mayors, alderman, common councilmen, sheriffs
during the session; State - MP also held an office of the state.
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Table C.2: Monarch and Local Governments
1679-1681 1685
(1) (2) (3) (4)
court opposition court opposition
local government 0.07*** 0.01 0.06* -0.05*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 2,016 2,016 509 509
R-squared 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07
occupation yes yes yes yes
other characteristics yes yes yes yes
electoral yes yes yes yes
parliament FE yes
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. All
specifications report OLS estimates. Outcomes are indicators if MP is affiliated
with the Court (column 1) or Opposition (column 2) during the Exclusion Parlia-
ments; affiliated with the Court (column 3) or the Opposition (column 4) under
James II.
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Figure C.4: Connections to the Monarch: Royal Household
Source: Author’s calculations from MP dataset.
Notes: Figure shows share of MPs with who held a position in the royal household during a session of
parliament. Vertical lines mark general elections and new parliaments. Parliament did not meet in 1672,
1676, 1682-1684, 1686-1688. Position in royal household include those who were grooms of the bedchamber,
privy chamber, secretary to a member of the royal family or the household, or cofferer of the household.
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